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A b s tra c t
This thesis explores and defends the idea that empty space is both visible and tangible 
-  we see and feel it. In particular, it is argued that empty space looks ‘clear’ and ‘see- 
through’. Naturally, this requires a defense of the claim that empty space is 
something, not nothing, and this is the first task the thesis takes up. Chapter One 
motivates metaphysical Absolutism as an assumption, while Chapter Two defends the 
thought that empty space, understood absolutely, is not inefficacious -  it has a kind of 
structural ‘b iff  that arises from its shape and which affects light and material located 
in and moving through it. This, it is argued, has consequences for perception, and 
these are worked out in Chapters Three and Six. Drawing on the work of Graham 
Nerlich, it is argued that empty space has a Took’ and a ‘feel’. Unlike Nerlich, 
however, it is insisted that Euclidean space is visible and tangible. Chapter Four asks 
in what sense the perception of a given empty region depends on that region - since 
empty space has a kind of biff, it is not negatively efficacious - while Chapter Five 
develops this theme in arguing against treating the perception of empty space as a 
species of absence perception. In this chapter, an alternative treatment of the 
perception of empty space is considered - the Structural View defended by 
Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (2011). This view emphasizes, not the structure of 
space, but the structure of experience. It is shown in what sense the ‘direct’ account 
so far defended is compatible with the structuralist position, where this is read 
descriptively, not transcendentally. Chapter Seven traces a speculative line of 
argument by considering the seeing of space in mirrors and figurative paintings, while 
Chapter Eight explains where the structuralist and direct views diverge. It is argued, 
after Husserl (1907), that empty space and objects are co-seen, but that this is so in 
two distinct respects. Seeing empty space as space that objects could take up involves 
seeing objects as space-takers. But there could well be perceivers who see the Took’ 
of empty space without yet seeing empty space as space that could be filled.
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Preamble
Empty space is puzzling. Is it something or nothing? Does it do anything? Can we 
perceive it? Historically, many philosophers have treated these questions as 
interwoven, their conclusions varying in accordance with which question is answered 
first.
For Bishop Berkeley, for example, esse est percipi, and since we don’t perceive 
empty space (evidently, he supposed), it is nothing it all. It is no thing.'
Not dissimilarly, Hume supposed empty space a potential embarrassment, at least for 
the empiricist. We have a conception of void or vacuum, but from whence does such 
an idea come? Ideas are distilled from sensory impressions, but empty space is 
entirely /'«sensible. So how, then, can we think of it?2
Perhaps surprisingly, even Newton agreed; empty space is imperceptible.3 Still, he 
insisted, it has effects - it does something. Consider a bucket of water suspended by a 
rope. When the bucket spins, the water tends to cleave to its sides, a hollow forming 
in the centre of the water as it swirls (just as it does when wine is whirled in a glass). 
It seems that the water is moving, but, argued Newton, it can’t be moving relative to 
the bucket -  after all, it is moving because the bucket is. Rather its movement is 
relative to absolute space, space that exists entirely independently of objects and that 
is itself motionless. Not all, however, were convinced. Among the more famous 
dissenters was Ernst Mach. Why appeal to empty space, he complained. If the same 
effects can be explained by considering only objects and their spatial relations, even
In the Principles o f  Human Knowledge, he writes: “ W hen I excite a motion in som e part o f  my body, 
if  it be free or  w ithout  resistance, I say there is Space; but if  I find a resistance, then I say there is Body, 
and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is m ore  or  less pure. 
So that when I speak o f  pure or em pty  space, it is not to be supposed that the word “ space“ stands for 
an idea distinct from or conceivable  w ithout body and m o tio n“ (paragraph 116. 1910, p . 124). T hanks  to 
Alasdair  R ichm ond for this reference.
2 Still, he insisted, we need never be “ em barrass ’d”  so long as we confine our  speculations to the 
appearances  o f  objects to our  senses (see footnote from the A ppend ix  to Book III o f  the Treatise, 
inserted in 1969, p. 112). H u m e’s solution to this puzzle  is to argue that space is a m anner o f  
appearance. For an excellen t critical account o f  H u m e ’s trea tm ent o f  space see Frasca-Sp ada  (1998, pp. 
56-82).
3 See Earm an 1970, p. 288.
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those as big as planets and stars, why suppose that empty space exists at all? If it has 
no explanatory function, why posit it? Where Berkeley argued from a failure to 
perceive, Mach argued from a failure to explain.4
So here, then, we can sort amongst two distinct threads of thought concerning the 
perception of empty space, or rather failure to perceive it, entangled in the history of 
ideas:
On the Berkeleyean/Machian tack, since we don’t perceive space, or since it doesn’t 
explain anything, we shouldn’t posit its (idle) existence. For the Newtonian however, 
because empty space has explanatory consequences, it is something, even though it is 
imperceptible being insensible. For such an absolutist, the perceptual and sensible are 
identified.
Notice, then, that on both arguments it is just assumed that we don’t perceive empty 
space. A third strand, one that can be found in philosophical theories of perception, 
aims to explain why. Empty space is inefficacious, and because we explain perceptual 
episodes causally -  what is perceived is whatever causes itself to be perceived -  
empty space is not seen.5 Here, then, not one but two assumptions are in play. Empty 
space is something and it is inefficacious. Hence our failure to see it. We can catch a 
glimmer of this two-fold assumption in José Luis Bermudez’s discussion of holes:
“Holes are an intriguing case...There is an obvious sense in which 
holes cannot be perceived. If  as is overwhelmingly plausible, 
perception involves a causal relation between perceiver and the 
object(s) of perception, then holes cannot count as objects of 
perception for the simple reason that they have no causal powers”.
(2000, p. 367)
4 For a less abbreviated  description o f  this dispute see Dainton (2001 , pp. 151-180).
This strand might be considered Lockean. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Book II,
viii, sections 5-6, L ocke considers  the perception  o f  privations, conclud ing “ in truth it will be hard to
determ ine w hether  there be really ideas from a privative ca u se ’7 (1991 . p. 57). See also the discussion in 
Casati and Varzi (1994 , pp. 156-158).
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Notably, then, all three positions converge on the opinion that empty space6 is 
imperceptible, either because it is non-existent or, being something, because it is 
insensible or ineffiacious. But such agreement is hardly universal. For example, in a 
well-known passage, M. G. F. Martin introduces into the stock of examples idiomatic 
in philosophy, among them barns and tomatoes, the case o f the Polo mint:
“Consider the case of looking at a ring-shaped object, a Polo mint, 
for instance, head on. One is aware of the various white parts of the 
mint arranged in a circle, and aware of how they are related to each 
other. One is also aware of the hole in the middle of the mint, and 
that that hole is there in the middle. If one was not aware of the hole 
one would not see the mint to be a ring-shape rather than a circle”.
(1992, p. 199)7
Even so, though we may happily grant that we can see holes (or Polo mints), the 
suspicion that may have prompted Berkeley et al -  not that empty space is non­
existent but that it is imperceptible - is not so easy to dispel. For although the notion 
that we fail to perceive empty space is, in one sense, phenomenologically off-key, by 
the same token we are apt to deny that we see anything that doesn’t have any 
observable colour or shape. For what would we thereby see? Yet in this equivocation 
we are in good company. Even Edmund Elusserl wavered in coming to finally 
conceed that we do, after all, perceive what he called ‘between-ness’. In his 1907 
Lectures Thing and Space, he writes:
“The “between” as empty, though continuously fillable, space, as the 
mere possibility of real intermediaries characterised in a lawfully 
determinate way, is what we would thus have here, although we 
cannot say that empty space would be seen”. (§76, lines 24-27, 1997, 
p. 223)
Elowever, in an appendix to §76, written in 1909, he rejoins:
“Is not the respective relief in visual space... precisely a mere relief, 
a mere, incompletely closed surface, such that the “between” is not
6 Here, for expediency,  I treat holes and regions o f  em pty space interchangeably . Later  1 sort b e tw een  
empty particulars, such as holes, and empty space in general,  or, as I call it, m ass-quantified  em pty  
space.
7 It might be noted that Martin says only that w e  are aware o f  the hole. On a certain understand ing  o f  
‘aw areness’, then, this may not be incom patib le  with  Berm udez. See the discussion in C hapter  Seven 
o f  this thesis.
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perceived? Indeed, this is obviously incorrect”, (lines 8-12, ibid., p.
323)
And later:
“with a little honesty, which, to be sure, is not easy to come by, we 
cannot escape the thought that we see the “between” and the entirety 
of space”, (ibid., lines 22-24)
But if  Husserl was phenomenologically puzzled in the face of empty space, it is 
hardly surprising (and no indictment) that metaphysicans, in asserting its 
imperceptibility, have proved such bad phenomenologists, something that Ingvar 
Johansson wages (though granted of empiricists) in his Ontological Investigations.8 
What, though, of the philosopher of perception?
Mostly, philosophical arguments for the imperceptibility of empty space, that is, where 
it is not simply assumed that empty space is imperceptible, have spun from 
metaphysical premises. So take the argument gestured at above:
(i) Empty space is inefficacious
(ii) Perception is explained causally
(iii) Empty space is not seen
Elere a conclusion about perception -  one that has phenomenological import - is 
drawn from a metaphysical premise. Since, however, we might have reason to doubt 
the conclusion (as Elusserl appeared to in 1909), we have reason too to question the 
premises. Yet equally since it seems that we can merely doubt the conclusion -  as I 
said phenomenology itself is not entirely conclusive -  this gives additional reasons to 
revisit metaphysics, specifically, and perhaps perversely, as a way of trying to clarify 
phenomenology. This, then, is the strategy I adopt.
In this thesis, I take an argumentative path that flows from metaphysics, but which, as 
I see it, nonetheless honours phenomenology and, critically, the ambivalence that
8 He writes: “ Empiricists have always been bad phenom enolog ists .  Obviously ,  we do perceive spaces
between things as em pty, at least norm ally,  i.e. w hen  it is no t  misty. Empty space is in this sense ve ry  
much a perceivable  ca tegory” (2004, p. 153).
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introspective reflection on the phenomenology of perceiving empty space seems to 
spark. But this in turn allows me to say something about the nature of the causal 
dependency involved in perceiving empty space and, in particular, it allows me to 
establish whether granting that empty space is perceived must involve appeal to 
negative causation. The first part of the thesis then tracks the trefoilate set of 
questions sketched at the outset: those concerning the being of empty space -  is it 
something? -  its efficacy -  does it do anything? -  and its perception - can we perceive 
it? I return a positive answer to all three:
In the first chapter, ‘Unoccupied Places’, I ask whether empty space is something or, 
as the skeptic would have it, nothing. For the skeptic -  the traditional metaphysical 
relationist - what we call ‘empty space’ is just the possibility of objects taking up 
certain spatial relations. I give reasons against embracing this skeptical hypothesis and 
taking up instead the absolutist’s invitation to realism. If  empty space turns out to be 
inefficacious, its inefficacy is not, we might assume, the inefficacy of unicorns.
Of course, it makes no sense to ask if empty space is efficacious if empty space is 
non-existent. For certain theorists, though, efficacy is the mark of being. Such 
theorists subscribe to what Armstrong (1997, p. 41) calls, after the Eleatic Stranger in 
Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Principle.9 On such a principle, the only entities that exist 
(or belief in the existence of which is justified) are those that have causal powers. In 
Chapter Two, ‘Efficacious Emptiness’, I show that empty space can satisfy the 
stranger’s demands; an argument can be raised in favour of the efficacy of empty 
space, albeit one that trades on a somewhat expansive understanding o f causation.
Typically, efficacy has been tied to the kinds of properties, powers or agencies that 
Aristotle, in the Physics, modelled on the notion of the efficient cause, and what 
Falkenstein (1998) has elsewhere called the ‘containment’ model of causation.10 What 
I aim to show, however, is that a case can be made in favour of empty space (and
9 See Kukso (2006 , p. 22).
10 On this understanding causation is, as Falkenstein puts it, "ana logous to giv ing bir th” -  causes m ust  
be capable o f  p roducing their effects; they must “ contain a least as m u c h ” as is to be found in the their  
effects (1998 , p. 333). Such a conception is exploited by Descartes  in his ontological and co sm o log ica l  
proofs for the existence o f  God.
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space in general) having ‘structural b iff , here extrapolating from the toy term “b iff 
introduced by Lewis (2004): ‘b iff  is intended to characterize whatever efficient 
quantities or properties confer causal ‘oomph’ or power on a material substance. What 
I propose, however, is that rather than treating immaterial empty space as 
inefficacious on the efficient model of causation, we can think of it as efficacious on 
the formal model -  the cases of causation that Aristotle speaks of when he explains 
what ‘causes’ an octave, namely the arrangement of notes. Here then, as elsewhere, I 
am indebted to the work of Graham Nerlich, and particularly The Shape o f  Space, 
mostly overlooked in the philosophy of perception. Part of the contribution of this 
thesis is to remedy this a little.
So much, then, for the first premise in the argument sketched above - there is, I 
claim, a sense in which empty space can be argued to be efficacious. But do we 
perceive it? This is my question in the third chapter, ‘Clearing the Ground’.
Contra reductive treatments of seeing empty space -  those on which empty space is 
reduced to perceiving the surfaces of objects that ostensibly Tine’ those regions - I 
argue that empty space has visible properties that are directly perceived. Here I mean 
the space that, if we were to sketch the room we are now in, we might ‘represent’ by 
leaving parts of the sheet blank. Alluding to the Gestalt notion of a ground, I call this 
empty space in a ground sense, and I argue that, so understood, empty space 
looks ‘clear’ and ‘see-through’, an appearance that flows from its Euclidean shape. I 
try to domesticate these peculiar looks claims by explaining, after recent work by M. 
G. F. Martin (2010), that the visible properties of individuals are those that warrant 
comparative looks statements in the form ‘x looks F’.
In the fourth chapter, ‘Gaps, Traps and Paths’, I begin unravelling some consequences 
that flow from this ‘direct’ account of perceiving empty space -  direct in the sense 
that it appeals, not to features of experience, but to the nature of space itself. I explain 
in what sense any given perception of a particular empty region depends on that 
region, so undermining the consensus that empty space must elude a causal theory of 
perception. Nonetheless, I grant that the way in which empty space enters into such 
cases of causal explanation is unusual.
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In The Images o f  Time, Robin LePoidevin introduces the notion of chronometric 
explanatory involvement. He suggests that certain temporal notions -  viz. when an 
event occurred or how long it took - contribute to explanations in a way that is non- 
causal, but which remain part of the full explanation of the relevant event. For 
example, when we ask why a firework exploded at a particular time, temporal notions, 
indeed particular times, enter into the context o f the causal explanation -  namely 
because it was lit five seconds earlier. I explore the prospects for a similar notion in 
the case of the perception of empty space, and I explain why the possibility of such 
locometric involvement means we can resist the temptation to invoke negative 
causation as a way of saving the causal theory in the face of apparently recalcitrant 
empty space. But this is not all. Since the look of empty space flows from its shape, it 
is not just the absence of objects at certain regions that explains the appearance of 
those regions. I take up this theme in Chapter Five, ‘Looking for Nothing’. I suggest 
that perceiving empty space is not best cast as a species of absence perception.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre tells a well-known story. When he goes to the café 
to meet Pierre, he perceives Pierre’s absence. Notoriously, this leads Sartre to suggest 
that Pierre’s absence depends on a frustrated expectation that he would be seen, a 
characterization Richard Gale describes as ‘attitudinal’ (1976, pp. 55-61). I consider a 
recent attempt to resist this attitudinal take on the perception of absence -  the 
Structural View, recently defended by Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (2011) -  and I 
explain where the direct account so far detailed and the structuralist position diverge.
On the Structural View, seeing empty space involves a structural feature of 
experience -  namely the phenomenology that one’s visual field is bounded. As such, 
unlike the direct account, it appeals not to the structure of space, but to the structure of 
experience. Insofar as it emphasizes the form of experience, then, it has an explicitly 
Kantian flavour. I explain in what sense this emphasis flows from a conception of the 
perception of empty space as a species of absence perception, for on this assumption 
there simply is no content to appeal to, hence the requirement to engage structural or 
formal features as explanatory. I show, however, in what sense both accounts can be 
brought into synchrony.
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In the chapter that follows, ‘Touching Empty Space’, I pursue the thought that 
perceiving empty space is not simply the perception of absence or of no thing, this 
time considering our tactual awareness of empty space. O f course, the idea that we 
have tactual awareness of empty space requires motivation, and I do so by calling 
again on the work of Graham Nerlich. Nerlich argues that non-Euclidean space would 
be palpable so long as its curvature were sufficiently constant to allow mobility. He 
denies, however, that Euclidean space can be felt. To feel empty space we must notice 
it. I draw on M. G. F. Martin’s template model of touch as a way of undoing this bind. 
Just as the look of empty space is apt to go overlooked, namely because empty space is 
colourless, nor do we notice our tactual awareness of empty space. When we ‘touch’ 
empty space, there is no sensation of contact. Still, as I argue, empty space is felt.
In Chapter Seven, ‘Specular Space’, I use this conclusion to set out a distinction 
between seeing and touching empty space, and seeing and feeling empty space alone. 
For example, when I see Rue de Rivoli in Paris on a live web-cam, though I can see 
see-through regions not yet occupied, I am not in a position to move through and so 
feel those empty regions (viewing them as I do in Glasgow). I suggest that we can use 
this distinction as a way of making sense of the perception of empty space ‘in’ 
specular objects -  objects the surfaces of which reflect light. My strategy is to compare 
specular perception with the perception of empty space in perceptual objects, and in 
particular figurative paintings. Perhaps appropriately, this chapter is speculative. Even 
so, I think it illustrates how the conceptual resources I assemble in this thesis can be 
brought to bear on wider issues in the philosophy of perception.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, ‘Taking Up Space’, I consider a time-honoured 
philosophical ‘puzzle’ as a way of trying to elucidate the relation between seeing 
objects and seeing empty space. Since we only appear to see the facing sides of 
objects, it might be wondered how we can see them, in Strawson’s idiom (1961, p. 
54), as ‘space-takers’. I argue, however, that when we see the facing side of objects, 
this is not all we see. We see the empty space ‘outside’ the object and that extends 
beyond and in front of it. What’s more, we see the region that it occupies or takes up 
as continuous with these regions. As such, I suggest there is a complicity between 
seeing objects as space-takers and seeing empty space as space that objects could take
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up. Both are co-seen. But this helps clarify, finally, in what sense the direct account I 
have tried to delineate and defend has the resources to make a space, in the 
philosophical literature on spatial experience, for a subject whose experience of the 
world has been so far under-theorised - one that can perceive empty space but without 
yet being able to conceive of it as absolute.
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U n o ccu p ied  Places
cartographers would  often em bellish  such em pty spaces  
with draw ings  o f  exotic beasts
- W. G. Sebald, The Rings o f  Saturn
When faced with empty space our intuitions seem to stall. On the one hand, we seem 
inclined to accept that empty space is something -  something we can gesture at or 
attend to. But on the other, we tend to refer to it as nothing, as absence. As I noted 
too, phenomenology is no better guide. Though we may happily grant that we can 
keep our eye, not just on the doughnut but on the hole," by the same token we are apt 
to deny that we see anything that doesn’t have any observable colour or shape, an 
assumption I discuss in Chapter Three. So how are we to make a start?
My strategy is to start with metaphysics, and not just with metaphysics, but with a 
metaphysical assumption. In this chapter, I aim to motivate reasons for adopting 
metaphysical absolutism as an assumption of this thesis. But given that there is little 
consensus on the metaphysical nature of space, it might be wondered why this 
strategy is preferred. I suggest two related reasons.
First, there is a kind of conceptual freedom that comes with unbinding the imagination 
from perception that reflection on metaphysics prompts -  this is something the work 
of Graham Nerlich teaches.
Second, since such reflection can yield perspectives on experience that our naive 
suppositions might otherwise be inclined to dismiss, as I hope is borne out by this 
thesis, we risk leaving certain argumentative paths unexplored when we neglect the 
murkier noumenal world -  i.e. those that flow from metaphysics to phenomenology.
~  i ~
11 As C. B. Martin writes: “Lewis  w ishes  to keep his eye upon the d ou ghnu t  and not upon the hole, bu t  
absences are perceived" (1996, p. 64).
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But, as such, the investigations that take up the early part of the thesis should be read 
as mostly methodological. I try to use metaphysics as a way of clarifying 
phenomenology. But to this extent the metaphysics that sparks the clarification need 
not itself be embraced, or at least not necessarily; one can, I think, grant some of the 
conclusions I draw while remaining agnostic on the metaphysics that prompts the 
reflection (though I leave the reader to decide which). Rather, a bit like Wittgenstein’s 
ladder, once we have surfaced with the phenomena, the metaphysics can be more or 
less left behind.
So here is the first rung. In this chapter, I consider the dispute between the 
metaphysical absolutist and the relationist over the existence of unoccupied places. 
The relationist is a skeptic, but I suggest that difficulties internal to relationism should 
make the realist feel unthreatened.
The chapter unfolds as follows. I begin by saying something about what we tend to 
mean by ‘empty space’ (§1). In §2-3, I offer a sketch, albeit a fairly impressionistic 
one, of the doctrines of absolutism and relationism and I say something about our 
naive category ‘space’ (§4). I then try to make sense of the relationist’s reductive 
identification of empty space with possibilities of location, and I consider one such 
attempted reduction -  that offered by Graham Forbes (1987) (§5). I close, in §6, by 
outlining those features of relationism that make the absolutist’s invitation to realism 
compelling enough to take up.
1.
For the most part, when we talk about regions being empty, we have some reason for 
doing so and, hence, do so with the aim of being, in Gricean idiom, informative and 
relevant.1“ But this being the case, it is mostly a relative sense of being empty that we 
tend to use. That is to say, when we talk about empty regions, we typically talk of
In 'L og ic  and C onversa t ion’, Paul Grice proposes that conversations  tha t are  co -operative display  
certain pragm atic  features; speakers  tend to be truthful,  to supply only as m uch or  as little inform ation  
as is required, and to be relevant and clear. On the assum ption that m ost o f  our conversation is c o ­
operative, there is, we m igh t  suppose,  little need to talk about  empty space (unless o f  course  if  do in g  
philosophy). See Grice (1989 , Chapter  2).
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regions that are empty of some specific thing or type of thing or stuff. For example, 
one might gesture at an “empty” chair by the fire; it is “empty” because no-one is 
sitting there. Indeed, it may be empty of a particular person - it may be Penelope’s 
chair. Likewise, a purse may be empty of coins, a dancefloor of dancers. Coins and 
dancers are things, but a region or place can be empty too of substances - for example, 
air or, like the pool below, water. This brings into view the comparative use.
Stadtbad, O d e r b e r g e r  Strasse, B e r l in .  P ic tu re :  
C h r i s t i a n  T h i e l e ,  w i k i m e d i a  c o m m o n s .13
An “empty” pool may be relatively empty, either of swimmers or of water, and 
typically we rely on context to decipher which state of affairs we mean to track. Even 
so, someone in a philosophical mood might yet deny that the pool above is “empty”; 
while it is relatively empty, it is comparatively full.
13 See w w w .w ik im e d ia .c o m m o n s .o rg .
< h t tp : / /com m o ns .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w ik i /S tad tbad_O derb erger_S traB e>. Retrieved 24/08/1 I.
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Now, in both relative and comparative uses what are picked out as “empty" (or 
otherwise) are particular places -  the place where Penelope fails to be (her chair), the 
public bath at Oderberger Strasse (above). There is, however, a more general way of 
understanding the phrase “empty space”, one that, philosophy aside, we don't tend to 
use simply because there is no need; there is nothing informative or relevant we can 
say about the regions it picks out. As I aim to show below, such “empty” regions are 
those that have a characteristic phenomenal appearance; as I will argue in Chapter 
Three, they have a Took’. Here I gesture at what I have in mind.
Imagine a pencil sketch of the layout of the room you are now in, and suppose that no 
region is in shadow. It is likely that the empty spaces between you and this 
manuscript, and you and the door (presuming it too is empty) are ‘represented’ in the 
same way -  by blank paper, or, if  you like, an absence of pencilmarks. These are the 
regions that this general way of understanding the phrase “empty space” aims at. It is 
worth noting in what sense this general use lacks relative or comparative force:
Though it is true that such regions are empty of a particular kind of stuff -  namely 
visible material -  unlike the chair by the fire, they are not empty of any particular 
visible thing or person (hence the notion that the use is general). But, conversely and 
relatedly, just as they are empty of nothing in particular, so can they be filled with 
anything at all -  chairs, bicycles, or even transparent, invisible objects (a large pane of 
glass or a tiny cloud of dust). But this being so, in designating such regions as 
“empty”, we typically don’t aim to imply that they are “empty” either in a relative or 
a comparative sense, and this is because, unlike the public baths, we don’t tend to 
think that such “empty” regions can be emptied and so be made emptier, at least not 
until we learn that they are filled with air and dust. That is to say, unlike places or 
things that we are apt to say are “filled” - seats that are occupied or biscuit tins - 
there is no intervention we can typically perform to empty what, in this sense, we aim 
to mean by “empty space”. Call this empty space in aground  sense.14
14 The term ‘g ro u n d ’ naturally alludes to the technical Gesta lt  notion, but, as I aim to use it, is not to be 
identified with that notion. On the Gesta lt  notion, w h a t  counts  as a g roun d  can be spelt  ou t  in term s o f  
certain image properties  -  so, a figure is typically m ore  convex , sm aller  and brighter  than the g ro u n d ,  
its texture and border sharp and tight (see Casati and Varzi 1994, p. 159). But ‘em pty space ’ in a 
ground sense is only m eant  to pick ou t  regions that, as I will later argue, have a certain kind o f  
phenom enal appearance. On my understanding  then, wh ile  an expanse o f  seaw ater  can act as a
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Sketch by E m i ly  B r o n te  s h o w i n g  h e r s e l f  and Ann at w o r k  in  the Parsonage.
The u n m ark ed  pap er  between the ta b le - leg s  ( fo r  exam ple )  ‘re p re s e n t s ’ em pty space in  a g r o u n d
sense, w i k i m e d i a  com m ons;  15
In the next section, I spell out a fourth and related way of reading “empty space”, the 
sense often used to designate absolute space.16
2 .
Ontologically speaking, and historically conceived, there are two candidate ways in 
which the space we are in could be: absolute or relational. I spell these out in turn.
When a space is said to be ‘absolute’ it is typically adjudicated to have two central 
features.17 First, it is held to be independent of the objects it contains; a bit like a 
container, things are contained in it -  call this the feature of Independence. Second, it
‘g ro u n d ’ against which the figure o f  a seahorse,  say, can 's tan d  o u t’, tha t region does not have  the look 
that ‘em pty space’ in a ground sense typically has. This  will becom e plain on read ing C hapter  Three .
15 See w w w . w ik im e d ia .c o m m o n s .o rg .
< h t tp : / /c o m m o n s .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w / in d e x .p h p ? t i t le = S p ec ia l% 3 A S ea rch & se a rc h = em ily + b ro n te >. 
Retrieved 24 /08/11 .
Ib I am grateful to Jessica Leech for discussion on how  to sort the foregoing d is tinc tions.
17 Though  see Earm an (1970) for  a m ore critical analysis o f  the ways in wh ich  the term  ‘ab so lu te ’ can 
be applied in opposition to the term ‘re la t io n a l’ .
is understood to have a so-called ‘manifold structure’; that is, it is composed of points 
that are arranged in a particular order - call this the feature of Structure. We can 
capture the import of this latter feature by appeal to an example Newton offers in his 
De Graviatione, a work not published until 1962:
“the immobility of space will be best exemplified by duration. For 
just as the parts of duration are individuated by their order, so that 
(for example) if yesterday could change places with today and 
become the later of the two, it would lose its individuality and 
would no longer be yesterday, but today; so the parts of space are 
individuated by their positions (positiones), so that if any two could 
change their positions, they would change their individuality at the 
same time and each would be converted numerically (numerice) 
into the other. The parts of duration and space are understood to be 
the same as they really are only because of their mutual order and 
position (ordinem et positiones inter se partes); nor do they have 
any principle of individuation apart from that order and position, 
which consequently cannot be altered”, (quoted in Slowik, 
unpublished, 2008, p. 25)
Here, Newton elucidates the nature of the manifold structure of space by analogy. Just 
as yesterday cannot be yesterday if it were to change places with today, nor can a 
point in the manifold change places with any other and yet be that point. Of course, 
the very thought that a point could leap over another is only hypothetical. As Newton 
points out, space is immobile and indiscerpible -  it can’t be divided by being torn or 
cut.18 But, as such, points in the manifold are individuals, despite being otherwise 
indistinguishable. Put somewhat differently, we might say that, by having a particular 
place in the manifold, points have particularity without being particulars, that is, they 
have particularity without being entities. '9
Now, notice that putting things this way involves devolving the notion of being an 
individual from the notion of being a particular. In Individuals, Strawson had argued 
that particulars are individuals that occupy places. But, on such a view, since places 
are what ground the individuality of particulars, and since particulars occupy places,
18 See Slowik (2008, p. 7).
19 As space can contain particulars, and universals  cannot contain particulars, space m ust  i tse lf  be a 
particular though ol a peculiar sort; one  that is not individuated by being som ew here  (see J o h a n n so n  
2004, p. 147).
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places are naturally neither individuals or particulars. Yet we need not insist on this 
identity. As Denkel writes:
“Particularity does not entail being an entity. In this sense ‘being a 
particular’ acquires meaning in contrast with ‘being a universal’. In 
Aristotle’s characterization, the latter signifies something’s being the 
case multiply and repetitively, as for example, when something is said to 
exist or to apply multiply and repetitively. Thus being a universal entails 
being identical with oneself as a plurality. The opposite of this, i.e.,
‘being a particular’ is for something to be the case uniquely and without 
repetition. For it to have this qualification is for it to be identical with 
itself as a single case only, i.e. for it to be just one in its entirety.” (1996, 
pp. 66-67)
But so understood, regions of absolute space can have particularity and so be 
individuals without being particulars in Strawson’s entity sense; they have their 
individuality, and hence particularity, in virtue of their position in the manifold.
In the case of Independence too there is a further refinement we can make. Some 
absolutists take the feature of Independence to mean that space exists prior to objects. 
But we can understand priority in two distinct ways. This requires distinguishing 
‘substantivalism’ and ‘absolutism’.
Substantivalism is the view that space is a distinct substance from whatever substance 
it is that comprises objects, while Absolutism may be considered an enhanced version 
of substantivalism -  call it Absolute Substantivalism or, hereafter, Absolutism. This is 
distinguished from Substantivalism by the claim that, in addition to being 
substantival, space has absolute properties -  orientation and dimensionality, as well as 
certain topological and geometric features. These are designated ‘absolute’ since they 
are understood to be properties of the space as a whole.
Now, since objects also have such properties -  orientation, dimensionality etc. - we 
might wonder what the relation of these properties is, where these are properties of 
objects, to the properties of space. Broadly speaking, three possibilities are canvassed 
in the literature:
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Objects may inherit their spatial properties from an absolute space, they may have 
spatial properties in addition to and independently of an absolute space, or they may 
project spatial properties onto a substantival space that in itself lacks absolute 
properties.20
I don’t intend to sort among these positions. Insofar as they suggest a two-part 
recasting of the priority issue, however, they are nonetheless noteworthy. This is 
because we may ask both whether what is prior is substantival or absolute, and 
whether objects have their spatial properties dependently or independently of space, 
(and, conversely, whether space has certain structural features independently of 
objects).21 For the purposes of this thesis, I leave these matters aside. Rather, I assume 
that Absolutism is the relationist’s target.22
Together these twin features, those of Independence and Structure, allow us to 
formulate the primitive notions of spatial distance and relatedness as the absolutist 
understands them. For the absolutist, distance is understood in terms of the set of 
intervening manifold points between two objects, while spatial relatedness is 
conceived in terms of a path connecting the relevant relata. In being comprised of 
manifold points a path is thereby understood to be made o f  space.
Compare this to the picture painted by the relationist.
Unlike the absolutist, the relationist denies Independence, urging instead that space 
depends entirely on objects and the spatial relations between them. For the relationist, 
objects and spatial relations constitute space. A common way of making sense of this 
claim is by asking what the candidate truth-makers for claims about space are.
For the absolutist, statements about space are made true by absolute space and so are 
made true independently o f  objects, but for the relationist the only truth-makers that
20 See Dainton (2001, pp. 139-140) and Barman (1970).
T hese  issues are distinct. A theoris t  w ho  takes substantial space to be prior  to objects  in the first 
sense may not ye t grant that the structural features o f  space  are also independent  of, and thereby prio r  
to, objects in the second sense.
~  Note that s ince absolu te  space  may have existed prior to and independently o f  objects ,  it might never 
have been em pty in a relative sense — that is, it m igh t never  have been em pty  o f  m a ter ia l .
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can be appealed to are objects and spatial relations.2'1 The "vanishing test1 helps 
illustrate this thought.
On relationism, if all the objects we describe as being ‘in1 space were to vanish, so too 
would space. But if all the objects in absolute space were to vanish, we would still be 
left with the manifold points ‘at’ which they were formerly located. On Relationism, 
then, having a certain position in manifold space can no longer be what individuates 
objects - a different criterion must be sought. But likewise, since spatial relations 
can’t be conceived as paths through points, distance is no longer extrinsic -  that is, it 
can’t be characterised and determined in relation to the manifold. I spell this thought 
out.
Drawing on Bricker (1993), Dainton (2001, pp. 145-146) distinguishes Gaussian 
(after Carl Friedrich Gauss) and intrinsic distance. The Gaussian distance between 
two points is given by the shortest continuous path  between them. By ‘path’ 
understand something that can be physically traversed, while two points are ‘path- 
connected’ if there is a path through space that connects them. An example helps 
explain how intrinsic distance differs.
Consider two villages p  and q separated by a high mountain. The Gaussian distance 
between p  and q is given by the shortest connecting path between them, say around 
the foot of the mountain. In contrast, the intrinsic distance is given by the length o f  a 
straight line connecting them -  the length that a tunnel through the mountain would 
be perhaps. But importantly a line is just a geometric notion; the straight line 
connecting p  and q may, in absolutist terms, denote no possible path.
For example, imagine that a region of void separates the two villages. Unlike vacuum, 
void is an absence of space.24 As David Lewis writes:
1 This constitutive thesis does not entail an ti-realism in the sense o f  D u m m ett  (1982).  T he  re la t io n a l  is 
a realist about space .
It is open to the absolu tist  to treat regions o f  void as holes in spacetime. For  the relationist  ho w ev e r ,  
since void and vacua are merely hypothetical regions w h ere  no objects actually are, they are e ffec t ive ly  
assim ilated .
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“if there is a vacuum within these four walls, there may be quite a lot 
of objects between the walls that are capable of exerting forces and 
supplying energy. Whereas if there is a void between these walls, 
then (even though the walls are some distance apart) there is nothing 
at all between the walls. What? -  Not even any spacetime? Not 
even any flat, causally inert spacetime? -  No, not even any 
spacetime. Nothing at all” (2004, pp. 277-278).
But if void is an absence of spacetime, then naturally no continuous path through 
space can transverse it. How could it? There is no space. Hence, in an absolutist sense, 
were p  and q so separated, they would not be spatially related. Since, however, the 
relationist rejects the manifold, hypothetical regions of void are no obstacle at all. 
Peculiarly, spatial relations can act through them.25
So how should we understand the relationist’s relations?
3.
Spatial relations are of two distinct genera. We can sort among object-space relations 
and object-object relations. Since the relationist rejects the existence of the former, 
only the latter are disputed, and specifically their nature. For the absolutist, recall, 
spatial relations are made of space -  a bit like a beaded necklace, they are made up of 
manifold points. But since for the relationist, spatial relations partly constitute space, 
they can’t be made of the space they constitute. So what are they? One way of finding 
out is by analogy with other familiar species of relation.
Take, for example, the supervenience relation. A well-known way of spelling this out 
is in terms of an original creationary act. On this characterization, if A-properties 
supervene on B-properties then when God created B-properties he had no further 
work to do - the supervenient A-properties come ‘for free’.26 The question is whether 
spatial relations come for free in this sense.
It is worth  noting that both these notions o f  dis tance are part  o f  our  conceptual repertoire. A cyclist  
may conceive o f  the distances separa ting the v illages in both intrinsic and Gaussian  term s - she may be 
frustrated that som ew here  so near could be so far aw ay.
26 See Chalm ers (1996 , p. 33).
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Now, to answer this much it seems we are required to establish the function of spatial 
relations, and here, as elsewhere, Dainton (2001) can guide us.
Dainton places two constraints on any metaphysical theory o f space: to explain both 
the intuition that all the places in space are comiected as well as the observation that 
there are constraints on movement in space - we cannot move about in all directions. 
On relationism, spatial relations seem to guarantee both; they both connect and 
constrain the movement of objects. But this suggests that when God created the realm 
of objects, he did, after all, have further work to do -  he had to weave them together, 
to connect them. Hence, as Dainton writes, “it seems clear that spatial relatedness is
not an ontological free lunch but [requires] an additional creative act on God’s
part” (ibid., pp. 142-143).
Yet since spatial relations come at a cost, another candidate relation also seems 
disqualified -  the groundedness relation. After Nerlich and Dainton we can harness 
the following diagnostic as a way of trying to work this out: Since the causal relation 
is arguably a grounded relation, if spatial relations are grounded, then we should find 
that the two species of relation are in some way alike.
Consider the vanishing test as a way of excavating a parallel.
If a particular cause, C, of a particular effect, E, were to vanish, so too would the 
effect.27 For example, if the cause of apple trees bearing fruit is pollination by 
honeybees, and honeybees were to become extinct, apple trees would no longer bear 
fruit.
But consider the same test when applied, not to causally related properties, but to 
spatially related objects -  a token apple tree and a bee in the same garden. Suppose 
the bee falls prey to a bird. Since the tree and the bee are only spatially related and not 
relata of some mysterious grounded relation, the demise of one isn’t the cause of the 
demise of the other; the tree doesn’t disappear.
I overlook the possibility that the effect m igh t  have been brought about  som e other way — see 
Chapter T w o.
24
Nerlich (1994, pp. 18-19) calls such mysterious relations internal. A relation is 
internal if in every world in which A exists, B exists also. Conversely, a relation is 
external, if there are worlds in which A exists but B does not exist. Spatial relations 
are naturally external. But this, in turn, suggests a problem.
Since the causal relation is internal and spatial relations are external, it might be 
wondered whether spatial relations, in being external, are also causally inert. Well, 
puzzlingly, it seems the answer is ‘no’. As Dainton puts it, spatial relations are 
‘potent’ -  after all they connect and constrain (ibid., p. 143). But on the assumption 
that naturalistic explanation is causal this then leaves the relationist with a difficult 
geminate character to reconcile; spatial relations have causal significance despite 
being external. I return to this difficulty in the closing section of this chapter.
So how far have we come? We have established that the relationist’s spatial relations 
are non-supervenient, hypothetically ungrounded and external. I suggest that ‘objects’ 
may simply be identified as the relata of such relations.28 In the next section, I say a 
little about our naïve category ‘space’, before turning to the key expository task o f this 
chapter -  the relationist’s reductive treatment of ‘empty space’.
4.
When we think about our naïve ontological category ‘space’, the following seems 
apposite:
We appreciate that things can move about ‘in’ space, but we don’t think that space 
can move; there is no intervention we could perform so as to make some part of space 
move. This explains why we can’t measure empty space without some object, a meter 
stick say - we can’t move parts of space so as to line them up with each other.
-8 Notably this leads to a distinction between sim ple  and co m plex  objects: S im ple objects  are the re/ata  
o f  external relations but do not enter into any g rounded  relations with o ther s imples. C om plex  ob jec ts ,  
in contrast, might be thought o f  fusions, the parts o f  which enter into both spatial and  g ro u n d ed  
relations.
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Likewise, because things can move about in space, aggregates of things can be 
formed where the parts are primary and the whole secondary -  for example, a bundle 
of clothes or basket of fruit. We understand, however, that this is not the case with 
space. Since parts of space can’t be moved we can’t make aggregates of space. 
Rather, just as a slice of cake is a sub-volume of the larger cake, the parts of space 
exist only as sub-volumes of the larger space in which they are. Hence, unlike 
aggregates of things, the larger space is primary and the subvolumes are secondary 
(see Johannson 2004, pp. 146-147).
But this being so, Independence and Structure seem to hold of the space we are in, 
and what’s more, this is how we understand ‘space’ to be. As such, I take it that our 
naïve ontological category ‘space’ is absolute. Indeed, I take this as a datum.29
Now, earlier I noted that the phrase ‘empty space’ is sometimes used to pick out 
absolute space; this was the fourth sense I isolated. Since, however, the relationist 
denies the existence of absolute space, she thereby denies the existence o f empty 
space in this particular sense - that is, she denies the existence of unoccupied manifold 
positions or places. We are now in a position to explain how this sense interacts with 
the third sense detailed above, the ground sense.
As I have indicated, there is some observational basis for absolutism -  we observe 
that parts of the space we are in don’t move, and that things appear to move about in 
space. What’s more, there appear to he unoccupied places', regions that we refer to as 
“empty space” in the ground sense. But this suggests that relationism can be cast as a 
species of phenomenalism. As Mundy (1983) points out:
“The phenomenalist picks out some class of facts which may be
It is worth  noting that both Peacocke (1979) and Evans (1985a) claim that our  p resc ien tif ic  
conception o f  space is relational.  See P eacocke pp. 41-52 ,  and Evans p. 254. (W riting o f  S t r a w so n ’s 
use o f  a Master Sound in his construction o f  a Sound  W orld in C hap te r  T w o  o f  Individuals, E v an s  
comments:  “T h e  space o f  S traw so n ’s auditory universe  is an absolute space and not a f ra m ew o rk  
constituted by the spatial relations o f  its occupan ts” ). I d o n ’t aim to argue against these theorists. It 
seems to m e that w hat  Peacocke and Evans in fact m ean  to discuss is not our  naïve on to log ica l  
category ‘space but rather w hat  is required for knowledge o f  location, nam ely  a conception o f  the 
relations in which objects  stand to each other independently  o f  o n e ’s experience o f  them at a place. For  
a robust defense o f  the claim that our  naïve ontologica l ca tegory  ‘space’ is a container  space, see 
Johannson (2004).
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regarded as the observational basis for the realist doctrine, and 
proposes to construct a modified theory governing those same facts, 
without appeal to the realist hypothesis. The phenomenalist theory is 
thus supposed to be observationally equivalent to the realist theory 
under attack. In our case, the special class of facts regarded as 
constituting the observational basis are those involving spatial 
relations among physical objects. A successful relationist theory is 
thus expected to produce the same predictions regarding those facts as 
the absolutist theory, on the basis of its postulated laws governing the 
spatial relations in question. It is not, of course, required to reproduce 
any of the assertions of the realist theory which go beyond that 
observational basis”, (p. 207)
Now, since the relationist theory might be thought of as a phenomenalistic theory, the 
class of facts which count as the observational basis for realism are granted. But this 
being so both theorists might be thought to allow that we ‘observe’ empty space in the 
third sense detailed, the sense that picks out the ground -  th e  unoccupied places 
that in our hypothetical sketch would be represented by blank paper. What the 
relationist insists however, and what the absolutist denies, is that the class of facts that 
constitute the observational basis fo r  realism need not appeal to empty space in the 
fourth sense -  that is, to absolute space. But as such, what grounds the truth of 
statements about empty space or unoccupied places in the third sense is distinct on 
both accounts.
For the absolutist, the possibility of an object taking up a position is grounded in 
absolute space. But for the relationist, as I will explain, the possibility of an object 
taking up a position is grounded in the possibility of certain spatial relations holding 
between objects. In terms of our metaphor, we can spell this out as follows.
Typically, we think that we can mark a blank region of paper because there is some 
paper to mark. Likewise, we think we can fill a certain empty region because there is 
an unoccupied place, some empty space, to fill. This is our intuitive understanding. 
For the relationist however, the possibility of filling an unoccupied place is understood 
to be grounded instead in the bare possibility o f  an object being located there. So, 
translated to the case of the sketch, the relationist supposes that the possibility of 
marking a blank expanse is grounded in the possibility of a mark being made in that 
region. But this just shores up how strained the metaphor is when applied to 
relationism. No-one would wish to deny that the paper is what grounds the possibility
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of marking it, which is why the relationist would reject the metaphor. For the 
relationist, there are no unfilled manifold points that exist independently of objects 
being ‘located’ there. Hence, there is no ‘blank’ equivalent. I spell out the relationist’s 
alternative understanding below. First, a clarification.
In this thesis I am mostly interested in empty space in the third sense detailed -  the 
interspaces that, were we to sketch your room, would be left blank (for example, the 
blank spaces ‘representing’ the empty space between the legs of Emily Bronte’s 
writing table). Consider, however, the particular region of space that you are currently 
perceptually aware of, the region that falls within the bounds of your visual field. 
This region, which contains both fu ll and empty regions, is experienced as a sub­
volume of a larger space that has that region as a part.30 But in experiencing it as a 
subvolume, we thereby conceive of the space o f  which it is a part as absolute, at least 
in the following sense: we understand both that the parts of space cannot move 
(,Structure) and, since things can be moved about in space, that space itself is not 
dependent on objects located in it (Independence). Conceiving of space as absolute in 
this sense, then, involves conceiving of it as “empty space” in the fourth  sense, the 
sense that both our naive experience and our conception o f the category ‘space’ make 
compelling.
5.
As noted, the relationist makes sense of ‘empty space’ in terms of possibility. Since 
this is a difficult notion to make vivid, I draw on an analogy that Johansson (2004, pp. 
150-151) develops for the same purpose.31
Colours can be ordered along three dimensions -  hue, saturation and intensity - which 
in turn form a colour space; a space which, as Johansson notes, is well known to the 
paint-dealer. In such a space, the ‘position’ of a colour is given as a function of its
I his phenom enology  is explained in m ore detail in Chapter  Five, specifically by appeal to the 
Structural V iew.
31 It should be noted that much o f  the discussion in this chapter  is indebted to a read ing o f  C hapter  10 - 
Container Space and Relational S pace’ - of  Johan nso n’s Ontological Investigations. 1 am grateful to 
Kevin Mulligan for the reference.
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distance from other colours that are distinguished from it along one or more of these 
dimensions. Consider now all the actual things that exist, and assume they have 
specific colours. We can plot the ‘location’ of these colours on the colour space as a 
function of their hue, saturation and intensity. But suppose now there are ‘gaps’ in this 
space -  positions that no actual existent things occupy, or colours that no actually 
existent things have - and imagine non-actual, possible things occupying these gaps. 
This is what makes a colour space a relational space: While there may be ‘gaps’ in the 
space which indicate that no actual thing has the colour that makes up that part of the 
space, the ‘gap’ itself is not empty -  it specifies a colour of a specific hue, saturation 
and intensity but which isn ’t actually instantiated. It is hence a colour that something 
could possibly have but doesn’t. How does this analogy apply to space?
For the relationist, what holds for colour in the colour space is true of locations for 
objects. Just as the ‘gaps’ in the colour space point to the colour of non-actual objects, 
the apparent gaps in space itself point to ‘locations’ that possible objects could have 
but don’t.'2 How might such an account apply in practice? In the case of colour, 
uninstantiated colours are reductively identified with colours that do exist. But what 
apparatus could make sense of the notion of a possible location? Below, I outline a 
proposal made by Graeme Forbes (1987).
Forbes’ inspiration comes from mathematics:
“The slogan that places are possibilities of location adverts to the
idea that just as a rational is introduced by a pair of naturals, so 
places are introduced by co-ordinates from a frame of reference, co­
ordinates which, relative to that frame, are possibly the co-ordinates 
of some object” (p. 299).
Here, Forbes’ idea is that just as we can ‘introduce’ the number 3 as equal to the 
fraction 6/2, a place can be introduced by appeal to objects and times, given a 
particular frame of reference. The use of the term ‘introduce’ is noteworthy. A place 
is not understood to be a set of objects and a frame of reference, but is rather
characterised in terms o f  these. As such, Forbes calls himself a reductive realist. He is
There is, how evei ,  a difference. The relations that m ake up a colour space are g rounded  — they are 
grounded in colours. But spatial relations are external and so are hypothetically  ung ro u n d ed .
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a realist about places but he reduces them to ostensibly less problematic entities -  
objects and spatial relations.33 On this assumption a definition is offered:
Def: A frame of reference, F, is a pair consisting of a time and a 
sequence of objects which are “sufficiently distributed” -  
where F can be written as [ <a> ,t*]
Here <a> refers to a set of “sufficiently distributed” objects - objects that are 
“sufficiently distributed” do not occupy the same place - while a frame of reference 
(F) is given by the set of these objects at a time. How do we make sense of co­
ordinates from the frame?
Co-ordinates are understood to form a sequence o f  numbers, <d> - <d> picks out a 
place which is d, units from the location of a, at t*, d2 units from the location of a2 at 
t*, d3 units from the location of a3 at t*, and so on. Given a two-dimensional space, 
and some unit of measurement, this yields a formulation o f what it is to be a ‘place’:
Def: [< i,j,k>, F] introduces a place iff 0 (3f)(3x)(D(x,a,f) = i &
D(x,b,t) = j  & D(x,c,t) = k)), where “D(x,.y,f)” is the distance
between x and y  at t.
Or in everyday English: Relative to some frame of reference, F, a 
set of objects a, b, c, and a target object x, if the distance between x 
and a at t is i, the distance between x and b at t is j ,  and the distance 
between x and c at t is k, then x is at a place introduced by the 
numbers (/, /, k).




F ig u re  1: x  is a place,  r e la t iv e  to F at /, g iv e n  by the n u m b e r s  ( i , j ,  k).
Yet with this in hand, Forbes recognizes a difficulty, which in turn clarifies the import 
of the term ‘introduce’:
Numerous different “entities” of the form [< i,j,k >, F] but involving different Fs will 
correspond to one and the same place. This is another way of casting a familiar 
insight: We can individuate the same place in terms of different frames of reference. I 
can individuate my present location relative to the door behind me, a favourite tree, 
the moon. But if a place is merely a set of numbers, then it becomes difficult to sort 
among these distinct ways of picking out the same place. Forbes grants this much for 
he acknowledges that [< i,j,k >, F] must be a temporally and modally rigid designator 
of a place, a concession I return to in the next section. In the meantime, however, 
consider the challenge he faces: In order to reductively reify unoccupied places, he 
needs to show how this characterization of place can extend to places that are not 
actually occupied. Here, his strategy is as follows:
Like places that are only possibly occupied, places that are occupied at times after t -  
viz. that are not occupied now -  are not actually occupied. So if we can make sense 
of place occupation at times other than t, then we can make sense o f possible 
occupation.
Now, critically this idea trades on an identification of the actuality that is opposed to 
possibility, with the actuality that is opposed to times that are not now present or 
actual. Forbes’ idea is to try and make sense of occupation at times after t as a way of 
making sense of possible occupation. To begin, however, an initial worry must be 
defused, namely, how a frame of reference that was set up at one time can extend to a 
later time. But not only this. Since a frame is characterized in terms of the location of 
objects, and since objects can change position, it might be asked: How can the same
c
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frame apply to objects that have changed position?
Peacocke (1979) offers one solution. He suggests that if there is a change in the 
relations of objects at a time after which a frame of reference was established, then the 
configuration that is consistent with how things were at t, but which would have 
resulted from the least motion o f  the objects in terms o f  which the frame was 
originally set up, can be attributed the same frame of reference (see ibid., pp. 50-51). 
This principle is supposed to explain how the same frame of reference can apply to 
objects that have changed position. Unfortunately, however, it is subject to a time- 
honoured objection-N ew ton’s rotating globes.
In a universe of two objects that are at a fixed distance from each other and are 
mutually rotating, no motion can be detected. But although no motion can be detected, 
the globes are not motionless. The principle of the minimization of motion therefore 
delivers the wrong answer. Forbes suggests an alternative solution.
Instead of applying a criterion of minimal motion, suppose that facts about the 
displacement of objects -  relational changes - are explained by a theory of motion- 
producing forces. That is, suppose that when objects change position, they do so 
because of the operation of motion-producing forces. The correct application o f a 
theory of such forces, says Forbes, should yield the configuration that is consistent 
with the application of a frame of reference that was set up in terms of the location of 
those objects at an earlier time.34
This, then, completes the first step in his proposed reduction. To be clear, it is 
proposed that a frame of reference, F, that was set up at t*, in relation to a set of 
sufficiently distributed objects <a>, can apply at times later than t* so long as it is 
granted that the set of distributed objects to which it applies at those later times is the 
set the current distribution of which would be predicted by the correct application o f a 
theory of motion-producing forces. This, then, overcomes the difficulty of extending 
F to times other than t*, as well as the worry that, since objects can move, F can’t 
apply at other times. This much established, the second step runs as follows:
1 hough it appeals to motion -  change o f  place -  this so lu tion  is, Forbes insists, non-circular.  I d o n ’t 
contest this claim here s ince my goal is only expository .
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Forbes supposes that the problem of extending an actual coordinate system into 
merely possible circumstances reduces to the problem of extending it into the future -  
this follows from his identification of the actuality that is opposed to possibility with 
the actuality that is opposed to times (including the past) that are not now or actual. In 
addition, however, it assumes a particular model of possible worlds, one on which a 
possible world is understood on a branching conception of time. On such a view, a 
possible world is one that ‘branches’ from the actual world at a time t f  But on this 
reductive assumption, and assuming too that F can be extended to future times 
(which, recall, is what the first step established), it only remains for him to specify 
which class of possible worlds F can range over. I spell out this thought below. First, I 
clarify what this part of his argument is supposed to accomplish.
Having established that F can apply to times later than t, Forbes supposes that the 
application of F to possible circumstances reduces to extending it to future times, a 
method for which is provided by step one. But this leaves only one further step to 
complete his proposed reduction.
In trying to delimit the class o f  possible worlds branching from the present (and in 
terms of which he will reductively identify unoccupied places - places that are 
occupied in those worlds but which are not actually occupied), Forbes has a number 
of criteria to guide him. Naturally, only those worlds in which the theory of motion- 
producing forces applies can be admitted (this followed from the first step in the 
proposed reduction). In addition, since there are some places that are ‘unoccupied’ as 
a matter o f  physical necessity -  i.e. voids -  the relevant set should also contain some 
logically, though not physically, possible worlds. Conversely, however, although 
some logically possible worlds are included, some must be excluded, specifically if  
they permit a range of motions distinct from those allowed in the actual world. This 
leads Forbes to introduce a key notion: that of geometric accessibility.
j5 Up to that time, possible and actual w orlds  are understood to be num erically  identical.  Belnap (1 9 9 2 )  
explains the history o f  the origins o f  the concep t  o f  b ranching time by recalling " the logicians Prior and 
lhom ason  and Me Call” . He writes: “T o express som e fundam enta l features o f  our  w orld  associa ted  
with indeterminism as a foundation for modal tense logic, Prior, and after him T hom aso n ,  started ou t  as 
the old physicists with moments [m om ents  are ins tantaneous  Euclidean spaces in a linear te m p o ra l  
order). Then he generalized linear tem poral order  to a branching tem poral order. The m anifo ld  o f  
m om ents  ordered in this tree-like way is called branching time” (p. 386).
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Only possible worlds that are geometrically accessible from the actual world are 
included in the set of branching possible worlds. What is this notion supposed to 
capture?
The thought that some worlds are geometrically inaccessible from others is best 
explained by example. Take two L-shaped things -  one with the ‘foot’ facing left and 
the other with the ‘foot’ facing right. In a two-dimensional space such figures cannot 
be made to coincide with each other. For example, ‘L’ would have to be ‘lifted off the 
page’ so as to coincide with its printed mirror image. Hence, worlds in which they do 
coincide are not geometrically accessible from two-dimensional worlds. For an 
absolutist, geometrically accessible worlds are elucidated of in terms of the properties 
of absolute space -  indeed, this is a compelling reason for realism, and I return to it in 
Chapter Two (see Nerlich 1979, 1994, 2009). But how does a relationist make sense 
of geometric accessibility?
Forbes draws a parallel with Humeanism about the laws of nature. For a Humean, 
causal laws supervene on what happens, so it couldn’t be the case that the same 
physical events could unfold in two worlds but the causal laws differ.36 In contrast, a 
non-Humean could allow this much. In what, then, would the sameness of the events 
consist? Says Forbes: in the obtaining of a certain class of counterfactuals such that if 
the antecedent is true in both worlds, then so is the consequent.
Now, Humeanism doesn’t seem to hold for geometric laws since the same physical 
event could unfold in spaces of different geometries -  for example one could “lift” the 
L off the page in any world of dimensions more than two. Hence, supervenience can 
be denied. Rather, what makes two worlds geometrically the same is that the same 
geometrically fundamental counterfactuals are true at both worlds. As such, what 
makes a possible world geometrically accessible from the actual world is not, as the 
absolutist has it, the geometric features o f  absolute space (a point which I discuss a 
little further in Chapter Two), but rather the bare holding o f  such modal facts, facts 
concerning possible movements. But this is all Forbes requires to make sense of 
unoccupied places - places that are merely possibly occupied now. Such places are all
See Psillos (2002, Part II) for a detailed exposition o f  both Hum ean  and non -H u m ean  ap pro ach es  to 
the laws o f  nature .
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those that are in the set of geometrically accessible branching worlds; worlds at which 
the same counterfactuals obtain.37
This completes my exposition of Forbes.38
6 .
So far I have outlined, in broad strokes, the doctrines of Absolutism and Relationism, 
and I have tried to provide a neutral exposition of one of the few explicit accounts in 
the literature that tries to provide a reductive identification of unoccupied places with 
possible locations -  Forbes (1987). In this section, I sketch some difficulties for the 
relationist’s skeptical challenge. O f course, I don’t suppose that these difficulties can’t 
be defused by the relationist, my point is only that, given these difficulties, 
Absolutism is compelling, and all the more so because it tallies with our prescientific 
understanding. As such, the iteration of these is intended to motivate my adoption of 
Absolutism.
/. The D ifficulty fro m  Individuadon  
In the course of the discussion above, I focus only on ontology. It might, however, be 
objected that I have overlooked what is most critical in the dispute between the 
absolutist and the relationist; the question as to whether motion is relational or 
absolute. '9 If there is absolute motion, then the absolutist is vindicated. But if  motion 
is relative, perhaps it might be supposed that absolute space no longer has any 
explanatory function.
j7 This  allows him to finally address a difficulty noted  at the ou tse t  o f  this exposition  -  the fact tha t the 
same place can be picked out by recourse to countless  frames. T houg h  w e  can introduce places in term s 
o f  frames o f  reference, “F coordinates  are not identical to places, any m ore  than a s ingle pair  o f  
integers is identical to the rational it introduces: w e  need equ ivalence  classes o f  co-ordinates from 
different frames o f  reference" (1987 , p. 308). His idea is to introduce distinct frames F and F1, toge ther  
with distinct configurations or  distributions o f  objects  <d> and <e>. [<d>, F], then, is equivalen t  to
[<e>, F’] ju s t  in case it picks out the sam e place, which  is to say they pick  o u t  the sam e object  o f  the 
same kind occupied  at that location. I f  they fail to pick ou t  the sam e object  they are not equ iva len t .
It migh t be noted that in his appeal to co-ordinates , Forbes  thereby assum es a manifo ld  s tructure ,  
something which the metaphysica l relationist rejects. In acknow ledging  this m uch , then, he im plic it ly  
allows that our  prescientific schem e is ‘absolu tis t7, som eth ing  1 have already urged. His goal,  h o w e v e r ,  
is only to reductively identify unoccupied  places with places that could be possibly occupied , a s su m in g  
they are geometrica lly  accessible from the actual world .
That is to say, w hether  acceleration is relative to an absolu te  space or  to material bodies .
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Johansson (2004, p. 156) argues against this thought. A conception of absolute space 
is what explains how we can conceive of two qualitatively identical things being 
numerically distinct. But what principle of individuation does relationism offer? 
Since the relationist rejects manifold points, what individuates an object is its place in 
the relational nexus. But how this works is opaque. As Hooker (1971) notes:
“According to RDS [the relational doctrine of space], to be at the 
position p  is to possess some complex relational property. Now it is in 
the nature of properties that they are instantiated in space, that 
instances occur at spatial locations and that it be possible that there be 
more than one distinct, simultaneous instance of any given property.
But the complex relational properties of RDS which determine spatial 
position can of logical necessity have none of these characteristics.
Since to be at a position p  is, according to RDS, to possess a particular 
relational property, relational spaces are in effect complexes of 
universals. Positioning in relational space individuates qualitatively 
only. But physical space makes possible numerical individuation 
among qualitatively indistinguishable individuals. This is only 
possible because qualitatively indistinguishable individuals occupy 
numerically distinct spatio-temporal locations” , (p. 107, fn. 2)40
2. T he  D ifficu lty  fro m  the  R equ irem en  t fo r  S o m e th in g  E /se  
While the relationist wishes to urge that space is woven exclusively from objects and 
relations, something else must nonetheless be introduced to make relationism 
intelligible. This is strikingly so in Forbes’ invocation of a modally and temporally 
rigid frame of reference. In addition to the set of sufficiently distributed objects at a 
time (and attendantly too the relations between them), Forbes requires a frame o f  
reference in order to hypostatise those relations. Essentially, then, the frame of 
reference plays a role akin to absolute space -  it plays the function o f individuating 
objects and relations through the modal and temporally rigid hypostatisation that it, 
qua frame, facilitates.41
40 On relationism, to be ‘at’ a position, p , is to stand in certain spatial relations to o ther  objects  - viz. 
‘being north o f  q \  ‘being left o f  r \  ‘being beside s' - w h ere  here the variables q, r and s d esign a te  
positions o f  objects Oq, Or and Os. But s ince this is w hat  ‘being at p ’ means, say ing  “ je  is at p  and has 
the relation Rq to O q"  d o esn ’t introduce any further information. But w e  d o n ’t generally  take such 
information -  information about w h a t  spatial relations objects  bear  to each other  - to be de fin i t iona lly  
true in this sense. No tice  too that defining the position p  in term s o f  the relations it holds to o the r  
objects involves the hypostatisation o f  those relations, see above .
Notably, Leibniz s fram e of reference or  ‘outside is God (though “God is not present  to things by 
situation but by essence — Leibniz s Third Paper to Clarke, §12, 1989, p. 326). S om e relationists even  
introduce absolute space, albeit only as a theoretical posit — i.e. as part of an epistemic  on to logy (see for 
example, the ‘E m bedding  V iew poin t '  deployed by M undy (1983)) .
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3. T he  D iffic u lty  fr o m  Possibilities us T ru th -M a kers
On relationism, what grounds the truth of statements about regions being unoccupied 
or empty is the possibility of an object being located there. But we typically don't treat 
possibilities as truth-makers.
4. T he  Difficult:) 'fro m  W hich P ossib ility
Relatedly, if truth-makers are possibilities, and numerous branching worlds are 
geometrically accessible from the actual world, as on Forbes’ proposed reduction, we 
might wonder which world is the truth maker for the claim that a region is empty?
5. T he D ifficu lty  fr o m  / m possible- to- O ccup y  P o in ts  
Butterfield (1984) sets out the following worry:
“One difficulty is that it may be impossible to occupy some points.
Clearly such a point could not be identified with the set of events that 
could occupy it: at least, this is so if there are two such points, for then 
each would have to be identified with the null set and thus with the 
other.
The relationist will naturally question the claim that some points 
cannot be occupied. But this claim is plausible when we consider a 
theory like general relativity, or Newtonian mechanics with 
geometrized gravity, which is dynamical in the sense that the metric 
and/or connection is affected by matter”. (1984, p. 107)
Forbes’ solution seems to make room for such points -  they are logically but not 
physically possibly occupied. But still, it might be wondered how the relationist 
marks the distinction between impossible to occupy points -  those that are not even 
logically possibly occupied (e.g. void) - and those that are only logically but not 
physically possibly occupied.
6. T he D iffic u lty  fr o m  the L  one O bject U niverse
For the relationist, a universe with a lone and simple object - one without parts - is not 
spatial.
7. T he D iffic u lty  fr o m  the T w o  O bject U niverse
Distance is a relation that holds between at least two entities — a single object is at no
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distance from itself. But consider a universe composed of exactly two objects. For the 
absolutist, the distance between these two is given as a function of the set of 
intervening manifold points. For the relationist, however, the most that can be said is 
that the objects are non-contiguous and so are at no particular distance from each 
other at all.
8. The D ifficu lty  fro m  In te llig ib ility
Spatial relations are understood by the relationist to be external and hence 
ungrounded. Still, as I have indicated, insofar as they connect objects and constrain 
their movement in relation to each other, they are supposed to explain. But how? 
Without construing them on the absolutist model -  that is, as being made o f  space -  
the essentially sui generis nature of the relationist’s relations is barely intelligible. 
This is something Nerlich remarks upon:
“Getting the need for thinkers and understanders out of some
enterprise has been the preserve of genius and inspiration has to be a 
substantial gain....But much that we may be tempted to think of as 
advancing the cause of philosophy merely deletes the need to 
understand....[I am not] denying that appeals to intuition and
understanding have impeded progress. Early resistance to the non- 
Euclidean geometries, to the relativity of time, and the like, show how 
fruitful it can be to break through the barrier set by the demand that 
new ideas be already intelligible. Nevertheless the risk here is that we 
will mistake for solutions to problems devices that have merely the 
form of solutions”. (1994, pp. 30-31)
For Nerlich, the relationist’s relations are merely “devices”. But we need to know 
how such devices work. The relationist needs to show then, “not merely that we can 
cut the realist’s ontology to relationist size, but that we should” (ibid., p. 28). She 
must not merely ‘match’ the realist, as Mundy suggested, she must explain why




At the outset I noted that phenomenology and even intuition are unhelpful guides in 
the case of empty space and specifically with regard to our apprehension of it -  
further evidence for which is to follow - and I noted two reasons that might be offered 
in support of the strategy this thesis tracks. I noted that we risk leaving certain 
argumentative paths unexplored when we remain dialectically agnostic on the 
metaphysical foundations of our perceptual world, and that reflection on metaphysics 
may even yield philosophical insights about perception, so long as we think 
metaphysically, not perceptually. So why Absolutism?
The mere fact that our naïve conception of space is absolute, and even that relationism 
is a phenomenalist theory, suggests that Absolutism is as good, if not a better 
noumenal place to start than any other. I adopt Absolutism, then, mostly for 
expediency, but also because it is possibly true.
In what follows, I will try to be consistent in using the following terminology: The 
phrase “empty space” is meant to refer to space in a ground sense -  the spaces that 
would be left blank in a sketch. When I simply use the word “space”, in line with the 
assumption adopted, I mean to pick out absolute space. Occasionally, however, I rely 
on context to help make sense of which empty space -  absolute space or empty space 
in a ground sense -  “empty space” is supposed to track.
in mice:
In this chapter I sketched, in fairly impressionistic terms, the doctrines of Absolutism 
and Relationism, and, in a little more detail, their dispute over the existence of empty 
space. In particular, I tried to set out the relationist’s phenomenalist reduction of 




still clad in the hom e-sp un  and ill-fitting garm ents  o f  the fuller o f  L y m in g ton ,  
with arms and legs shooting out
- A rthur Conan Doyle, The While Com pany
In the last chapter, I motivated the adoption of metaphysical absolutism as an 
assumption of the thesis. Here I aim to consider whether empty space can also satisfy 
the so-called Eleatic principle -  the thought that everything that exists must make a 
causal difference. I don’t aim to defend the Eleatic principle, but only to show that, 
for those who are so demanding, empty space may not, after all, prove so elusive.
Of course, being empty of objects, it might be thought that empty space could cause 
by omission, something Roy Sorensen suggests. In Seeing Dark Things, he urges, 
echoing David Lewis: “Empty space is deadly. But not because of what it does. 
Empty space is lethal because of what it fails to do.” (2008, p. 190).42 And:
“If you have no protection in the void, this would be the least of 
your worries. Your blood would boil. Not because empty space is 
hot. Rather because empty space fails to exert the pressure 
needed to keep your blood from boiling”, (my emphasis, ibid.)
In this chapter, I argue for a different conclusion. While vacua may well be lethal 
because of what they fail to do, absolute space has positively efficacious properties 
too, those that arise from its shape. Space, as I will argue, has ‘structural b iff . To this 
end, however, it is worth noting a rhetorical slip in the passage above.
Sorensen substitutes “void” for “empty space” (I have italicised the shift). But in the 
last chapter, I argued in favour of the assumption that empty space is something -  it is 
not nothing, an absence. Yet that it precisely what void is; an absence o f  spacetime. 
So why think that this distinction, or rather the failure to draw it, makes a difference?
42 See Lewis (2004, p. 277).
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If one treats empty space as void, as nothing, it can’t be perceived -  qua nothingness, 
how could it? But assuming that perception causally depends on its objects, in a sense 
yet to be explored, and supposing that empty space is perceived, it might be wondered 
whether this requires an attendant commitment to the reality of negative causation. I 
take up this question in Chapter Four, while here I make a start at assembling the 
conceptual materials required to make a response. I tease apart two questions that 
Sorensen’s conflation above entangles: I ask whether absolute space is efficacious 
and, if so, whether it functions as negative cause.
The chapter unfolds as follows. In §1, I outline some desiderata for being a cause that 
will guide us in the case of space. These are not exhaustive, but rather chart the 
conceptual terrain that must be negotiated in trying to characterize the causal 
character, if any, of space. In §2-6, I detail a disagreement between Nerlich and Robin 
LePoidevin concerning the efficacy of space and suggest that we need not choose 
between them. Rather, once a distinction is drawn between ‘effecting’ and ‘affecting’, 
we can grant that empty space is efficacious in the following sense: it is apt to affect 
its occupants. In §4, I offer a brief excursus on negative causation which in turn 
provides the backdrop for my conclusion. I outline in what sense empty space might 
be thought to be positively efficacious, though not without some renegotiation of the 
desiderata noted at the outset (§7-8).43
1.
There is some disagreement over what it takes to be a cause. To make a start at 
outlining where theorists diverge, I isolate five, non-exhaustive desiderata. This 
analysis is only cursory but it helps sketch a functional role that will later guide us in 
the case of space.
/. Insufficiency (1)
Causes are thought to be neither necessary nor sufficient for their effects (see Sosa 
and Tooley 1993, pp. 5-7); an effect can be brought about another way -  causes are
I am grateful to Ghislain Guigon for detailed com m ents  on an earlier version o f  this chap ter .
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not necessary for their effects. Likewise, since standing or background conditions are 
involved, the cause is not sufficient; it can’t act alone. For example, suppose my 
blowing out the candle causes its extinction. My blowing out the candle is not 
necessary for its extinction since a wisp of wind may pre-empt me. Similarly, even 
though my lighting the candle caused it to light, my lighting it is not sufficient. To 
light, the wick must be dry.
2. Locality (L)
We tend to think of causes and their effects as being in roughly the same region and 
as occurring at adjacent times; that’s why action at a distance is considered so 
peculiar, that and the fact that in such putative instances o f causation the time-like 
separation of causes and effects fails. Critically, however, this seems to be the case 
specifically on a conception of causation as intrinsic, as something ‘in’ the objects. 
Dowe (2009, p. 1), for example, insists: “singular causation obtains in virtue only of 
local factors, i.e. factors that obtain in the spatiotemporal region containing, and 
stretching between, the cause and the effect”.44
3. Reciprocity (R)
Intuitively we suppose that causes are apt to bring about their effects -  that is to say, 
we assume there must be some complicity between the effecting object or event and 
the effected object or event brought about. C. B. Martin casts this intuition in terms of 
what he terms of the Mutual Manifestation o f  Reciprocal Disposition Partners. 
Here’s his parade case:
“A typical causal situation is Locke’s case of the turning with a 
particular force a key of a particular shape, size and hardness, etc. in 
a lock of a particular shape, size and hardness, etc., that is showing a 
particular force of resistance or lacking of resistance, etc. to the key
for their mutual manifestation of an unlocking”. (1997, p. 204)
Take another standard case. When a billiard ball strikes another, causing it to move, 
we suppose that it moves not only because the cue was applied with sufficient force
44 A regularity theoris t might disagree. On a regularity v iew o f  causation (R V C ),  w h ether  two token
events instantia te a causal relation depends on w hether  they instantiate a regularity. Hence,  w h ether  a
paiticular sequence is causal depends not merely in the spatio tem poral region stretching be tween the 
putative cause and effect, but on occurrences  elsewhere in the universe (Psillos 2002, p. 68).
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and skill, but also because the balls are of a particular shape and rigidity. Such 
categorical properties ensure that the balls can reciprocally affect each other in the 
way they do -  viz. that the second ball rolls and doesn’t shatter (say) on contact.43
4. Connection (C)
Causation involves a bind or connection between causal relata. This can be spelt out 
in one of two ways:
Physical connection theorists maintain that a physical comiection is a necessary 
condition for causation, where this is so independently of how the ontology of that 
connection is understood. For Aronson (1971), for example, the ‘A ’ in ‘A causes B ’, 
“refers to an object that successfully transfers one of its quantities to the effect object” 
(1971, p. 422. For Salmon (1993), causal connections are processive - processes, he 
argues, are the means by which structure and order are propagated or transmitted from 
one spacetime region to another (p. 169). To emphasise the commonality between 
both species of theorist, I harness a term used by Lewis (2004) -  ‘b iff . Call ‘b iff  
whatever it is that flows or is transferred or exerted from one object or event to 
another, or in virtue of which causal processes are propagated. For the physical 
connectionist, irrespective of ontology, biff is physical.
The second way in which connections can be elaborated is intrinsically. On such a 
view, often called ADT (after Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley, its main proponents), 
no appeal to ‘b iff need be made, even if instances of biff-transfer turn out to be 
symptomatic of what is really doing the causal work: contingent necessitating 
relations between universals. For example, consider the toy ‘law’ that all ravens are 
black. On ADT, this doesn’t merely capture a regularity in nature where the properties 
of being a raven and being black are regularly co-instantiated (which they regularly 
are). Rather, on the assumption that this is a law, it expresses a relation (itself a 
higher-order universal) between two universals -  ravenhood and blackness -  where 
these are co-instantiated because there is a a relation of necessitation between them
451 return to the role tha t categorical properties have in grounding  disposit ions in C hapter  E ight.
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(see Psillos 2002, p. 162). For the ADT- theorist, this relation of necessitation is 
intrinsic.46
5. Difference M aking (L))
Causes are typically construed as difference-makers -  they are what make a difference 
(see Lewis 1973). Indeed this is a basic tenet of scientific explanation, at least on a 
subsumptivist strategy (see Cummins 1985). Here, however, we ought to note, with 
Williams (2005), an explanatory bias towards dynamic, not static dispositions. 
Dynamic dispositions are those the manifestation of which results in some kind of 
change within a world. In contrast, static dispositions are those the manifestation of 
which involves no change at all. Rather, their manifestation results only in the 
“maintenance of the status quo” (2005, p. 204). Such dispositions explain the 
soundness of a bridge, or, as Williams almost poetically puts it, what it takes for a 
small table to sit silent and motionless in the corner of the room.
Our question is if and how space meets these (or any of these) desiderata.
2 .
In The Shape o f  Space and elsewhere, Nerlich argues that we should resist the urge to 
think that space is efficacious. He asks us to consider Galileo’s insight that motion in 
a straight line is unforced, or uncaused. Take a flying arrow. The useful question is not 
what causes it to keep flying, but why does it ever stop? (Nerlich 2008) What causes 
it to stop is some force', a force might even cause it to accelerate, the wind say. But 
when the arrow is at rest or moving at a uniform velocity, it is motionless or so
46 Of course, it is not a law that all ravens are black, but rather a s ta tem ent that is true in our  w orld .  But 
consider a truth that also implies a law -  say the truth tha t ‘w ater  boils  at 100°’ . For the regu la ri ty  
theorist, the truth-makers for this s tatem ent are extrinsic - no particular instance o f  w a ter  boiling  at 
100 can render the s ta tem ent true. But as such, the regularity theoris t  has som e difficulty in sor t ing  
am ong 'g o o d '  regularities, as in the case o f  water,  and accidental ones,  as in the case o f  ravens.  In 
contrast, on A D T, an intrinsic nomic relation o f  necessi ta t ion  holds between the properties  o f  be ing  
water  and boiling at 100°. The d ifference with the raven case, then, is that although it is a un iv ersa l  
truth that all ravens are black, laws are relationships be tween universal qualities and quantit ies  ra the r  
than particulars that have those properties (and there is, w e  m igh t  p resum e, no law o f  na ture  tha t  
nomically relates ravenhood and blackness).  A s  such, laws can be expressed by s ingular s ta tem en ts  
about universal qualities and quantities rather than universal s ta tem ents  about  particulars  (D re tsk e  
1977, p. 253-4).
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moving precisely because nothing, no force, causes it to move or to change its track or 
speed. As such, the explanation of its rest or uniform motion is non-causal- it does not 
invoke a force (“we can speak of causes only when we can speak of forces”, Nerlich 
1979, p. 72).
The following case is treated as analogous:
“When I push to get my hand into a non-Euclidean hole, I don’t push 
against the hole. The push into the hole has to push my body parts 
against one another (or apart) so as to change the spatial relations 
among them and give my hand a non-Euclidean shape that can be in 
the hole...I don’t pressure the space and it doesn’t pressure me. I 
can’t push, pull or twist it; nor can it do that to me. Yet I feel the 
hole distinctly”. (Nerlich 1994, p. 40)
Here a ‘non-Euclidean hole’ is supposed to pick out regions of space of non-zero 
curvature. An appreciation of Nerlich’s point, then, requires that we imagine 
ourselves to inhabit worlds in which non-Euclidean holes are there to palpate. In the 
next chapter and in Chapter Six, I consider what the perceptual consequences of 
inhabiting such worlds would or could be. Here I try to spell out Nerlich’s contention 
that in such imaginative cases -  those where there are non-Euclidean holes to palpate 
- the reciprocity of causation is lacking: “I don’t pressure the space and it doesn’t 
pressure me. I can’t push, pull or twist it; nor can it do that to me”.
Nerlich’s claim is that were we to attempt to ‘squash’ our Euclidean selves into a non- 
Euclidean region, the geometrical structure of the space would restrict our passage. In 
attempting to push ourselves through it, the force we would have to apply would just 
be the force required to change the spatial relations in which parts of our Euclidean 
bodies stand to each other. Put simply, no outside force could be said to impinge upon 
or negate our efforts. The space itself would offer no resistance in the manner that an 
apple meeting the arrow would. Rather, writes Nerlich:
“The explanation of the struggle is that there isn’t the space (isn’t 
the shape) there for me to fit my hand or body into without the 
struggle. The structure of the hole independently of my filling it 
explains things. But not causally - it says nothing about how the 
hole pushes me or how I push it. It is geometrical explanation”.
(ibid., p. 41)
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The notion that the shape of things can play an explanatory role is familiar. When C.B. 
Martin explains the reciprocity involved in an unlocking, he appeals to, among other 
dispositions, the shape of the lock and key. Or take Hume’s billiard balls. The 
roundness of the balls explains their aptness to roll. In a famous passage, Hilary 
Putnam argues that the failure of a peg to pass through a hole is best explained not at 
the vague and ragged micro-level, but at the macro-level -  the level that invokes the 
shape of the peg and the hole. For in such explanation he says:
“certain relevant structural features of the situation are brought out.
The geometrical features are brought out. It is relevant that a square 
one inch high is bigger than a circle one inch around. And the 
relationship between the size and shape of the peg and the size and the 
shape of the holes is relevant”. (1975, p. 296)
Nerlich’s thought is somewhat analogous, though it does not involve appeal to the 
structure of material (just as for Putnam there is no need to invoke the geometric 
properties of immaterial space). Still, there is a commonality in both species of 
explanation. It might be thought that the explanatory role played by shape is non- 
causal. The failure of the peg to fit the hole does not depend on anything that the hole 
does to the peg.
Consider another example, one closer to the world we are in. Below is an illustration 
of an eggshell-shaped space (adapted from Nerlich 1994, p. 83). A ’ is a patch of 
paper.
In contemplating its freedom of movement, Nerlich writes:
Clearly, a thing in the two-space defined by an eggshell cannot 
move freely about it without changing its shape [this thing is x in the
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figure above]. If [x...] were a paper patch lying on the eggshell, 
then it would tear if we tried to fit it onto flatter areas near the 
middle of the shell, or it would wrinkle if we tried to fit it onto the 
more acutely curved regions near the ‘pointed’ end. If it were to 
slide along the space then it would have to  deform like an 
elastic thing (stretch, not merely bend) or it would resist the motion.”
(ibid, p. 83)
So, if the patch were to move closer to the edges it would have to wrinkle to ‘fit’. 
Likewise, it would tear if we tried to spread it on the flatter, less curved region in the 
middle. By analogy, think of trying on an ill-fitting garment, a jumper say. To fit the 
girth or shape of the underlying body, it may have to stretch, or, if its sleeves are too 
long, it may wrinkle at the wrists and have to be rolled up. The analogous idea is that 
matter may have to change shape to take up paths in space that are peculiarly curved 
or shaped.
Of course, our experience of space is not like this. Unlike the patch paper, or an ill- 
fitting jumper, things do not change shape, they do not wrinkle or spread in trying to 
move through regions of empty space.47 But this in turn suggests that the shape of 
space in our vicinity is of relatively constant curvature; it does not require that we, or 
items in it, change shape in order to move through it. Indeed, as Nerlich writes, “our 
experience of how things move in space suggests they are very freely mobile” (ibid.). 
But, as such, the shape of space explains our free movement in it. For Nerlich, since 
such explanation appeals to the geometric properties of space, it is non-causal.
Now, one motivation for insisting that the shape o f space explains geometrically, not 
causally, is that, as Nerlich writes in The Shape o f  Space, “there is still no consensus 
yet on what we mean by cause” (ibid., p. 41). In a much earlier article, however, he 
writes:
“I take cause to be, fundamentally, a relation among events, causal 
efficacy to require one event to make another happen or, at least, one 
thing s having a disposition to change another which is manifested 
under certain conditions (elasticity is manifested in collisions, for 
example)”. (1979, p. 70)
17 Naturally the patch and garm ent do not m ove through the surface they try to c leave to -  the egg-she ll  
or the body ol the wearer. They m ove over It. Still, I hope the analogy is clear: the idea is that the sh ap e  
of the items must change as a function o f  the shape o f  the area they m o v e  through o r  over.
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On these grounds, then, Nerlich might be thought to endorse desiderata (R) and (D), 
while later we find him writing that “space absorbs no energy, exerts no force, enters 
no reaction” (ibid., p. 78). To this extent, then, he seems to embrace a physical 
connections reading of (C). Indeed, a broader sense of causal efficacy is. he notes, “a 
deviant one” (1979, p. 70). I return to this charge below. First, I consider one final 
explanation (or at least from the point of view of this exposition) the shape of space, 
as Nerlich contends, provides.
It is a familiar fact that our hands are ‘handed’ and so cannot be made to coincide 
with each other, a point which intrigued Immanuel Kant. In Concerning the Ultimate 
Ground o f  the Differentiation o f  Directions in Space, he observed, “the limits of the 
one cannot also be the limits of the other” (1992 [1768], p. 369), later noting that the 
surface enclosing the space of one hand “cannot serve as a boundary to limit the other, 
no matter how that surface be twisted and turned” (1992 [1768], p. 371 ).48 Cast 
somewhat differently we may say that worlds in which they do coincide are 
geometrically inaccessible from the worlds we are in - recall, this notion was spelt 
out when considering Forbes’ phenomenalistic reduction of unoccupied places. For 
example, if we embed an ‘L’ in a two-dimensional Euclidean plane, like this sheet of 
paper, it is asymmetric. But if it is embedded in something like a Mobius strip, it can 
be moved rigidly around the space such that it can be folded back on itself -  viz. so 
that the limits of the one can be the limits of the other (see Nerlich ibid., p. 71).
Now, the resources available to the relationist and absolutist to explain the 
accessibility or otherwise in these cases are distinct. For the relationist, geometrically 
inaccessible worlds are simply those at which certain counterfactuals fail to obtain. So 
the ‘Mobius strip world’ is distinguished from the ‘sheet world’ in terms of the bare 
holding of distinct counterfactuals. Unlike the relationist, however, the Absolutist has 
an explanation as to why distinct counterfactuals hold -  the worlds are not 
distinguished by the bare holding of distinct counterfacuals, rather they are 
distinguished by what grounds the holding of those counterfactuals in the first place; 
namely the shape of the relevant region. On this understanding, then, but not the first, 
what paths are available to an occupant of a particular space depends on the shape of
48 Both quotations com e from Pooley (2003. p. 252). See also Nerlich (2009).
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the space it inhabits. Hence, what the occupant can do, or what can happen to that 
occupant, depends on the shape of the region. For Nerlich. explaining this much 
requires a style of explanation that is non-causal since, just like the peg and the hole, 
space doesn’t do anything -  it doesn’t “sustain the handedness of objects by some 
action it performs upon them or some disposition it has to make things handed (or 
not)” (ibid., p. 72).
It might be wondered, then, whether this conclusion does not make tempting a move 
to relationism after all - if space doesn’t do anything, why admit it into our ontology? 
What Nerlich shows, however, is that the non-efficacy of space is in fact no reason to 
doubt its reality. Space does do something: it explains, albeit non-causally. What's 
more, the relevant explanation is grounded; it is grounded, appropriately, in the shape 
of space. To wit:
“I take geometrical explanation, a kind that calls on local or global 
shapes for space, to be a kind of explanation all its own. It is like 
causal explanation in that it explains events, and like it in that the
explanans needs to be understood as a real concrete thing for the
explanation to make sense”, (ibid., pp. 41- 42)
Hence, the charge that empty space is inefficacious does not require that we side with
the Eleatic stranger -  as Nerlich puts it, to be an explanans, empty space must be real
and concrete. In §4, I consider a distinct account that meets the stranger’s demands -  
that set out by LePoidevin (1992). First, however, I say a little about negative 
causation, so going some way towards teasing apart the two questions I took 
Sorensen’s collapse to entangle at the outset.
3.
Above, I sketched an attempt by Nerlich to show that not all explanation is causal. 
The shape of space explains geometrically. Allowing this much, then, requires that we 
expand our notion of explanation while preserving a certain understanding of causal 
efficacy; one on which one event is required to make another happen, “or, at least, one
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thing's having a disposition to change another which is manifested under certain 
conditions” (Nerlich 1979, p. 70).
A somewhat different tack, however, is to expand instead our notion of causation, and 
to preserve the thought that all explanation is causal. LePoidevin, who observes that 
Nerlich’s take on causal efficacy is “narrow” and “mechanical” (1992. p. 151), adopts 
this strategy. In §4, I show in what sense LePoidevin’s broader understanding, one 
which Nerlich would no doubt dub “deviant”, is thereby akin to treatments of negative 
causation that I designate here as ‘functionalist’. I spell out the import of this 
designation here.
An expedient way of bringing the notion of negative causation into view is to consider 
the ‘neuron’ diagrams below. The first diagram represents causation by omission, 
while the second represents positive causation. Conventions are as follows. Filled 
circles represent firing ‘neurons’ or occurring events, while unfilled circles represent 
non-firing ‘neurons’ or absences. Arrows represent ‘stimulatory synapses’ or physical 
connections, while lines terminating with black dots represent inhibitory synapses or 
preventions (see Schaffer 2000, also Armstrong 1999).
Flowers wilt
F ig u re  3: C au sa t io n  by o m is s io n
Inebriation
Whisky consum ption
F ig u re  4: P o s i t iv e  C au sa t io n
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The first diagram represents causation by omission - the causal relation is represented 
by the line terminating in a dot - while the filled circle in the second diagram 
represents the positively efficacious power of whisky to inebriate; hence the arrow. 
Together these help us sort among two broad species of causal theorist.
A genuinist about negative causation is a theorist that acknowledges the existence of 
causal relations terminating in a dot, while a non-genuinist admits only biff-like or 
intrinsic connections; those represented by an arrow. For the genuinist, then, unfilled 
circles represent genuine entities which can act as causal relata -  hence the presence 
of an inhibitory synapse terminating in a dot. For the non-genuinist, however, since 
absences are not genuine entities, they cannot ground or field the causal relation. The 
non-genuinist, then, rejects the notion that the first diagram represents a causal event 
of any species; by non-geniunist lights, the genuinist take on causal efficacy is 
“deviant”. So how does the genuinist justify such deviancy?
Schaffer (2005, p. 329), a genuinist, lists four reasons.
First, causal explanations that invoke absences, lacks, failures, preventions or 
omissions are intuitively acceptable -  for example, we accept that the room is in 
darkness because the curtains are drawn (and so prevent sunlight from entering).
Second, explanations of the form ‘an absence of x caused y ’ are ubiquitous in the 
empirical sciences -  a lack of vitamin D is said to cause rickets (see Schaffer 2004, p. 
202 for a host of examples).
Third, absences play the moral and legal role of causes and effects -  one can be tried 
and found guilty for not doing something, as in cases of neglect, or for failing to 
prevent the occurrence of something -  for example, the bank clerk that fails to lock a 
safe may fail to prevent a robbery (and so too the occurrence of another absence; 
namely of money in the vault).49
49 rl-or an account o t  negative action see Varzi (2007).
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Fourth, causative verbs of ordinary language include verbs of disconnection -  i.e. 
uncouple, disengage, part, untie, cleave, disjoin, rend. But since negative causes often 
cause by disconnection (the curtains cause the room to darken because they ‘cut o ff  
the sunlight that would otherwise have entered), this too seems evidence for a species 
of causation mediated by absence or non-occurrence.
For such a theorist, then, what is emphasized is the functional role that absences play 
in our explanatory practices. As such, the notion of causation is functionally defined. 
For example, Schaffer (2004) recommends the following strategy:
“Conjoin our most central platitudes involving the concept, replacing 
the term “causes” by the variable R , and uniquely existentially 
quantifying over the conjunction. The best satisfier of this definition 
then deserves to be considered the best candidate to be the meaning 
of our actual concept. The central platitudes involving causation are 
to be drawn from the conceptual connotations, paradigm cases, and 
theoretical applications of the concept. Thus the functional definition 
of causation will look something like:
“There exists a unique relation R such that: R is associated with 
counterfactual dependence & R is associated with statistical 
relevance & R is associated with agential means & R is necessary for 
inferential evidence & R is necessary for explanation & R is 
necessary for moral responsibility & . . . & / ?  holds between heart 
damage and death & R holds between trigger pullings and gun 
firings & R holds between volitions and actions R secures
the reference of names & R is involved in rational decision & R is 
the genera of perception & . . .”. (p. 206)
Call such a theorist a causal functionalist. Unlike the non-genuinist, whose rejection 
of absence causation might be thought to stem from the inability of absences to 
ground causal relations, the functionalist does not require causes to be grounded at all 
(though in some cases they might be). And this is because, as the above passage 
illustrates, the functional definition of cause itself appeals to explanatory 
considerations and so cannot be thought of as grounding them. As such, the 
functionalist might be thought to expand the notion of causation while treating all 
explanation as causal -  a cause is just whatever explains.
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Finally, it is worth noting something about the ontology of absences which the 
representation above may obscure.'0 Absences are spatially located. When flowers 
wilt due to a lack of rain, there is a place at which there is a lack of rain, or at which 
rain is absent. 1 return to this point in Chapter Five. In the next section. I consider 
LePoidevin’s argument in support of the claim that space is efficacious.
4.
Le Poidevin (1992) notes two reasons that might lead to a rejection of the claim the 
space is efficacious:
First, whatever intrinsic property we attribute to space or its parts, all regions are 
homogeneous with respect to that property. Hence, since causal laws are invariant 
across regions, no particular region can make a causal difference since all regions are 
the same. Call this the Homogeneity worry.
Second, even if we argue that the topological properties of space are causally 
explanatory of the behaviour of objects, such properties are global. But desiderata (L) 
said that we ought to seek out causes at particular or local spatio-temporal locations. 
Call this the problem of Locality.
Now, in responding to these concerns, LePoidevin’s strategy is to appeal to just the 
considerations Nerlich does. Rather than being homogenous, spacetime regions differ 
intrinsically as a function of their curvature. But notice this defuses both worries at 
once. Regions are not homogenous after all, and local geometric properties can make 
a difference to occupants of that region, namely as a function of their dulations or 
convolutions. With this much established, then, LePoidevin makes the following 
move: He seeks to argue that particular, local regions of space are causally efficacious 
in virtue of their geometric properties. But, we might wonder, isn’t this just the thesis 
Nerlich denies?
i0 See M audlin (1990) on the importance o f  the distinguishing the ontology o f  the representation from 
the ontology o f  w hat  is represented .
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Nerlich, recall, treats space as inert. Since space absorbs no energy, exerts no force, 
enters no reaction, it cannot enter into reciprocal relations with its inhabitants. To 
diffuse Nerlich's claim, then, LePoidevin must address two assumptions implicitly 
underpinning Nerlich's reluctance. First, that causality must involve some kind of 
biff-like transfer or connection, and second, and relatedly, the thought that empty 
space thereby fails the reciprocity desideratum. He deals with the first assumption 
quickly:
“Graham Nerlich considers geometrical explanation - that is, 
explanation of the behaviour of objects by reference to the geometrical 
properties of space - to be non-causal because “Space absorbs no 
energy, exerts no force, enters no reaction” ([1979], p. 78). But this is 
to take a rather narrow, mechanical view of causation. Is it obvious, 
for example, that causal interaction essentially involves energy 
transfer? How would mental causation fit into Nerlich's 
characterization? Perhaps causation does have mechanical 
connotations, but if causal potency is to be used as a criterion for 
something's existence then the consequences of a restrictive 
conception of causality will be an impoverished ontology.” (ibid., p.
151)
LePoidevin, then, would rather expand our notion of causation than render 
explanation heterogeneous (at least in this instance)?1 But to this extent, he might be 
cast as a causal functionalist. The second objection offered is a little more substantive. 
He aims to show that space can meet the reciprocity desideratum. His argument runs 
as follows:
On the General Theory of Relativity, the distribution of matter in space affects its 
curvature. A change in the distribution of matter then should effect a change in the 
shape of space. The critical question is whether this change occurs simultaneously.
The reciprocity required for causation requires that change is non-simultaneous -  we 
typically assume that cause and effect are time-like separated. But if so, a puzzle 
arises. Given that we are talking about space-time, if times are distinct, then so are the 
regions', there can be no change in regions across times since, at any given time, the
51 In Chapter Four, I outline his notion o f  Chronometrie explanation.
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regions are distinct. So how can there be causal change in a region at all? Either way, 
we are left with a paradox:
“the action is supposed to be a reciprocal action: the change in the 
distribution of matter results in a change in the curvature which in 
turn produces a change in the distribution of matter. That is, the 
effect of the distribution of matter on spacetime results in a change 
in that distribution”, (ibid., p. 152)
But if that change is simultaneous -  viz. if a change in distribution of matter results in 
a change of curvature - then this would entail that one region has two distinct 
geometries at a time (viz. since a change in the distribution of matter is caused by 
change in curvature). Yet by the same token, if the relevant causation is non- 
simultaneous then this, as noted, entails that same region persists at two distinct 
times, which, in a spacetime context, makes no sense. LePoidevin then makes a 
another move:
He argues that to cause a particular (in this case some matter) to have some property 
(in this case some distributional property) is not necessarily to bring about a change in 
that particular at a time even i f  change is involved. I spell this idea out using the 
example that LePoidevin offers as illustrative.
Consider a particle created at one moment and annihilated at the next and which has 
some intrinsic property G. He asks: “Are we to say that there cannot be a cause of this 
particle’s being G because there is no time at which it was not G? Of course, not” (p. 
153). Rather the cause of the particle’s being G precedes its existence. But likewise, 
the dependency of the geometry of a region on a particular distribution of matter need 
not involve a change in the properties of that region at a time (the analogous question 
is: “Are we to say that there cannot be a cause of a region’s having a particular 
geometry at a time because there was no time at which it did not have that geometry? 
Of course not”). Rather the way matter was distributed earlier can affect the curvature 
later, and vice versa -  the way the curvature was earlier can affect the distribution of 
matter later.
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This idea is spelt out in terms of future light-cones; the sum of all paths that light 
emanating from a single event would take in all directions. He writes:
“What we should say then, is that the distribution of objects in a 
given region affects the curvature of spacetime only in the forward 
light-cone of that region, not in the region itself. Similarly, the 
curvature of a certain region affects the distribution of objects only 
in the forward light-cone of that region”, (my emphasis, ibid., p.
153)
Hence, the relation can be reciprocal without entailing that the same region persists at 
two distinct times. This completes LePoidevin’s argument for the efficaciousness of 
space.52 How compelling, though, is his case against Nerlich?
Nerlich seems to require both that we admit a distinct kind of explanation -  geometric 
explanation -  and that we embrace non-causal criteria for admitting something into 
our ontology. We might therefore welcome LePoidevin’s more inclusive functionalist 
take on causation, which anyway preserves Nerlich’s primary insight -  namely, that 
the shape of space explains the character and nature of the movement of objects in it. 
(As Nerlich notes, this causalist thesis “is an obvious boost to the idea that space is a 
real, concrete, mediating thing” (1994, pp. 40-41)). Even so, it appears to me that 
Nerlich’s worry remains. Consider again the case of attempting to push one’s hand 
inside a non-Euclidean hole. Nerlich urges:
“The explanation of the struggle is that there isn’t the space (isn’t 
the shape) there for me to fit my hand or body into it without the 
struggle. The structure of the hole independently of my filling it 
explains things. But not causally -  it says nothing about how the 
hole pushes me or how I push it. It is geometrical explanation”.
(ibid., p. 41)
So how should we adjudicate? In the next section, I suggest that we may not have to 
-  a conciliatory thesis can be advanced.
52 It might be objected that this account undermines our intuitive conception o f  the causal relation as 
transitive. Hall (2000 , p. 198) for example, writes: "T h at  causation is, necessarily , a transitive re lation  
between events seem s to many a bedrock datum, one o f  the few indisputable a priori insights we have 
into the workings o f  the concept"’. I agree that causation is transit ive. However,  the thought that 
causation by spacetime disrupts our concept o f  the transitivity o f  the causal chain arguably only m akes  
sense on the implicit assumption that causal partners need to be pa th-connected .
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5.
Notice that on both LePoidevin’s account for the efficaciousness of space, and on 
Nerlich’s argument against it, distinct (ostensible) causal partners are arguably 
posited. LePoidevin claims to discover a reciprocity between the distribution of matter 
in space and its curvature; the relevant causal partners, then, are matter and spacetime. 
For Nerlich, however, a lack of reciprocity is found between particulars53 in space -  
me and my hand or body -  and space itself, where space is found to “absorb no 
energy, exert no force, enter no reaction.” But this being so, perhaps we need not 
choose between them.
LePoidevin aims to causally explain the shape of spacetime; we causally explain its 
topological and geometric properties as a function of the distribution of matter in it. 
But Nerlich seeks to explain the behaviour of particular objects in space over time, 
namely, by reference to its geometrical properties, where those properties are fixed - 
“the structure of the hole independently of my filling it explains things” (ibid., p. 41). 
Recall, however, that LePoidevin’s account explains how a certain distribution of 
objects in a given region can affect the curvature of spacetime in the forward light- 
cone o f  that region. It is consistent then with LePoidevin’s thesis that the curvature of 
space is fixed  at a time. But this suggests grounds for a conciliatory thesis.
Earlier, we noted C. B. Martin’s claim that cause and effect should be explained in 
terms of the mutual manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners. On such an 
understanding, the relation between distribution of matter and the curvature of 
spacetime can be construed as reciprocal, and hence, as LePoidevin insists, causal. 
Not so, however, the relation of particulars to the space in which they are located -  a 
point Nerlich urges. But this seems puzzling. Some particulars are material. So both 
theses cannot be right. Take some material particular x. It seems that both (a) and (b) 
below cannot be jointly held.
53 Here I mean particulars in the 'en t i t ies ’ sense -  see Chapter One.
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(a) x causally affects the curvature of spacetime -  LePoidevin's Thesis
(b) x enters into no causal reaction with space -  Nerlich '5 Intuition
I suggest, however, that once we recognize that we can individuate x either as a 
particular or as a fragment of matter, both can be accommodated. To develop this 
notion further, I note a distinction detailed by Mellor (1995).
Mellor suggests we distinguish between causation that brings something into being, 
and causation that merely affects something already existent:
“Kim gives her father-in-law,...an injection to make his death 
painless. The injection affects his death, but does not cause it.
Here the affected particular is an event. But things too, including 
people, can be affected. In perception, for example, we are 
affected but not caused by the things we see and hear”, (pp. 140- 
144)
Call a cause that brings something into being effective - it’s action effects. And call a 
cause that affects things already existent one that affects those entities. If LePoidevin’s 
account is correct then the following ought to be said: The curvature of spacetime 
effects the distribution of matter in it -  it brings into being a certain constellation of 
matter in the forward light-cone of that region. Even so, as Nerlich recognises, it 
merely affects particulars; it constrains the way they move for example.
It seems to me, then, that the following resolution is plausible and attractive: The 
mutual manifestation of reciprocity applies to the distribution of matter and the 
curvature of spacetime, not to particulars and the space in which they find themselves. 
Hence, even while space affects particulars, particulars, qua particulars, are powerless 
to affect space (unlike particulars, qua fragments of matter which do effect the 
curvature of spacetime). Thus, space is efficacious in its power, not to effect, but to 
affect -  it constrains the movement of material particulars in space.
Notice, then, that this requires endorsing an expanded, or as Nerlich would have it, 
“deviant” understanding of causal efficacy. Still, it preserves the idea that explanation 
is causal -  causes are what explain. On this expanded view, then, emptiness is 
efficacious. But whether or not this more inclusive strategy is compelling, what is
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important is the insight from which it ultimately derives - Nerlich's insight that the 
shape of space is explanatory. Henceforth, I use the term "affect’ in this technical 
sense and I treat it as causal. As such, I am inclined to adopt a functionalist approach, 
though admittedly I adopt this without argument.
6 .
So far I have considered two realist arguments that disagree over whether space is 
efficacious. Nerlich urges that space is not a cause but nonetheless explains. He 
thereby advocates a distinct species of explanation -  geometric explanation. In 
contrast, LePoidevin, who is also a realist, essentially suggests that we can embrace a 
less mechanical notion of cause so as to allow that space, insofar as it can effect 
changes in distributions of matter, is efficient. As I have noted, such a view might be 
considered functionalist in its characterization of causation.
Now, at the outset, I unraveled two questions that seemed to be conflated on 
Sorensen’s identification of void and empty space: the question as to whether empty 
space is efficacious and, if so, whether it functions as negative cause. We are now in a 
position to offer a response.
Drawing on both Nerlich and LePoidevin, I have tried to generate an argument for the 
efficacy of empty space. I have suggested that it is efficacious in its power, not to 
effect, but to affect, and I have argued, after Nerlich, that this flows from its shape. 
But this in turn explains why empty space has positive efficacious properties after all. 
The aptness of space to affect flows from its shape. As such, it might be suggested 
that empty space has structural biff. I gloss this notion below. Even so, a question 
remains. Surely, empty space, qua cause, is peculiar precisely because it is empty. 
Does it not then act as a negative cause?
It seems to me that whether or not space can be said to act as a negative cause 
depends on what effect is in question. Void is lethal because, as Lewis explains:
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“you are kept alive by the forces and flows of energy that come 
from the objects that surround you. If instead of objects, you 
were surrounded by a void, these life-sustaining forces and flows 
would cease”. (2004, p. 277)
This, then, is how the void causes death. It is deadly not because it exerts forces and 
supplies energy, but because it doesn't.34 But the ostensible ‘effect’ I aim to consider, 
and which an appeal to negative causation might be thought to explain, is the 
perception of empty space.53 I return to this issue in Chapter Four. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I consider negative causation in a general sense, and I explain in what 
sense the power of empty space to affect is not thereby negative.
Consider why the non-genuinuist rejects negative causation.36 Three worries can be 
advanced.
First, absences simply lack biff; they are propertyless.
Second, and relatedly, absences generate what Lewis (2004, p. 281) calls ‘The 
Problem of the Missing RelatunT. Relations need relata, but absences are nothing. 
Hence, if causal interaction involves biff, to what or where is the biff transferred or 
propagated? On the other hand, if causation involves necessitation relation between 
universals, as the intrinsic connections theorist has it, what can ground or ‘field’ the 
relation?57
Finally, negative causes must be located; they must be located along a path where b iff 
would otherwise have flown. For some non-genuinists, this is problematic. Hall (2002, 
p. 279) for example writes:
“right now I am typing on my computer at home, and hence fail 
to be typing on the computer in my office. Assuming this 
omission has a location, is it taking place there or here?”
54 Notably, Lewis does not m ake the slip Sorensen does (see also Chapter I). Still, when it com es to 
absences, “ the void is like the vacuum only m ore so” (2004, p. 278).
55 See Snowdon (1990) for a critical discussion o f  the idiom o f  cause and effect when applied to 
experience.
56 See Beebee (2004) for a detailed treatm ent o f  this dismissal.
57 As Armstrong, an intrinsic connections theorist, urges: “ [e]very causal situation develops it does as a 
result o f  the presence o f  positive factors alone” (1999, p. 177).
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With these concerns in mind, it might be wondered: Do the same worries apply in the 
case of space? If so, some parity would be revealed that might in turn explain 
Sorensen’s indifferent treatment of void and empty space.
As noted, the non-genuinist theorist disputes the plausibility of causation by absence 
on the grounds that absences are propertyless -  they are nothingnesses. But if the 
argument advanced so far is correct, and, of course, if absolutism is assumed, then this 
is simply not true in the case of empty space. Empty space has topological and 
geometric properties that explain its power to affect. But, as such, it is not after all 
biffless. It has, I suggest, structural biff.
One might think of structural biff on an Aristotelian model, not as involving efficient 
or material causation, but as formal, where here, of course, it is not the arrangement of 
matter that counts but the structure of immaterial empty space/8
So what about the problem of the Missing Relatum?
One motivation for pressing this worry is that absences are propertyless, and hence 
have no properties to ground the relation that non-genuinists insist is required for 
causation. I have argued above, however, that unlike absences and omissions, empty 
space is not after all propertyless; it is a bona fide  entity. Even so, the problem of the 
Missing Relatum has some intuitive force. After all, what could be grounding the 
relation in the case of empty space?
As I have indicated, for a non-genuist who believes in biff-like causation the causal 
relation is conceived of as operating through space; causal relations are path-mediated 
physical connections. Hence, if there is nothing at some place, there is nothing to 
ground the relation. But consider, in contrast, the case of space. Particulars are not 
path-connected to the space they are in. Yet this does not mean that the relatum -  
space - is missing.
58 O f  course, the notion o f  formal causation is m eant to apply to materiaI causes o f  a certain form. My 
suggestion is that the form o f  immaterial space can be likened to the Aristotelian notion o f  a form al 
cause.
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Something is ‘missing’ if there is somewhere where it could have been but isn't. Since, 
however, space is that somewhere, it is a condition on something being present or 
missing in the first place. Hence, to the extent that the relatum is not in space, it is 
‘missing’ -  viz. it is absent at some place (naturally since it is the place where 
absences or presences are located). But to the extent that it exists -  it is space itself -  
it is very much present. I pick up this thought in Chapters Four and Five.
Finally, Hall objects that absences are not located. But naturally, nor is space- as I 
have indicated, things, including absences, are located in it.
Space, then, does not then act negatively, or not merely so. Rather, as I have argued, it 
has structural biff.
7.
At the outset, I gave a set of non-exhaustive desiderata. We are now in a position to 
consider the case of space in light of these. So far I have implicitly addressed 
desiderata (C), (R) and (L).
I have suggested that the aptness of space to affect need not involve a connection 
whereby causes and effects are understood to share the same space. Space is apt to 
affect its occupants, but they do not share the same space. Rather they are in it.
Likewise, reciprocity can be understood to hold so long as the relevant causal partners 
are spacetime and matter. Where fragments of matter are individuated as particulars, 
reciprocity fails.
Finally, locality need not fail in the case of space so long as it is granted that local 
causation need not operate through space. This is because local spacetime regions 
differ in their intrinsic curvature, and are thereby apt to exercise their affect at those 
regions.
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What about the remaining desiderata?
Our first desideratum -  Insufficiency (I) - said that causes are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for their effects. But since space places necessary constraints on the 
movements of objects, this seems undermined. We can, I think, circumvent this 
worry.
First, (I) can be honoured once we acknowledge that the relevant necessity applies 
only to spaces of certain dimensions. If space were of four dimensions then we would 
be constrained to move in four dimensions, not three, and surely it is not necessary 
that the space we are in is of three dimensions.
Second, since our question concerns the efficacy of empty space, it is certainly true 
that, qua affective cause, space is insufficient for its effects. Why? Because entities to 
affect -  particulars - are also required. So how about our final desideratum?
(D) insisted that causes are difference makers. But, as I will argue, space is a 
difference maker. The shape of space can make a difference to how and where things 
move. But as such, as I will explain, it makes a difference to how empty space 
appears and feels.
I pick up this thread in the next chapter.
in mice:
In this chapter I have argued that in granting that empty space is efficacious, we need 
not insist that it is efficacious in virtue of what it fails to do. Rather, empty space has 
positive causal properties that affect the way objects move. The biff possessed by 




While at our  feet, the voice o f  crystal bubbles
- John Keats, I Stood Tip-toe on a Little H ill
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks of St. Augustine’s enquiry into 
time:
“Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know 
when we are supposed to give an account of it is something that we 
need to remind ourselves o f ’ (1997, p. 42, §89).
Less often quoted is the sentence in parenthesis that follows: “And it is obviously 
something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself’. In this chapter, I 
argue that what is true of time is also true of empty space and specifically our 
apprehension of it, and I try to provide the requisite ‘reminder’. I argue that we see 
empty space. My dialectical strategy is to consider two ways of making sense of this 
claim.
First, I examine the notion that we see empty space by perceiving the surfaces of 
objects. Then I consider an ostensibly more radical claim -  the claim that empty space 
has a look. On this understanding, but not the first, empty space has visible properties. 
Drawing once more Nerlich, I try to make this thought intelligible. I argue that the 
look of space flows from its shape, which in turn explains the peculiar difficulty in 
‘reminding’ oneself in the case of empty space; because empty space is uniformly flat 
and colourless, we tend to overlook its appearance.59
The chapter unfolds as follows. I begin by spelling out why appeal to untutored 
phenomenology is, in the case of seeing empty space, apt to puzzle (§1-2). In §3, I
5<) In Chapter Five, I outline an alternative account o f  seeing empty space -  the Structural V iew  
defended by Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (201 I).
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outline an account on which one comes to be aware of the presence of empty space by 
perceiving the surfaces of objects. I detail in what sense this position might lead one 
to accept commitments that are otherwise unattractive. In §4, I outline what seems, on 
the face of it, to be a more radical thesis -  the idea that empty space has visible 
properties that are directly perceived. I explain in what sense the view I outline differs 
from that of Graham Nerlich, to which it is otherwise indebted (§5). In §6, I sketch a 
way of domesticating the claim that empty space has visible properties. M. G. F. 
Martin proposes that the visible properties of individuals are those that warrant 
comparative statements of the form ‘x looks F’. By appeal to such claims, I try to 
characterise the look of empty space. I argue that it looks ‘clear’ and ‘see-through’. I 
close by countenancing some objections (§7).60
1.
Naively, unreflectingly, we might happily take ourselves to perceive empty space. 
When we see someone across a crowded room, we might be thought to see the space 
that separates us. To use the metaphor introduced in Chapter One, when sketching a 
room, we know what to leave blank -  the bits representing the empty space that, when 
we look up from our sketchpad, we can see. Likewise, just as we can erase an object 
to leave that bit of paper blank, in removing some object from a place -  a chair say -  
we might suppose that we can bring empty space into view.61
601 am grateful to Kevin M ulligan and Sean Enda Power for com m ents  on an earlier draft, as well as to 
an anonym ous reviewer at the European Journal o f  Philosophy. Som e o f  the material in this ch ap te r  
was presented at a W ork  In Progress sem inar at E d inburgh University and at a Philosophy and 
Psychology Sem inar at the University o f  G lasg ow .
61 The thought that empty space has an appearance, at least under certain conditions, is not en tire ly 
without precedent. In a 1925 paper entitled “T h e  Glassy Sensation”, E. F. M öller  assesses a claim m a d e  
five years earlier by F. Schum ann. In his ‘Die Repräsentation des leeren Raumes im Bewußtsein. Eine 
neue Empfindung', Schum ann had reported that, under certain circum stances,  subjects  w ere  found to 
describe empty space as filled with a “glass body”, “frozen air” or  “ transparent ice” , a fact which  he 
equates with the discovery o f  a new sensation, a ‘glassy sensation’. Möller presents  as his task the 
description and determination o f  this sensation, and the conditions o f  its arousal. A series o f  b izarre  
phenomenological reports are detailed, including the following (pp. 280-283):
“ I g lanced up at the treetops and saw the branches held rigidly apart by som e solid 
m edium  which was perfectly transparent,  ye t plainly there before the gray o f  the 
sky. It seem ed to hold the branches stiffly, as if  they were frozen in it.”
“ I saw the library and the snow as i f  they w ere  all set in a glass paper-weight.  I 
almost expected to walk  into a wall o f  glass, only the wall was all around m e too .”
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Still, when we think about it we might begin to wonder. For example, some of our 
intuitions could be cast very differently. When we see someone across a crowded 
room, perhaps we only see that we are spatially related to them. When we leave 
blanks in our sketch, perhaps we depict regions where there is nothing to see, not 
regions where something -  empty space -  is seen.62 In seeing a paper cut-out, say of a 
castle, we may only see a peculiarly holed object, one with an odd morphology, not 
the empty spaces where paper has been cut out to form the battlements.
Such thoughts may recruit some elementary metaphysics: If empty space is nothing, 
how can it be seen? If space is or involves absence, and absence is powerless, how 
can it shore up in our perceptions? How can there be anything but matter? These 
issues were partly addressed in Chapters One and Two.
Yet intuitions aside, and without thinking metaphysically, even phenomenology might 
give us reason to pause if asked whether empty space is seen, at least if our 
introspective reflection is also guided by a folk psychological account of seeing. For 
example, we might suppose that we only see what is coloured, and space is colourless. 
Not dissimilarly, one might reason, drawing on some introductory physics, since light 
passes through empty space, it is transparent, and so invisible.
I begin by explaining why such reflections are not conclusive -  it is just not obvious 
that empty space is thereby invisible.
“I suddenly saw that the glass in the door  was no longer a a thin sheet, but w as  
now merely part o f  the the bulk that extended Into the next room as far as I can 
see.”
Notably, Moller concludes that this appearance has a central origin, and so is not sensory. See 
Mausfeld (forthcoming) for contem porary  reflection on this “ sensa t ion” .
" Recall that in Chapter  O n e  I motivated absolutism as an assum ption .
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2.
Transparent materials neither absorb nor reflect light but allow it to pass with very 
little or no loss. Air is transparent, as is refined glass. Naturally, space is not material 
but, like transparent media, light passes through it. So is it not, then, invisible?
For Mizrahi (2010), transparency and invisibility “go hand in hand” - the more 
transparent, the less visible.
“Transparency and visibility therefore appear to be opposite notions.
In order to see behind or through a body, there must be no visible 
obstacle. If a body is spatially located between the observer and the 
background, the background is visible provided only that the 
intermediate body is not seen”, (p. 4)63
Of course, transparent things are not always invisible. If glass is smudged or smeared, 
it is visible. Or if its boundaries or edges can be seen, perhaps because they are thicker 
and invite refraction. In his neglected paper “Thing and Medium”, Fritz Heider 
explains why this is so. In such instances, the glass no longer acts as a medium:
“One cannot get much information about a transparent pane of glass 
as long as one lets it act as a medium. One can look through it as if it 
were clear air. Only if one touches it with one’s hand (...) can one 
get information about the pane itself. This is also the case when it is 
possible to see its edge, or when one sees it from the side and notices 
a thin glittering line. In all these case it does not act as a pure 
medium”. (1959, p. 49)64
But glittering lines aside, perfectly clean glass is invisible, and typically we don’t 
wonder why. As Mizrahi puts it, canonically, I think:
“For an object to be transparent it must be invisible, whereas to be 
colored an object must be visible.” (ibid.).
On this understanding, transparent objects are invisible because they are colourless, 
and something is colourless when it neither absorbs nor reflects light but allows it to
63 This page num ber refers to an online  version o f  the paper -  see b ib l iography .
I am grateful to Kevin M ulligan and Oliv ier M assin for bringing Heider to my attention.
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pass with very little, or no loss. Yet where transparency and visibility are polarized in 
this way - that is, with respect to colour - then, on the assumption that empty space is 
also transparent, it disappears from view. But we need not accept either assumption.
First, though it is true that empty space transmits light with no loss, we might 
reasonably insist that the predicate “transparent” apply only to material things or 
substances that occupy space.
Second, we could dispute the seeming extrapolation that moves from the invisibility 
of transparent things to the invisibility of empty space on the discovery that both are 
colourless. For we can grant Mizrahi’s insistence that an object, to be coloured, must 
be visible, while denying that only what is coloured is visible. For it is intelligible that 
empty space could be visible -  numerous theorists take this as a datum.6' But this 
being so, we could equally suppose that transparent things are invisible, not because 
they are colourless, but because when they are invisible -  i.e. glittering lines aside - 
we see the entirety of the region of space they occupy. Indeed this is compatible with 
what Mizrahi writes above, for she says “in order to see behind or through a body, 
there must be no visible obstacle”. But saying that there must be no visible obstacle -  
no thing -  is not to say there must be nothing visible. For empty space may be visible.
Besides, the simple thought that empty space is invisible because it is colourless is not 
sufficiently convincing to trump phenomenology, however ambivalent. It is just not 
self-evident that we don’t see empty space because it is colourless. For imagine if 
empty space had been in some sense ‘coloured’ -  rose-tinted say - perhaps we would 
then be inclined to allow that empty space is something we see. Yet if it were 
ubiquitously and uniformly rose-tinted, maybe we would fail to notice it, and even 
mistakenly suppose it invisible.
Or again, suppose that empty space in Twin Earth is ‘coloured’. A tourist from Earth 
might at once observe that she can now see empty space. But perhaps this experience 
would soon fade, a little like the adaption Ivo Kohler reported subjects to undergo 
when wearing two-toned goggles, one half of which was yellow and the other blue.
65 For example, Richardson (2010, p. 228) writes “ it seem s rather obviously characteristic  o f  vision that 
we not only see objects  but also the em pty space around and between th e m ” .
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After a while subjects no longer perceived, or perhaps noticed, the disruption to their 
colour experience.66
Of course, we should be suspicious of claims that we have undergone some kind of 
colour adaption in the case of space -  space, after all, is immaterial. But there is 
another sense in which empty space displays a ubiquity and uniformity that might go 
unnoticed.
The space that our visual system has evolved to represent is ubiquitously and 
uniformly Euclidean. Moreover, unlike objects, the space occupied by objects has no 
visible boundaries. This might lead one to suppose, mistakenly, that empty space has 
no shape. But Relativity speaks against this. Even Euclidean space has a shape - it is 
flat. So why should it be false that we directly and non-epistemically see the shape 
that the space in our vicinity has?
This is what the second account I detail urges. First, however, I assess a proposal that 
is, on the face of it, more modest.
2 .
To begin, it is helpful to differentiate the spaces in which things are from the spaces 
which are in things. There are things in the room you now occupy -  a chair, a reading 
lamp. And there are holes in things -  proverbially, doughnuts and Polo mints. Call the 
former space mass-quantified space and the latter empty particulars.
There are a number of ways of distinguishing mass-quantified empty space and empty 
particulars. We can count empty particulars,67 but not mass-quantified empty space. 
We can count the holes in a wedge of emmental or a pair of shoes, but although we
66 See W ard (2011) for a m ore detailed description o f  this p h e n om e n on .
67 For an account o f  how see Casati and Varzi (2004).
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can single out empty regions, by nodding at them say,68 we can't count mass- 
quantified empty regions.
Second, empty particulars can be moved -  the holes in doughnuts move with their so- 
called hosts, the material from which the ‘dough’nut is made.69 But mass-quantified 
empty space doesn’t move. This, recall, was one of the features of our naive 
conception of empty space that mark it out as absolute. As I explained in Chapter 
One, regions of space have particularity without being particulars -  they have 
particularity in virtue of their place in the manifold. But in contrast empty particulars 
owe their particularity to their hosts. This explains why they can be located ‘ in’ space 
and move through it -  the hole in the shoe moves with its wearer.
Finally, unlike mass-quantified empty space, some empty particulars have descriptive 
names - tunnels, cavities, gaps. Some even have proper names; the Aitken Basin is the 
largest crater on the moon.
As I noted, I am primarily concerned with the perception of mass-quantified empty 
space in a ground sense, space that, in our sketch, would be figured by unmarked 
paper. On the first account I set out, however, perceiving such space is analogized to 
perceiving empty particulars; what is involved in perceiving the latter is a microcosm 
of what is involved in perceiving the former.
68 Incidentally, the fact that w e  can indexically  pick out or  gesture at em pty regions is, at least a rguab ly ,  
another reason that weighs  in favour o f  absolutism. As M audlin (1993 , p. 191) writes: “For  the 
substantivalist, terms such as “he re” or “n o w ” can be used to drive linguistic pegs into the abso lu te  
fabric o f  space and time. W ithout such pegs, the static Leibniz  shift cannot even be formulated. T he  
relationist will no doubt contest this interpretation o f  the indexicals. I f  no substantival points are 
available to pick out,  such terminology m ust  be  explicated instead in terms o f  relations to pa rt icu lar  
physical bodies. But to objec t this to the substantivalist is a manifest  petito principii: I f  such points do 
exist, there is no reason that we cannot directly refer to them .. .The world  described by the shift may be 
qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual world  in the sense that no purely qualitative predicate is 
true o f  the one which is false o f  the other. But w e  have m ore than purely qualitative vocabulary  to 
describe the actual world ; we have, for example, the indexicals without which the Leibniz  static shift 
cannot be d escr ibed” .




There are two broad ways of accounting for empty particulars from an ontological 
perspective -  one can be nominalist or realist about such particulars. Take the 
example of holes. A nominalist says that the name “hole” has no referent, while a 
realist naturally demurs.70 Within the realist camp, however, there are two distinct 
positions: one can identify holes with their so-called hosts, or one can suppose that 
holes are something in addition to their hosts, although ontologically dependent on 
them. Call the first position Superficial Realism, and the latter Immaterial Realism. I 
aim to elucidate Superficial Realism, specifically as a way of shoring up a dialectic 
that can also be brought to bear, not on the ontology of mass-quantified space -  we 
have, after all, assumed absolutism - but on how it is perceived.
Unlike the nominalist, the superficial realist supposes that in saying ‘there is a crack 
in the glass’, we quantify over real things. Unlike the immaterial realist however, the 
superficialist insists that we quantify, not over immaterial things, but material things 
with certain surface properties. For example, in speaking of a “tunnel”, we speak only 
of a certain way in which a mountain, say, is shaped. Likewise, in speaking of the 
“hole” in the Polo, we simply describe the sweet’s form. Such realism is materialist, 
and, as David and Stephanie Lewis demonstrate in their philosophical dialogue 
“Holes”, curiously so in the case of empty space:
Argle. When I say that there are holes in something, I mean nothing 
more nor less than it is perforated. The synonymous shape-predicates 
‘..is perforated’ and ‘there are holes in ...’ -  just like any other shape 
predicate, say ‘...is a dodecahedron’ -  may truly be predicated of 
pieces of cheese, without any implication that perforation is due to 
the presence of occult, immaterial entities. (1970, p. 206)
Bargle. ...You are thinking, doubtless, that every hole is filled with 
matter: silver amalgam, air, interstellar gas, luminiferous ether or 
whatever it may be....[but] how can something utterly devoid of 
matter be made of matter? (ibid., p. 207)
70 Note that this debate  is independent o f  the debate about the onto logy o f  space, s ince one  could be 
nominalist about empty particulars, and yet be realist about empty space (this seem s to be the pos it ion  
o f  Simons 1997).
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Argle. You are looking for the matter in the wrong place. (I mean to 
say, that’s what you would be doing if there were any such things as
places, which there aren’t). The matter isn’t inside the hole. It would
be absurd to say it was: nobody wants to say that holes are inside 
themselves. The matter surrounds the hole. The lining of a hole, you 
agree is a material object. For every hole there is a hole-lining; for 
every hole-lining there is a hole. I say the hole-lining is the hole 
(ibid.).
As this excerpt dramatises, what motivates superficialism about holes is relationism 
about space (note the parenthesis -  “I mean to say, that’s what you would be doing if
there were any such things as places, which there aren’t”). But because the
superficialist identifies holes with their so-called material linings, realism about holes 
can be advanced. Notably, then, this strategy is eliminativist, at least from the 
perspective of naive ontology; holes are construed, counter-intuitively, as materially 
and spatially co-incident with the matter that surrounds them. But this makes it easy, 
or so it seems, to explain how holes can be perceived -  namely by perceiving the 
hole-linings with which they are identified. As I explain, however, this ease is only 
superficial.
Peculiarly, holes can be made of different substances as a function of the hole-lining 
with which the hole is identified. But we would never say a hole was “made of 
cheese” or of leather or glass. Oddly too, the volume of the hole must be the same as 
its putative host. Yet surely we should want to say that the volume of the eye of a 
needle, say, is less then the volume of the needle itself; in Sanford’s (1967) terms, we 
should want to say that the intensive volume is less than the extensive volume.71
Translated to the case of empty space, similar oddities arise. The space that separates 
my desk from the door is bordered on the right by bookshelves, and on the left by a 
window. So, on the understanding that this empty space is identified with the material 
that surrounds it, it is constituted by parts of the desk, as well as by the door and 
bookshelves. Moreover, since some of those objects ‘line’ other empty spaces, the 
question as to how we parse particular empty spaces arises, as well as the issue as to 
how we determine the volume of the relevant empty space. Does it have the same 
volume as the region that, as we would naively put it, includes those objects? Or is it
71 See Casati and Varzi (1994, pp. 25-26).
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just the region we take, albeit mistakenly on this view, to be 'outside' their surfaces? 
And how can a hole be a property of an object that comprises these distinct things?"
Given these difficulties, it is fortunate, then, that the thesis that empty space is 
perceived by seeing the surfaces of objects doesn't rely on an identity thesis.7' A 
theorist that advances a superficialist account of perceiving empty space may be an 
immaterial realist about the ontology> of empty space; it may be granted that empty 
space is something distinct from the surfaces that articulate it. Bermudez (2000) is 
perhaps one such theorist. I requote:
“Holes are an intriguing case...There is an obvious sense in 
which holes cannot be perceived. If as is overwhelmingly 
plausible, perception involves a causal relation between 
perceiver and the object(s) of perception, then holes cannot count 
as objects of perception for the simple reason that they have no 
causal powers. Apparent cases of perception of holes will have to 
be parsed in such a way that holes no longer count as objects of 
perception. One might want to parse ‘x sees a hole’ as ‘x 
becomes aware of the presence of a hole in virtue of perceiving 
parts of the surface(s) of some material object or combination of 
material objects (hole-surrounds)’”. (2000, p. 367)
Here Bermudez does not explicitly endorse any particular position on the ontology of 
holes or, we might suppose, empty space. Still, since he makes the imperceptibility of 
holes spring from their inefficacy, not their non-existence, Immaterial Realism might 
be assumed, at least so far as their ontology is concerned. As such, the following 
extrapolation, concerning their perception, seems fair: ‘x sees some empty space’ can 
be parsed as ‘x becomes aware of the presence of empty space in virtue of perceiving 
parts of the surfaces of some material object or objects’. I suggest this extrapolation 
helps bring into focus the consequences of adopting a superficialist treatment of 
perceiving empty space. First, a note on Bermudez’s broader proposal is in order.
Bermudez argues that we perceive three-dimensional objects directly by perceiving 
their facing surfaces. As such, he recommends cleaving apart two notions that have 
been systematically run together in the philosophical literature on perception -  direct
7" Thanks to M att N u d ds  for this pointer.
77 Casati and Varzi also m ake this point - see (ibid., p. 157).
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and immediate perception. The former he takes to be epistemological, while the latter 
is supposed to capture a relation of objective dependence, typically spelt out in terms 
of an ‘in virtue o f  relation. This says: if x is seen ‘in virtue o f  y, y  is immediately 
perceived and x is mediately perceived (and y  is immediately seen if it is not seen in 
virtue of anything else).74 In contrast, ‘direct’ perception is supposed to gesture at the 
kind of perceptual contact with an object that is often understood on the model of 
Russellian acquaintance, i.e. contact that must be enjoyed if one is to make 
demonstrative judgments about that thing. Bermudez invokes Paul Snowdon’s notion 
of d-perception as a way of making this plain. This says:
“x d-perceives y  iff x stands, in virtue of x’s perceptual experience, in 
such a relation to y  that, if x could make demonstrative judgments, 
then it would be possible for x to make the true demonstrative 
judgement ‘That is_y’”. (Snowdon 1992 p. 56)
And with these two distinguished, Bermudez reasons: it is not “obvious why one 
could not perceive an object in virtue of perceiving something else, and yet still be 
perceptually acquainted with it in a way that would allow one to identify it
demonstratively.” (2000, p. 357). But what happens in the case of perceiving empty
space?
In the passage above, Bermudez takes cases of the perception of holes to be only
“apparent”. Holes, we are told, are inefficacious and hence can’t shore up in
experience. But, as such, they can’t be immediately perceived. We do, however, have 
perceptual contact with the surfaces of objects. So perhaps we enjoy mediate 
perception of holes and, by extension, empty space, through the immediate perception 
of surfaces. By Bermudez’ lights, such perception would be direct if, on the basis of 
perceiving those surfaces, it would be possible to make true demonstrative judgments 
about the empty spaces they ‘line’. Unfortunately, however, he does not provide us 
with the conceptual materials to effect the “fine-tuning” he supposes his account 
requires in the case of holes and, as I suppose, empty space (ibid., p. 357). Perhaps, 
however, we can surmise on behalf of the superficialist.
74 See also Jackson (1977, p p . 15-16).
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It might be thought that in perceiving the surfaces of objects, one is made aware of the 
failure to experience anything ‘outside’ those surfaces and, on the basis of this failure, 
that one comes to be in a representational state with the content ‘no thing is at that 
region’ (there being no thing at a region explaining one’s failure to experience 
anything there). Notably, such an account of perceiving empty space isn’t strictly 
speaking perceptual, since the presence of empty space is only inferred.75
Importantly too, since the ‘no’ in this proposition is meant to pick out something like 
a negation operator, it requires that, for a subject to come to be aware of the presence 
of empty space in her surroundings, understood as space at which objects are absent, 
she must be able to enjoy mental states, not merely with material conceptual content, 
but logical conceptual content - content that has no material referent.76 Indeed, it 
might even be wondered whether this makes tempting a category mistake, the fact that 
such content is formal, and so in a sense immaterial, leading to the assumption that 
the possession of mental states involving logical content is a condition on perceiving 
immaterial empty space.77 If so, then, in line with Wittgenstein’s counsel, the 
following ‘reminders’ might be offered:
If seeing empty space and seeing that a space is empty are assimilated such that 
perception of the former involves the possession of mental states with logical 
conceptual content, then arguably infants and many animals should not be found to 
enjoy experiences of empty space.
Much more critical, however, is the following dilemma: Like empty space, the rear 
facing side of an object is also causally inefficacious with respect to the immediate 
content of perception. Nonetheless, Bermudez allows that three-dimensional objects 
can be directly perceived, and the (extrapolated) suggestion is that the same treatment 
can apply to empty space. But if empty space is to be directly perceived through the 
immediate perception of the surfaces of objects, then perhaps we should not attribute
751 offer a m ore sustained discussion o f  this v iew in Chapter  Five.
’ See John M acF arlane’s doctoral thesis  for an account o f  diverse w ays in which ‘fo rm ’, as opposed to 
'content’, can be understood; also, relatedly, the distinction between material and formal inference  
made by Brandom (1994, pp. 104-105).
Cf. Sorensen’s entry on ‘N o th ingness’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia. Sorensen reports that “ s ince  
Heidegger thinks that animals do not experience nothingness, he is com m itted  to skeptic ism about 
animal reasoning involving n eg a t io n ” .
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to the superficialist a position on which the perception of empty space involves 
inference after all, since a subject that must infer the presence of something is not 
perceptually acquainted with it. But if the presence of empty space is not inferred, and 
it is inefficacious with respect to the immediate content of perception, how can it be 
directly perceived? It might be thought that the presence of the rear-facing sides of 
objects need not be inferred on the basis of the immediate perception of their facing 
surfaces, since objects, unlike space, have surfaces. But this does not explain how 
empty space can be directly perceived - unless, that is, the metaphysical identity thesis 
is also advanced (viz. where holes and empty spaces are their linings and ‘empty 
spaces’ thereby have surfaces). But such an identity saves direct perception only at the 
expense of making empty space material.
It might be objected, then, that it is only the distinction between direct and immediate 
perception that yields this conclusion. Why not allow that we /«directly perceive 
empty space by perceiving the facing surfaces of objects?
Above, I sketched one reason why: insisting that we /'«directly perceive empty space 
by perceiving the facing surfaces of objects returns us to the proposal that perceiving 
empty space involves entertaining mental states with formal conceptual content. So 
perhaps we should seek out an alternative explanation. One alternative is to invoke an 
alternation:
It might be suggested that seeing surfaces involves not an absence o f  experience, but 
experience o f  absence. It involves experiencing no thing outwith the surfaces seen. 
Richardson (2010, p. 230) reifies this distinction:
“there is a difference...between absence of visual experrience... and 
experience of ‘nothing there’ -  of empty space. This is brought out 
by reflecting on what are, at least on the face of it, examples of 
localised absence of visual experience...When a bright light is 
flashed into your face, the retinal cells onto which the light is 
focussed are temporarily bleached. For a moment, the cells are, as 
Austin Clark puts it, ‘out of commission’... At the location in space 
from which reflected light is focussed onto these cells, nothing, 
briefly, can be seen. As the cells recover, the experience is that 
which we characterise as an ‘afterimage’. During that brief period
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when the cells are out of commision, we have a temporary blindspot 
-  a location at which there is an absence of visual experience.”
Even so, it might be thought that making this switch is not without consequences. I 
detail two.
First, given that absences are biffless, appealing to an experience of absence arguably 
requires embracing a controversial genuinist take on negative causation (see Chapter 
Two), at least assuming a Causal Theory of Perception is likewise embraced./S
Second, if the perception of what is absent outwith the boundaries of objects is itself 
required to make sense of the perception of their surfaces,79 then this may involve an 
inadvertent and unvirtuous appeal to empty space. For example, C. B. Martin writes:
“The concept of an edge is the concept of a limit of where something 
is and where something isn’t...The reference of the referring term 
‘world’ is divided into presences whose limits are drawn by 
absence” (1996, p. 60).
But if what is required to perceive the edges or surfaces of material objects is the 
absence of material outwith those boundaries, then this just requires the perception of 
empty space. And if the perception of surfaces itself involves the perception of empty 
space, then, by appealing to surfaces, the superficialist appeals to the empty space 
that is supposed to be perceived in terms of them.
Given these difficulties, then, we should naturally seek to resist a superficialist 
treatment. For the moment, however, we might grant the following:
If perceiving the surfaces of objects involves seeing the absence o f objects outwith 
those surfaces, then either this involves negative causation, which a superficialist 
might expressly wish to rule out, or it involves perceiving regions at which there are 
no objects -  namely, empty space. But this is precisely what the superficialist wanted 
to reductively explain. If seeing surfaces involves seeing empty space, it might be 
thought that we cannot explain the seeing of empty space in terms of the immediate
78 Bui see Chapter Five for an account o f  how the Structuralist View circum vents  this d iff iculty .
7) I owe this point to Soteriou (2011).
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perception of surfaces. The superficialist view thereby collapses into the untutored 
position that it ideally sought to domesticate -  the supposition that we see empty 
space. So how do we make sense of this, if not entirely superficially?
I have already glossed an account on which the presence of empty space is inferred 
and so is not strictly speaking seen - on such a view the ‘perception’ of empty space is 
indirect (call perception that is indirect ‘perception’). In Chapter Five, I consider 
Soteriou’s (2011) position, one to which the epithet ‘indirect’ cannot be so happily 
applied, but which nonetheless shares with the indirect appeal to logical formal 
content an emphasis on experience, and specifically its structural features (see also 
Richardson (2010)). In contrast, the view I now explore and defend explains the 
perception of empty space not in terms of experience, but in terms of its nature. This 
view, then, is a direct account insofar as it insists that empty space has visible 
properties that are directly perceived. Here I focus on the visual case, while Chapter 
Six touches on the tactile.
4.
In The Shape o f  Space, Nerlich develops an argument that has been so far overlooked 
in the philosophy of perception. He argues that non-Euclidean regions o f empty space 
can be seen:
“Let’s suppose that, nearby in an otherwise flat space, there is a 
football-sized volume within which the curvature sharply varies. 
(All you need to grasp in order to follow the examples is that light 
lines will have no parallel paths to follow through regions which 
aren’t Euclidean). It will be a non-Euclidean hole. Since the 
curvature is zero everywhere round this hole but not zero inside it, it 
has to contain both positively and negatively curved regions. Linear 
paths which are parallel outside the hole converge and diverge again 
inside it (depending on just what kind of hole it is). So, as we look at 
distant things that lie beyond the hole, the photons by means of 
which we see them sometimes pass through the hole and sometimes 
not; things will change their appearances as the visual angles 
subtended by the various paths change, just as things change their 
shapes and shimmer in a heat haze or when seen through some 
inhomogeneous physical medium like uneven glass.” (1994, p. 38)
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Nerlich’s thought is that were we in a position to see it. empty space, as a function of 
its shape, would alter how a background source appears. Here “in a position” might be 
thought to encompass a variety of necessary conditions; those whereby the perceiver’s 
perceptual apparatus is normal, where he or she is in the space perceived with his or 
her eyes open, where there is light, and finally, where the relevant region falls within 
his or her field of vision. These positions being satisfied - which is to say the 
perceiver is able in the sense of being capable of seeing empty space -  the idea is as 
follows:
If the appearance of something seen through an empty region is distorted relative to 
its appearance when seen through Euclidean space, then the region seen through is 
itself seen. The idea is that because you see the distortion, you see the space. Think of 
how a magnifying glass changes how things look. The parallel thought is that space 
can likewise act like a lens.80 For example, in spacetime with Riemannian curvature, 
light from a background source would converge, as it would in a convex lens. But in a 
Lobachevskian spacetime, it would rather act as a concave lens; light would de-focus 
in passing through it, with consequences for how things seen through it would look. 
Unlike a lens though, which can be moved through space, the lensing region, in being
80 See Schneider et at 1999 for an accoun t o f  gravita tional lensing. In the presence  o f  m ass with a large 
gravita tional pull — nebulae say - light bends, occasionally  yielding som e peculiar observational effects .  
For example, depending on the location o f  the intervening mass, multip le  im ages o f  the source can 
appear. The diagram* below shows a stra ightforward exam ple  o f  such lensing - light from the source is 
deflected due to the presence o f  som e intervening material. T h e  m ost  well know n ex am ple  o f  such 
lensing is the Twin Quasar. Due to a large concentration o f  matter  be tween the quasa r  and earth, not 
one, but two images o f  the quasar  appear in the night sky (Q S O  0957+561 A and Q S O  0957+561 B).
...........
G ra v i ta t io n a l  len s in g  - an i n t e r v e n in g  mass causes l i g h t  to bend .
The idea in the passage above is that empty space should likewise be thought  capable  o f  acting like a 
lens; depending on its shape, how a background source appears  should be found to vary. 1 am gra te fu l  
to Alasdair R ichm ond for  the suggestion that N e r l ic h ’s idea effectively treats em pty space as a 
gravitational lens.
*lmage created by Michael R ichmond, < h t tp : / /sp if f .r i t .edu /c lasses /p hys440 / lec tu res / l im b/ l im b .h tm l>. 
Retrieved 26/08/11 ,
79
made of space, cannot move. Still, so long as it were surrounded by near Euclidean 
space, a perceiver would be able to move around it and so get a sense of its size and 
relative location: “we would see that the distorting region lies now in this direction 
from us, and now in that, and we would soon see how distant it was and how big" 
(ibid., p. 39). In such cases, Nerlich petitions, wouldn’t we say “not that we see that 
there is such a hole, but that we see the hole itself ’ (ibid.)?
Here a comparison with fairground mirrors comes to mind. Mirrors that are planar 
preserve the geometric properties of the entities that they reflect. But when the surface 
is curved, the image is distorted - the angle of incidence is no longer equal to the 
angle of reflection. An explicit specular example helps clarify this analogy, one that 
also helps paint a picture of what Nerlich’s imaginative landscape would look like 
(albeit by using computer generated ‘mirrors’, not regions of empty space).
A m i r r o r e d  sphere  is g rad u a l ly  e lo n g a te d  in to  an egg shape. W h e r e  the 
cu rva tu re  a lo n g  the v e r t ic a l  axis is red u ced ,  the r e f le c te d  scene is ‘ s t r e t c h e d ’
( F le m in g ,  T o r r a l b a  and A d e ls o n  2004, p. 805).
In these images, starting from the top, a curved mirrored surface is repeatedly 
elongated, with consequences for the specular image presented. In the first picture, the
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curvature is uniform, and so is the image distortion. But consider the third picture. 
The surface of the mirror is no longer uniformly curved but is egg-shaped, something 
which the properties of the specular image encode; where the surface is highly curved 
-  at the top and bottom of the ‘egg’ - more information is compressed into a smaller 
portion of the image, and where it is less curved the image is ‘stretched’. The authors 
argue that such distortion is exploited by the visual system to retrieve information 
about the three-dimensional shape of the reflecting thing. I suggest that Nerlich's idea 
is the same. Just as reflections on teaspoons and taps reveal something about their 
morphology, how things appear to look when seen through an empty region says 
something about the shape of the region seen through. This however does not exhaust 
Nerlich’s proposal.
In addition to this thought, Nerlich implicitly adds another, one he does not argue for, 
but which he might be assumed to endorse; namely the thought that the region seen 
through is visible only if it is visually differentiated from the regions in which it is 
embedded. I spell out the import of this claim, before renegotiating it in §5.
Fred Dretske has forcefully argued that a condition on seeing is visual differentiation. 
When something is visually differentiated, in addition to it looking some way to a 
percipient, it looks distinct from its immediate environment. For example:
“Suppose that we attach a piece of beige paper to a beige wall and 
dim the lights until the paper appears (from where we are standing) 
as an undistinguished portion of the wall. Does one, under these 
circumstances, still see the piece of paper?” (1969, p. 23)
Dretske says ‘no’, and intuitively I think that phenomenology concurs -  when we are 
happy to say that a subject has seen something, independently of whatever beliefs the 
subject has about that thing, we suppose that the thing seen is differentiated from its 
immediate surroundings. How does the visual differentiation condition play out on 
Nerlich’s account?
Imagine there were non-Euclidean regions a bit like the mirrored balls above 
sprinkled across our solar system. And suppose too that such curved regions were 
interspersed with intervening flat spaces. Nerlich wonders: “might we not come to say
81
that we see places quite generally?” (1994, p. 39). Here his idea is that in such a 
landscape flat regions would seen in relation to curved regions, while curved regions 
would presumably be seen because they are so interspersed. Hence, regions of both 
species would be seen because they are visually differentiated from each other. But if 
flat regions are seen only in relation to curved regions, we might ask: what happens to 
space in our vicinity, which is uniformly flat? Since it is homogeneous, is the visual 
differentiation condition thereby flouted and empty space invisible? So it seems. For 
although, as Nerlich assures us, space has, “essentially visual properties” (ibid., p. 
39), these he insists are “visually distorting ones”. Hence, we only see regions that 
visually distort. And this leads him to conclude: “our space is imperceptible in the 
same way as clear air in a jar is” and, like the Emperor’s new clothes, “we know 
where to look and feel to see that it’s invisible” (ibid., p. 40).
The idea, then, is that one sees that empty space in our vicinity is invisible because, 
like the Emperor’s new clothes, one sees that nothing is there. But this suggests that 
unlike the seeing of the non-Euclidean hole which, recall, is itself seen, seeing 
uniformly Euclidean empty space is indirect. One sees only that no object is at some 
place which one thereby doesn’t see -  it is invisible because no object is located there. 
For Nerlich, then, it is the geometric and not ontic kind of space that makes it elusive 
to perception; the shape of space is what renders it perceptible or, in the case o f the 
space we are in, invisible.
In the next section, I argue against Nerlich’s pessimism about the visibility of the 
space in our vicinity and I suggest that we can harness the very insight he impresses in 
the non-Euclidean case.
If space has essentially visual properties that, as he argues, flow from its shape, why 
should only the regions that are deemed visible be those that distort? Moreover, even 
if, like Dretske’s wall, regions of Euclidean space are not visually differentiated from  
each other, why not allow that regions of empty space are visually differentiated, 
namely from the opaque objects whose ‘outside’ or ground they are?
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5.
In trying to characterize the perceptual character that experience of such non- 
Euclidean regions would yield, notice that Nerlich draws a series of implicit 
comparative claims. We are told that things seen through such regions would change 
their appearance “just as things change their shapes and shimmer in a heat haze" or 
“when seen through some inhomogeneous physical medium like uneven glass" (ibid. 
p. 38). Such analogies are useful in trying to rally an understanding of how something 
of which we have no perceptual experience would look -  viz. the appearance of an 
object seen through non-Euclidean empty space - and they work by drawing parallels 
with paradigmatic visual experiences that we do have.
We have experience of seeing through haze on a hot summer’s day, or the print of a 
tablecloth distorted by bubbles in a glass. Yet while such claims are comparative, we 
are in no position to evaluate the comparison they make since we do not have 
experience of the regions of empty space they aim to comparatively pick out. But this 
is not true of the space we are in.
I aim to show that we can excavate ways in which empty space in our vicinity looks 
by appeal to comparative looks claims. What’s more, unlike claims made in respect of 
non-Euclidean regions, I suggest we can actually evaluate the comparisons they make 
because we have acquaintance with the visible properties that warrant the making of 
such claims in the first place - I argue below that empty space in our vicinity looks 
‘clear’ and ‘see-through’.
Still, it might be wondered whether the argument I offer doesn’t beg the question -  
how can something that is invisible look a certain way? I propose, however, that the 
intelligibility of such looks statements, and, more importantly, the fact that they can 
be evaluated, entails perceptual acquaintance with how empty space looks. As 
Chisholm writes, whose discussion of appearance verbs is the starting point for much 
philosophical theorizing on looks:
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“If you knew nothing of Arabian music, you could never tell, merely 
by listening to someone play, whether or not his music happens to 
“sound Arabian” (1957, p. 49).
But likewise, as I aim to show, if you had never seen empty space, you wouldn't be 
able to tell, just by looking, whether it looks, as I will argue, ‘clear’ or ‘see-through’. 
Indeed, the fact that we can evaluate claims about the look of empty space might even 
be taken as transcendental evidence for our perceptual acquaintance with the way of 
looking that empty space has.81
To begin, I say something about looks claims.
Sometimes when we say that something looks a certain way, we want to suggest that 
there is visual evidence for the thing looking that way without yet claiming that things 
are the way they look. So, on seeing the curtains drawn in the house next door, a 
neighbour might say: “it looks like they’re away”, without intending to assert that the 
occupants are away for the neighbour may not know. On other occasions, though, 
when we say that something looks a certain way, we don’t even aim to gesture at 
visual evidence for the thing being the way it looks. In a recent paper, M. G. F. 
Martin offers an iconic example:
(1) That model looks pregnant
When (1) is said of the model in the picture, it is not meant to be understood 
evidentially, in saying (1) the speaker doesn’t intend to point to visual evidence for
81 A parallel might be as follows. M olecules are invisible but w e  kno w  they are am ong  the sorts o f  
things that could be seen. I f  seen under a microscope, a given m olecule might, for exam ple ,  be said to 
look a bit like a crown. But we would  never be able to say o f  num bers, which are also invisible, w hat  
way they would  look i f  only  w e  could see them. The claim that they would  look a certain w ay , i f  only  
we could see them , is ¡¿«intelligible (supposing it is genuinely num bers  under discussion and not 
representations o f  them).
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the model being pregnant. The use of looks, then, is non-evidential. It means only to 
pick out some way o f  looking that the model has. I suggest that we can describe the 
way empty space looks in such non-evidential terms.
For example, in describing how non-Euclidean holes would look when seen through, 
Nerlich draws on paradigmatic cases of perceptual experience, those where the 
medium seen through - haze or inhomogeneous glass -  modifies the appearance of 
objects seen through it (recall, his thought was that the medium seen through is itself 
rendered visible because of the distortion it causes). But saying that empty regions can 
look some way -  for example, ‘hazy’ or ‘shimmery’ or Tike fairground mirrors’ -  is 
not yet to say that there is visual evidence for the region being that way. For example, 
in saying a region looks ‘misty’, this need not be taken as a claim that the region is 
misty, unless by that one means to say that the region is occupied by mist. For what 
would it mean to say that space is misty, space being immaterial? Still, in the context 
of Nerlich’s thought experiment, such statements -  viz. that a region looks ‘hazy’ or 
‘shimmery’ - are intelligible. I suggest that this, in itself, is noteworthy.
The fact that such statements are intelligible suggests that it is anyway implicit that 
empty regions can have ways of looking that warrant the application of such claims -  
viz. that they Took F \  For if the relevant hypothetical regions could not even be 
conceived of looking some way, the claim that they would look some way would be 
unintelligible.
Still, even if such statements are intelligible, it remains the case that, despite their 
intelligibility, we are not yet in a position to evaluate the comparisons they make 
since we have no perceptual experience of the non-Euclidean regions they aim to pick 
out. But consider such claims when made of the space we are in.
We might evaluate as false  claims that the empty regions of space we see through 
distort the appearance of objects seen through it.82 Unwittingly, then, we would 
implicitly grant as true claims that the space in our vicinity does not distort the look of
s~ O f  course, outside o f  the context o f  a philosophical argum ent we would  hardly know  w hat such a 
statement means. The idea is that, granting N e rl ich ’s insight, we would  evaluate as false c la im s that the 
empty regions o f  space we see through distort the appearance  o f  objects seen through them (viz. in the 
manner o f  a magnifying glass).
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things. Of course, we have some way to go to the claim that empty space is seen. So 
consider what I am calling a Nerlich landscape -  a region where curved and flat 
regions are interspersed.
It might be said that such a landscape if  seen from afar would look a little like a piece 
of inhomogeneous glass looks -  viz. in which ‘clear’ regions are separated by 
bubbles.83 But if so, it might conversely be allowed that space in our vicinity does not 
look like this. Rather it looks entirely ‘clear’; it has the appearance that clear glass 
does, at least with respect to its homogeneity, an appearance that arises from its shape 
-  it is nearly Euclidean, and uniformly so. But as such, not only does empty space in 
our vicinity not look like a Nerlich landscape would - with local regions that are 
topologically convoluted - it is globally topologically uniform. That is to say, it is not 
merely the case that adjacent regions are homogenous with respect to their 
appearance, but that all empty regions look the same. I spell out this thought.
Imagine a phenomenal sorites paradox arising for adjacent regions of empty space. 
Regions a and b might be judged to distort the appearance of items seen through them 
to the same degree. Likewise, b and c. But region c might be judged to distort the 
appearance of items seen through it more or less than region a. The claim is that 
empty space is our vicinity is not like this. It is locally and globally homogenous in 
respect of its shape -  it is homogeneously flat. My claim is not just that this has 
consequences for how it looks (after all, Dretske’s beige piece of paper has a way of 
looking), but that empty space is seen. I defend this additional claim below. First, I 
elaborate a little further on the look of empty space.
Above, I tried to uncover an assumption operative on Nerlich’s account: the thought 
that homogenously Euclidean regions are invisible because they are visually 
undifferentiated from each other. This assumption can be put somewhat differently. 
For any itemx, if x was seen through such regions it would look the same. In contrast,
8j Assume the glass, the appearance o f  which is being used to comparatively pick  out the look o f  em pty  
space, is coloured. This is to distinguish two species o f  clarity. In trying to isolate the clearness o f  
empty space in our vicinity, we need only have in mind the clarity o f  homogenous glass; glass tha t is 
not smeared, or scratched or  that contains air-bubbles. Such glass may be tinted. O f  course,  em pty  
space is also clear in the sense that it is colourless, but this is not the kind o f  clarity 1 aim to isolate 
above. The apparent co lourlessness  o f  empty space is better captured by the notion o f  it looking scc- 
through, a notion tha t I spell out below.
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for any two regions that differ in their intrinsic curvature, the appearance of x  would, 
with respect to one and not the other, appear distorted. This has been our narrative so 
far. There is, however, something further to note that is implicit in the idiom of 
appearances and distortion, namely the thought that some thing must be seen through 
the relevant region, for otherwise how would the relevant ‘distortion’ be indexed or 
noticed? But this in turn suggests a distinction.
For a region to be seen, it is not merely sufficient that it be lit, the presence of light 
naturally being a condition on anything being seen. Rather, what light there is, and 
there may be very little (for example, there may only be a lone star), must illuminate -  
that is, it must fall on something.
In The World o f  Colour, David Katz illustrates the distinction between luminosity and 
illumination:
“If on a dark night we sally forth into the open with a red lantern, 
and hold this lantern above us in the direction of the open sky, we 
will then see a beautiful luminous red circle and around it pitch 
blackness. In such a case we need see no illumination, and there is 
none to see as long as the lantern does not by chance illumine some 
previously unseen objects”. (1935, p. 39)
This distinction seems to me important. Nerlich’s argument appeals to the idea of 
distortion -  it says that where regions seen through cause no distortion, those regions 
are invisible.84 I propose, however, that it is plausible that such regions are seen, but 
are not noticed precisely because they do not visually distort. Nonetheless, it is only 
on the assumption that something is seen through the region that we can make sense 
of the claim that the visible properties of empty space can be seen.
Above I noted Dretske’s insistence that when something is visually differentiated, in 
addition to it looking some way to a percipient, it also looks distinct from its
84 Cf. Heider (1926. p. 1): " W e  see things that are in im m edia te  contact with our skins and we are o f ten  
aware o f  one thing through something else. For instance, we see stars through em pty space; w e  hear the 
sound o f  a bell through the air; w e  m easure the pressure o f  air by means o f  a barom eter;  a p e r s o n ’s 
expressive m ovem ents  tell us som eth ing o f  what he is etc. These cases are not entirely equivalent,  but 
what they do have in co m m on is that the objec t o f  perception or cognition does not affect the sense  
organ directly but by m eans o f  som e kind o f  m ed ia t io n ” .
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immediate environment. I also tried to make sense of the notion of empty space in our 
vicinity looking some way by appeal to comparatives - I proposed that it looks ‘clear' 
and I suggested that its so looking flows from its shape. Still, on Dretske’s 
understanding, looking some way to a percipient is not yet sufficient for being seen.
Consider his example. The beige paper looking some way (viz. beige) is not sufficient 
for it to be seen. To be seen it must be differentiated from the wall -  it must stand out. 
Put somewhat differently, the wall must act as a ground. But if having a ground is an 
additional condition on being seen -  viz. as well as looking some way - then perhaps 
Nerlich would after all grant that empty space in our vicinity has a way of looking, but 
that it remains unseen in not ‘standing out’ from other regions of empty space. On this 
understanding, it would be granted that empty space has a way of looking but that it 
remains unseen since, like the beige paper, it remains undifferentiated from adjacent 
empty regions. But surely this concession neglects the very material in terms of which 
Nerlich’s thought experiment garners its force — the items whose characteristic 
appearance alters as a function of the curvature of the region through which they are 
seen. For even if it is insisted that adjacent regions of Euclidean empty space are not 
differentiated with respect to each other, it remains the case that, for Nerlich’s 
thought experiment to make sense, the kind of visual appearance that regions of 
empty space can in principle have is not the kind of appearance that is characteristic 
of the look of coloured objects. For if empty space were to have an appearance 
characteristic of the look of objects, then, one would not be able to visually 
distinguish opaque objects from the regions through which they are seen. But this 
suggests an alternative differentiation condition, one that Nerlich’s experiment 
requires and which is critically met even in the Euclidean case -  empty regions are 
differentiated from the opaque objects the ‘outside’ of which they are. Material 
objects are, perversely, its ground.
Consider this in the context of the analogy we have been impressing: when an object 
is erased from a pencil sketch, what is left is a blank space -  a white expanse - that is 
itself seen. Likewise, I am suggesting that when absolute space is ‘cleared’ of visible
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objects, it is itself seen, so long as they, qua its ground, are also seen.*0 Call the look 
that empty space thereby has ‘see-through’.
Regions and entities that are see-through disclose the appearance of the object seen 
through them (even while, as have noted, in some instances they may distort the 
appearance of that object). As such, however, see-through regions and entities are not 
opaque. In saying that empty space looks ‘see-through’, then, I mean to gesture at its 
non-opacity, an appearance also shared by, among other things, water, mist (assuming 
it is translucent) and certain kinds of fabric - indeed, the compound adjective ‘see- 
through’ first appears in the 1950s in a headline in the american magazine Life. “See- 
through Fabrics Bring Undercoverings to the Surface”.86
I henceforth use the adjective ‘see-through’ as an abbreviated way of picking out the 
appearance that empty space has, remembering of course that empty space in our 
vicinity is, in addition, ‘clear’.87 Importantly, however, such terms are comparative 
and are used non-evidentially. That is to say, I don’t mean to gesture at visual 
evidence for empty space being ‘clear’ and ‘see-through’. I merely suggest that empty 
space looks that way.
In the closing section, I ask what properties or states of affairs warrant the making of 
such peculiar looks statements in the first place.
s’ The verb ‘to c lear’ also m eans ‘to em p ty ’ -  something that the title o f  the chapter  gestures  at. It is 
noteworthy then that the verb  ‘to c lear’ undergoes patient/location alternation; a region can be can 
cleared o f  something, or  things can be cleared from  a place.
86 Curiously, by the 1970s such garm ents  have achieved nom inal status -  they are See-T hrus .
87 Notably, so long as non-Euclidean regions are seen through, they also have a ‘see- th ro u g h ’ look. 
Thanks to Sue Locke for pressing this point.
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6.
In a recent papei, M. G. F. Martin argues that the visible properties of objects, or as I 
would like to say, individuals are those that warrant the application of looks 
statements.88 He offers the following narrative by way of explication:
Typically we can tell just by looking whether there are tomatoes, say, at the 
greengrocer. But consider a community that developed in a world equally full of 
tomatoes and schmatoes — fruit that are identical in appearance to tomatoes but 
different in taste and “culinary application”. A shopper in such a world would not be 
able to tell, just by looking, whether there are tomatoes, and not schmatoes, on the 
greengrocer’s stall. But this reveals that the property of looking like a tomato and 
being a tomato are distinct; a schmato has the former but not the latter. Moreover, 
returning to our world, there can be tomatoes that fail to have the canonical look of 
tomatoes while being tomatoes.
Now, since tomatoes and schmatoes can’t be discriminated from each other on visual 
grounds, Martin calls them visual duplicates. Still, they are visually non-unique in the 
following sense: A kind is visually non-unique where there is a concrete individual 
which is a member of that kind and which has the look characteristic of the kind, but 
which also has a visual duplicate which is not a member of that kind. As such, the 
look of tomatoes is visually non-unique in the schmato world; there are schmatoes 
that have the look. So can non-visually unique properties be candidates for 
constituting the look of an object?
Martin says ‘no’. If a non-visually unique property is had by an individual that has the 
look characteristic o f that kind, and a visual duplicate also has the look but lacks the 
relevant property, then it can’t be the case that the property in question constitutes the 
look. We can cast this same thought a little differently. If for some property, p, one 
can affect a change in the property but without a concomitant change in how things 
look, then that property is not constitutive of the look of the individual that has that
88 See C hapter  O n e  for an explanation o f  how the term 'individuals  can happily apply to regions of 
empty space. S ince A bsolu tism  is assum ed, empty regions have particularity, in being part ol a 
manifold, w ithout  be ing particulars .
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property. For example, if a fairy Godmother transformed all schmatoes into tomatoes, 
we would not be able to tell just by looking. So the property of being a schmato is not 
constitutive of the look that schmatoes have. This, then, suggests a diagnostic. We 
may ask: which properties if transformed or substituted would result in a concomitant 
change in how things look? Martin suggests that observational properties would -  
those of colour and visible shape - and this is because observational properties are 
visually unique.
“That is to say, observational properties are those properties for 
which necessarily no object which exemplifies them, and is 
characteristic with respect to look for that property, has a visual 
duplicate” (2010, p. 203).
But this being the case there can be no distinction between having the look of that 
property and having that property; they must coincide.
This suggests the following definition:
D ef (looks-CON) Those properties that constitute the look of an object 
or individual are those which, if they were modified, 
or substituted would result in a change in the look of 
that object or individual.
We can harness this definition as a way of responding to the question above, the 
question as to what properties or states of affairs warrant the making of claims to the 
effect that empty space looks a certain way -  viz. ‘see-through’ and ‘clear’.
I have claimed that regions of space look ‘see-through’ in contrast to regions at which 
opaque objects are located. As such, space looking ‘see-through’ is dependent on the 
presence of an object (seen through the relevant region) and of light, both conditions 
thereby bringing about the “remarkable phenomenon” that David Katz remarks upon 
below - lit regions may look more or less bright:
“Let us look through the unlighted interior of a blackened tube, set 
up in a normally illuminated room in such a way that there is a space 
between the end of the tube and the farther wall of the room. We 
then see the space in front of the tube and beyond it in its normal 
brightness, but the space within the tube appears as clear -  one is
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tempted to say luminous -  darkness. This darkness has nothing in 
common with the misty darkness of a fog, nor even with the dull 
darkness of the shadowed corner of a room. No sharp line can be 
diawn, it is true, between differently lighted spaces, but there always 
remains that remarkable phenomenon of empty spaces, lying one 
behind another, with clearly distinguishable, one might almost say, 
mutually contrasting brightnesses”. (1935, pp. 43-44)
Empty space, then, like objects, can look more or less bright as a function of the level 
of illumination. Still, how empty space itself looks does not change depending on how 
it is lit (anymore than a red kettle changes its colour in near darkness) -  space in our 
vicinity always looks ‘clear’. What properties make it look that way?
If we accept the conclusion of Nerlich’s argument, then we should allow that a change 
in the intrinsic curvature of empty space would lead to a change in the way it looks as 
a function of how objects seen through it would look.89 But by D ef (looks-CON), we 
should thereby grant that the curvature of a region constitutes its look precisely 
because a change in the intrinsic curvature of a region results in a change in its look 
(again on the assumption that objects are seen through it). But, pace Nerlich, this 
result generalises to Euclidean regions: If  we are compelled by Nerlich’s argument we 
should likewise grant that locally curved regions would change their appearance if 
they were ‘flattened’. Equivalently, if a given Nerlich landscape were ‘ironed out’, we 
should allow that its appearance would also change -  as I am urging it would look 
‘clear’. But since all these changes flow from the shape of space, the shape of space is 
constitutive of its look, even when it is flat.
We are now in a position to set out what properties or states of affairs warrant the 
making of such claims in the first place.
The state of affairs that warrants the claim that empty space looks ‘see-through’ 
involves the visual presentation of an object in a space through which the subject is 
path-connected to that object - I detail this notion a little further in Chapters Four and 
Seven. In contrast, what warrants the claim that empty space looks ‘clear’ is, it the 
argument advanced here is correct, the Euclidean shape of absolute space. As such,
89 Presuming, LhaL is, lhat the change in the degree o f  curvature is significant enough -  I leave this issue 
aside.
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we can evaluate such comparatives because we have acquaintance with, in the first 
instance, the complex state of affairs that involves the percipient, the object and the 
region through which it is seen, and in the second, the visible properties of empty 
space -  its shape.
But this explains finally why such claims are both intelligible, and why they can be 
evaluated. They can be evaluated because we see empty space. So why was this 
‘reminder’ so hard to come by?
I suggest two, related reasons:
First, because empty regions are homogeneous with respect to each other -  they are 
‘clear’. This means that we are apt to overlook the look of empty space. And second, 
because empty space has a ‘see-through’ look and typically we take see-through 
things to be invisible because they are transparent. Neither reason, however, entails 
that empty space is invisible.
7.
I have presented an argument for the visibility of empty space, and I have tried to 
bring its peculiar look into view by appeal to comparative looks statements. I have 
argued that empty space looks ‘see-through’ and ‘clear’, and I have urged that the 
intelligibility of these statements might be counted as transcendental evidence for our 
acquaintance with the look, itself explained by the intrinsic properties of the 
Euclidean space in our vicinity (presuming too that objects are present and 
illuminated). In Chapter Five, I consider another way of making sense of the claim 
that we see empty space -  the Structural View.
I close by addressing some objections.
/. O b jec t ion  fr o m  D u st 
It might be objected that empty space in our world is not empty since it is filled with 
air and dust.
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Response. Perceptually speaking, being filled or empty of air makes no discernable 
diffeience to how the space it occupies looks since air is effectively transparent and 
dust is too tiny to be seen. Besides, it is not simply the presence or absence of air, or 
indeed of any other invisible or visible object, that explains the look of space. As 1 
argued, we explain the look of empty space by appeal too to its intrinsic shape.
2. Objection from  W ater
Regions of space filled with water are full, but they look see-through.90 So it can’t be 
the case that all regions of space that look see-through are empty. On the other hand, 
we do occasionally treat regions filled with water as empty — for example, scuba- 
divers are likely to treat the space they swim through as empty relative to those that 
are filled with fauna.
Response: It need not be denied that regions that are comparatively “full”, in one 
sense can’t be relatively “empty” in another -  recall the public bath at Oderberger 
Strasse. I am mostly interested, however, in empty regions in a ground sense, where 
these, I suggest, should be individuated in terms o f their having the look. Besides, I 
don’t claim that all regions that look see-through are empty. Regions filled with 
transparent objects may look empty if one can see the entirety of the region of space 
they occupy91 — this explains why one can mistakenly walk into a perfectly clean 
window the boundaries of which are invisible (i.e. glittering lines aside). You walk 
into the window because you don’t see it -  it’s invisible. Rather, the region has the 
look that empty regions have.
3. Objection from  Clear Blue S k y
When we see the sky, we can see empty space though without necessarily anything 
seeing through it, say if it is clear and cloudless.
Response: It is true in such instances that one sees empty space, but, perhaps 
surprisingly, if what I am arguing is correct, the sky doesn’t look empty. One only
90 Cf. Merleau Ponty (1968 , xlvii-iii): “ When through the w a ter 's  thickness I see the tiling at the bottom  
of a pool, 1 do not see it despite the  water and the reflections there; 1 see it through them and because ol 
them.”
91 This way o f  putting things was suggested to me by Matt N udds.
94
knows that it is empty because it is seen as continunous with the see-through space 
which one does see. I pick up this argument in Chapter Seven.
4. Objection from  Pro!eon Objects
Suppose we can magically modify the shape of space so as to practically bring about 
two phenomenally indistinguishable circumstances: one in which a non-Euclidean 
object is seen through a Euclidean region, and another in which a Euclidean object is 
seen through a non-Euclidean region. In such instances, one wouldn’t be able to tell, 
which region one was in.
Response: Even if one can’t tell which kind of region one is in, this doesn’t undermine 
the thought that the shape of space is what renders it visible. Granted, like schmatoes 
and tomatoes, one wouldn’t be able tell in such cases if one is in a Euclidean or a non- 
Euclidean region, but it is not true that there is no look that one sees, even if, on 
occasion one might be mistaken as to which.
5. Objection fro m  Efficacy
It might be thought that empty space simply can’t be seen since it is causally 
inefficacious. Here a metaphysical assumption, which I anyway disputed in Chapter 
Two, is supposed to trump phenomenology (however ambivalent).
Response: I have tried to rally transcendental evidence for our acquaintance with the 
look. As I argued, since the comparative looks claims I spelt out are intelligible and 
evaluable, one must have perceptual knowledge of what look is being specified.
6. Objection from  Spa tia l Relations
One might deny that empty space is seen and that only spatial relations are.
Response: Though I have adopted absolutism as an assumption of this thesis, we can 
nonetheless respond to this theorist on his or her own terms. Such a theorist would 
naturally have to explain how spatial relations can be visible. Here the difficulty is 
that relata must begin and end somewhere, and seeing the boundaries of objects 
involves seeing whatever is ‘outside’ them, canonically empty space. But a relationist
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who insists that spatial relations are visible can have no recourse to enrpty space. 
Whatever it is that is outside objects is just whatever connects them, namely spatial 
relations. The relevant relation, then, must have some phenomenal character. But if 
this is not the character that flows from being made of empty space, then what?
7. Objection from  Magnification
Dretske insists, somewhat peculiarly, that the ability to visually differentiate an object 
from its immediate surroundings “is a capacity which may be enhanced by the 
acquisition of eyeglasses” (1969, p. 28). But how does this translate to the case of 
space? It does not seem as though we can see space better through wearing 
spectacles.
Response: Since the ability to differentiate an object from its immediate surroundings is 
enhanced by wearing glasses, we should likewise grant, however oddly, that the 
ability to differentiate empty space from the objects for which it is their ‘outside’ is 
also augmented. For when one sees where an object begins and ends more clearly, one 
concomitantly sees where the empty space that is the ‘outside’ for the object begins 
and ends too. As I will later explain, in Chapter Eight, empty space and objects are 
co-seen.
8. Objection from  the Imperative
Finally, it might be supposed that whatever is seen can form the subject of an 
imperative to ‘look at x l’ But we never entreat people to look at regions of empty 
space.
Response: Though we never entreat people to look at regions of empty space, there is 
no reason to suppose that the imperative is nonsensical. In most conversational 
contexts, the request is irrelevant, and the standard Gricean maxims are flouted. But I 
have tried to excavate the look philosophically, and the result, it seems to me, is not 
entirely uninformative.
At the outset I noted that phenomenology is not, after all, so reliable in the case of 
empty space, and I tried to provide a philosophical argument for our seeing empty
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space, here drawing on Nerlich. There is some precedent for such a strategy; 
O’Shaughnessy uses it in Consciousness and the World. In trying to uncover the 
sense-data that, as he sees it, mediate perception of physical objects, he writes:
“It seems to me that we must avail ourselves instead of tools of an 
altogether different and non-observational kind: namely, those of 
argument. Indeed of argument of a purely philosophical order”.
(2000, p. 439)
This has been my strategy too. But to this extent, my conclusion, which is a 
conclusion about our perceptual experience and its character, is not metaphysically 
neutral; it is premised on the adoption of absolutism as an assumption. Yet to that end, 
it is interesting to note that the argument from perception that Nerlich raises, and 
which I have harnessed (in spirit, if not to the letter), is in fact used to justify 
Absolutism, for with it he aims to disable one of the primary motivations for 
Relationism; the thought that empty space is imperceptible. He shows that, rather than 
putative imperceptibility of empty space making Relationism plausible, it makes 
Absolutism likely, since it is only through being Euclidean, and homogeneously so, 
that we fail to see it. Pace Nerlich, however, I have tried to urge, arguing from the 
intelligibility o f comparative looks claims, that Euclidean space is perceived, but its 
look goes unnoticed or overlooked precisely because it is ‘clear’ and ‘see-through’.
in mice:
In this chapter, I have constructed an argument on which empty space has visible 
properties that are directly perceived -  such properties flow from its shape. I have 
argued that even Euclidean space can be seen, despite looking ‘clear’ and ‘see- 
through’. Call this account the Direct View.
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~  IV
Gaps, Traps and Paths
see through —
1. lit. To see objects  on the other side o f  (an aperture, or something transparent).
H ence fig. to penetrate  (a disguise, fallacious appearance), to detect (an im posture),  
to perceive  the real character or aims o f  (a person).
- The Oxford English Dictionary
In the last chapter, I outlined a position, drawing on Nerlich, on which empty space is 
directly perceived. But I also noted Bermudez’s worry that since holes are 
inefficacious they can’t shore up in perceptual experience. In Chapter Two, I argued 
against the metaphysical supposition which informs this assumption -  the thought that 
space is inefficacious. Insofar as empty space is apt to affect its occupants, space 
might be thought to have structural biff. Still, Bermudez gestures at a genuine puzzle 
in the case of empty space.
We tend to think that our perception of things ‘depends’ on those things, something 
that Strawson forcefully argues for in his classic paper “Perception and its Objects”. 
This is relatively easy to make sense of in the standard case he treats - the perception 
of objects. For example, we might think that our experience of objects appearing a 
certain way -  looking a certain colour or feeling a certain way -  depends on what 
properties those objects have. Likewise, we tend to think that which objects we see are 
those on which our experience depends, something that Grice (1961) excavates. But 
the case of perceiving empty space doesn’t easily fit this model. It is not so easy to 
make sense of our perception of a given empty region depending on that region, and 
this is because, as I explained in the last chapter, it is not intuitively obvious that we 
do see empty space - recall that I had to appeal to philosophical argument to cajole a 
‘reminder’. Moreover, the question as to which empty space is seen seems to make 
little sense. Because regions are homogeneous, there is no question of reidentifying 
certain regions. And since regions cannot ‘leap over each other’, anymore than days 
of the week can, there is never any requirement to sort among numerically distinct
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regions. So in what sense, if any, does the seeing of empty space 'depend' on its 
object? This question takes up the main body of the chapter.
Here’s a sketch of the response I aim to develop and defend:
I argue that which region one sees is the region that transmitted the light in terms of 
which one’s occurrent perceptual experience of the object seen through it is explained. 
In contrast, how a given empty region looks is a function of its shape. So making 
sense of how our experience of a given region depends on that region itself depends 
on which question we ask; which or how. As I will argue, in the first case, empty 
space enters into the context of a causal explanation, but does not itself cause. But in 
the second, the role space plays is genuinely causal -  this is insofar as its shape 
determines how it appears. I close by explaining why this result means we ought not 
invoke negative causation as a way of making sense both of the perception of empty 
space, and of the dependency of our experience of a particular empty region on that 
region.
The chapter patterns as follows. In §1, I outline Strawson’s Dependency Intuition on 
perception and I explain in what sense the case of empty space might be thought to 
contravene the intuition. In § 2 ,1 consider the ostensibly parallel case of the perception 
of time, and outline a critical difference - unlike time, space can affect how things 
appear. In §3, extrapolating from LePoidevin’s (2007) notion of chronometric 
explanation in the case of time, I sort among two ways in which the dependency 
condition might be met in the case of empty space -  empty space can be part of the 
context of explanation - it can explain locometrically - or it can be directly causally 
efficacious, at least in its power to affect. In §4-5, I apply this distinction to an 
explanation of which region is seen and how. I argue that we should explain which 
region is seen locometrically, while the way it appears should be explained causally. 
In §6, I turn finally to the question of negative causation, and I explain why the 
solution I offer allows us to remain neutral on the reality of negative causation, while 
nonetheless denying that perceiving empty space involves negative causation.
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1.
In “Perception and its Objects , Strawson argues that we pretheoretically take 
perceiving to be an ‘immediate’ awareness of things ‘outside us’ (1998, p. 97). It is 
‘immediate in the sense that we are not aware of any mediating sensory veil that we 
must pierce so as to perceptually encounter the world.9- And insofar as we perceive 
the world non-solipsistically,93 we are aware of things as being ‘outside us’. We 
perceive them as having a life beyond our fleeting, discontinuous perceptions of them. 
Strawson urges that our pre-theoretic concept of perception is thereby causal, at least 
in the following sense:
“The idea of the presence of the thing as accounting for, or being 
responsible for, our perceptual awareness of it is implicit in the pre- 
theoretical scheme from the very start. For we think of perception as a 
way, indeed the basic way, of informing ourselves about the world of 
independently existing things: we assume, that is to say, the general 
reliability o f our perceptual experiences; and that assumption is the same 
as the assumption of a general causal dependence of our perceptual 
experiences on the independently existing things we take them to be 
of... It really should be obvious that with the distinction between 
independently existing objects and perceptual awareness of objects we 
already have the general notion of a causal dependence of the latter on 
the former” (ibid., p. 101).
I spell out this argument.
By perceiving things, we can come to know about them. For example, we can see that 
a lemon is yellow and tastes bitter, that it feels cool to touch. Indeed, the most ‘basic’ 
way we have of learning about lemons is by perceiving them. And this holds for our 
perception of the world at large.
Generally too, we suppose that our perception of the world is reliable, not that it is 
always veridical of course, but that the world is, for the most part, the way we 
perceive it as being. For Strawson, this assumption of reliability is essentially the 
assumption of a general causal dependence of our perceptual experiences on what
9_ This follows the use o f ‘im m edia te ’ used by B erm udez in the last chapter.
That is, we distinguish between our  experiences and w hat  they are experiences oi. See Straw son 
(1961, p. 69).
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they are of. Importantly, though, this is not something about which we theorise. 
Rather, says Strawson, it is implicit from our conceptual scheme from the start. 
Otherwise we would not be able to think of perception as a way of finding out about 
the world. This, then, suggests a requirement on what it takes for something to be 
perceived, at least insofar as we understand what it is to perceive something.
For something to be perceived is for our perception of that individual to depend on 
that individual in such a way that makes our experience of that individual a reliable 
way of coming to know how that individual is. Call this Strawson’s Dependency 
Intuition - ‘intuition’ since it is supposed to be, compellingly I think, pretheoretic. In 
this chapter I ask how this requirement might be met in the case of space.
As have I noted, however, the case of space is peculiar. In Chapter Two, I argued that 
space is efficacious insofar as it is apt to affect its occupants. But in the last chapter I 
quoted Bermudez’s reasonable denial of this much - reasonable because, again 
pretheoretically, and unlike objects, we don’t perceive space to ‘enter any reaction, 
exert any force or absorb any energy’ -  something that Nerlich insisted. But as such, 
space doesn’t appear to be the kind of thing that could be a relatum of a causal 
relation. So, given that fact that we can perceive empty regions, or so the Direct View 
urges, if Strawson’s Dependency Intuition is to go through in the case of empty space, 
we need to understand how we can make sense of our perception of a region 
depending on that region in a way that does justice both to our pretheoretical 
understanding that the perception of things depends on those things, and the intuition 
that empty space seems inefficacious.
In the next section, I make a start at providing a response by drawing a rough 
comparison with the case of time. First, though, a clarification conerning the scope of 
my enquiry.
The claim that experience depends on its objects should be sharply distinguished from 
a dialectically related issue about the ontology of experience — one whereby the causal 
theory of perception is supposed to yield a specific understanding of what it takes to 
be an experience: one on which hallucinations and perceptions are type-identical
101
mental states of the same metaphysical nature. The question as to how experience 
depends on its objects is neutral on the ontology experience.94
2 .
For LePoidevin, a causal theory is “almost irresistible” in the case of perception 
(2007, p. 23) and, like Strawson, he is primarily concerned with the epistemic status 
of perception. We have perceptual knowledge of how things are and it might be 
wondered how. Fie advocates a causal theory of perceptual knowledge, one on which 
“the causal chain... contains the truth-maker of the belief’ (ibid., p. 24). Later it will 
become plain just how appropriate the metaphor of a ‘chain’ is, as well as the idiom 
of ‘containment’. First, though, it is worth stating the principle he takes as a working 
hypothesis - The Causal Truth Maker Principle.
The Causal Truth Maker Principle says: Perceptual beliefs that qualify for the title 
‘knowledge’ are caused, in part, by their truth-makers. For LePoidevin, then, which 
perceptual beliefs are knowledge is a function of how they were caused. As such, his 
emphasis is different to Strawson’s. Strawson argues that because we treat perception 
as knowledge yielding, our conception of perception is causal. LePoidevin, however, 
adds an assumption that Strawson doesn’t broach, but that helps bring the peculiarity 
of the case of space into view. Truth-makers for our perceptual beliefs “have to be 
capable of being causally active” (ibid., p. 31).
Now, in the case of time, it is not so difficult to see how this might be puzzling, and 
indeed, as LePoidevin notes, even non-sensical depending on one’s metaphysics. For 
example, if you are a presentist about time -  a theorist who takes it that only the 
present is real and existent -  then how can you have beliefs about duration and 
succession that involve earlier and later times? How can non-existent future times be 
causally active now? But metaphysics aside, since experience is confined to the 
present, it might be wondered how we can even experience such things. The thought
94 See Nudds (2009) for an exposition and discussion o f  this dispute .
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that we directly perceive duration and succession certainly isn’t tempting, or so 
LePoidevin says. We might wonder why. He offers three reasons.
First, time can t modify input. This, he says, is quite unlike the case of spatial 
properties like shape. Take for example the simple case of perceiving the shape of an 
apple:
“There is a relatively straightforward story to be told about the way 
in which the shape of, say, an apple can be an object of perception... 
the shape of the apple modifies the distribution and properties of 
light rays reflected from its surface...
[But] with time... it does not make sense to suppose that, when a 
given event such as the ringing of the telephone is perceived, the 
duration of that event, or its occuring after some other event, 
somehow modifies the input, allowing us just to hear its duration 
and position vis-à-vis other events. We are only aware of how long 
an event lasted when it has receded into our phenomenal past — 
when, in other words, the event has ceased to be an object of 
perception” (ibid., p. 98)
Here the assumption is that the perception of some property is direct if the property 
has modified the input of the sensory signal in terms of which it is perceived. But the 
property of lasting for some length of time can’t modify a sensory signal at a time.
Second, since there are temporal limits on the present, some temporally extended 
processes, depending on their temporal extent, can’t be directly perceived - for 
example, a peal of laughter or Mozart’s twentieth piano concerto. Both events take 
time, so, on LePoidevin’s understanding, the succession of their parts cannot be 
directly perceived; this is because this would entail their being perceived all at once, 
simultaneously. Depending on how ‘tight’ we draw the limits of the present then -  
which, incidentally, “are not chosen by us” (ibid., p. 76) -  certain processes and 
events cannot be directly perceived.9’
Finally, to perceive one event following another we need only be aware of the events 
themselves. The temporal interval ‘in which they are’ -  understood on the model of
95 Cf. Soteriou (2007 , 2010),  Phillips (2010) and Crowther (2009).
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space plays no role at all. Or put somewhat differently: How can we perceive 
absolutely empty time? The question hardly seems to make sense.96
The puzzle in the case of time, then, is that despite all this we can nonetheless form 
beliefs about order and duration on the basis o f  our perceptions. Moreover, such 
beliefs count as perceptual knowledge. But given the requirement that truth-makers 
must be causally active, it is hard to see how. Before I consider this dilemma in more 
detail, consider the case of space.
Unlike time, space can modify input. In the passage quoted above, LePoidevin notes 
how the shape of the apple can modify the distribution and properties of light rays that 
hit the retina and in terms of which the apple is visually presented. In the last chapter, 
I noted a somewhat distinct way in which the shape of space can modify input; by 
affecting the geodesic paths along which light travels.
Second, while there are spatial limits on what can be seen -  for example, we can’t see 
things that are too small to discern and we can’t see things in their entirety if they 
overflow our field of vision (for example, if you press your nose up against a door, 
you can’t see the hinges or the handle) -  we nonetheless experience as limited the 
region of space of which we have experience (see Richardson 2010). But in temporal 
experience we don’t experience the boundaries of the interval that we call ‘the 
present’ -  this is something Soteriou (2011) elucidates.
Likewise, though temporal experience is often oriented -  this is inasmuch as the 
present is experienced as at the edge of a succession of times that are now past - it is 
not perspectival in the sense that spatial experience is. For example, observers that 
share the same space typically agree on what is happening now. But in the case of 
space, while observers may agree on what is happening in that region, their 
perspectives on what is happening are not identical.
Finally, and again unlike the case of time, we see objects and the space in which they 
are, a claim I detail further in the closing chapter.9'
% Though again see e.g. Soteriou (2011).
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So what is the puzzle LePoidevin isolates in the case of time?
LePoidevin suggests that objective order and duration cannot be the causes of our 
perceptual beliefs concerning order and duration because order and duration relations 
do not have location.
“There is a clap of thunder at 4 o’clock, and the rain starts pouring 
down at one minute past 4. These events are readily locatable. But 
what of the temporal relation between them? That relation, even if 
we treat it as a trope, is not readily locatable at 4, or one minute past, 
or any time in between. And what of the rainstorm’s property of 
lasting 20 minutes? Where is that in time?” (2007, p. 102)
The assumption is, then, that causes must be located in space — something 
desideratum (L) gestured at in Chapter Two. The understanding of causation implicit 
then, is one whereby causes are understood to be path-connected to their effects.
Now, critically, the physical connections theorist (though not necessarily the theorist 
who treats connections as necessitating relations between universals) and the theorist 
that embraces negative causation must both assume this much. Biff, standardly 
conceived, flows along paths. But causation by absence occurs precisely because the 
biff that might have flowed along the path that connects the absence to its causal 
partner, doesn’t. The assumption is, then, that causes (even if one’s causal nexus 
involves absences) must be located and path-connected to their effects. This explains 
then why, in the case of perceptual belief, truth-makers, in being causally active, must 
be ‘contained’ in space. Similarly, if they are part of a ‘chain’, they must be path- 
connected to their effects. Yet it also makes clear why order and duration are 
problematic.
Order and duration are not located anywhere and there is no path through space that 
connects earlier and later times. So how can we have perceptual beliefs that, assuming 
the Causal Truth Maker Principle, count as knowledge about order and duration? It 
seems that either we must give up the principle or else we must relinquish the
97 As Martin (1992 , p. 189) writes: “ W c can think o f  normal visual experience as experience not only  
of objects which are located in som e space, but as o f  a space within which they are located.
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plausible assumption that oidei and duration are acausal. LePoidevin's solution is to 
modify the former. He suggests:
“Instead of confining the explanatory relationship between 
perceptual beliefs and their truth-makers to one that is purely causal, 
we might expand it to include other, non-causal components of 
explanation”, (ibid., p. 116)
This strategy yields what LePoidevin calls the Explanatory Truth-Maker Principle 
(ETMP). This says: Perceptual beliefs that qualify for the title ‘knowledge’ have 
truth-makers that figure in a full explanation of the acquisition of those beliefs. On 
this principle, true perceptual beliefs need not be caused by their truth-makers. Rather, 
they need only be more weakly involved, namely, in contributing to a full explanation 
of the acquisition of those beliefs. In the case of time, he calls such explanatory 
involvement chronometric (ibid, p. 117), and he suggests that certain kinds of fact or 
property -  namely when something occurred, or its duration -  contribute to 
explanations in a way that is non-causal but which are nonetheless part of the full 
explanation of the relevant event.
Here are a couple of examples he offers:
(a) Why did the firework explode at t?
Because it was lit five seconds before t.
(b) Why did electricity flow around the system?
Because two buttons were pressed simultaneously.
In (a) the order of events is explanatorily relevant to what happened at t, while in (b) 
the simultaneity of two happenings, itself non-causal, nonetheless explains a certain 
outcome. Such explanation, then, occurs in the context of causal explanation, but is 
not itself causal. It might be wondered whether a similar kind of explanation might be 
adverted to in the case of perceiving empty space -  to echo LePoidevin, call it 
locometric explanation.98
98 Note, while this notion ‘echoes '  LcPoidevin’s notion, it is not claimed to be analogous — the case ol 
spatial perception is unlike the case o f  temporal perception in ways that m ake an explanation as to how
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3.
To begin, a disanalogy between the temporal and spatial cases should be reasserted. 
LePoidevin supposes that oider and duration cannot be directly perceived. But I aim 
to pursue the thought, argued for in the last chapter, that empty space has visible 
properties that are directly perceived. This shores up a distinction noted earlier. 
LePoidevin urges that order and duration can’t modify input. But I argued, after 
Nerlich, that empty space can modify input, and in Chapter Two I explained in what 
sense this modification might be considered causal — empty space has a kind of 
structural biff. Notably, then, the conception of causation embraced is wider than that 
allowed by the physical connections theorist and is rather in line with the functionalist 
approach favoured by Schaffer in his treatment of negative causation. To this extent, 
it is worth drawing attention to the pluralist understanding of casual explanation that 
Strawson likewise allows.
In the passage quoted at the outset, he writes of the presence of the thing as 
“accounting for” or “being responsible for” our experience of it. This, then, 
recapitulates Grice who, in his “The Causal Theory of Perception” (CTP), writes, not 
dissimilarly:
“If we are to deal sympathetically with the CTP we must not restrict the 
Causal Theorist to the verb ‘cause’; we must allow him to make use of 
other members of the family of causal verbs or verb phrases if he 
wishes. This family includes such expressions as “accounts for”, 
“explains”, “is part of the explanation o f ’, “is partly responsible for”.
(1961, pp. 144-145)
With this in mind, we can thereby weaken the Dependency Intuition so as to capture 
the spirit of this pluralism. We can allow that for something to be perceived is for that
we can have perceptual beliefs about t ime disanalogous to an explanation o f  how w e can h ave  
perceptual beliefs about  space. A problem arises in the case o f  time since it seem s w e can have 
perceptual beliefs that involve times that are not now present. But in the case oi space, the re levan t  
regions are present;  as I have  argued, they are directly perceived. This, then, explains how we can have 
perceptual beliefs about  empty space — because we perceive it. Even so, there is som eth ing to 
recommend the expository strategy I have been pursuing. The difiiculty that arises in the case ol t im e 
seems to stem from the fact that the relevant truth-makers are neither causally active nor located in 
space. S imilar difficulties seem to attend the case o t the perception of empty space. Empty space  
appears inefficacious this was B erm udez’ intuition -  and likewise space itselt is not located 
anywhere.
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thing to be lesponsible foi, to account for, or to be part of the explanation of our
p  . 9 9perception oj it.
Now, chronometric explanation clearly meets the dependency requirement. For the 
order in which things happen, or when they happen, is part of our explanation as to 
why they happened. Still, as LePoidevin insists, chronometric explanation is not 
causal, but arises only in the context of causal explanation. This, then, allows us to 
reify our question: Does space meet the dependency requirement in appearing in the 
context of causal explanation or as being genuinely causal? As we will see, what 
response we give depends on which question we ask. For in asking which region is 
seen or how it appears, the role played by space in our explanation is distinct. In the 
first case, as 1 will argue, the role played by space is locometric. Space separates 
objects and perceivers. So when an empty region is seen, the region seen is the one 
that transmits the light in terms of which the object seen through it is visually 
presented. While in the second case, although space plays a role in transmitting light, 
its shape structures the light, and so causally affects how it (viz. the region) appears.100 
I outline these in turn.
4.
In his celebrated paper, Grice gives an account of a peculiar case of seeing. Suppose it 
looks to some subject as though there is a pillar at a certain distance and direction 
from the perceiver, and that there actually is a pillar at that place. However, imagine 
too that, unbeknownst to the perceiver, a mirror is interposed between it and the pillar 
such that a numerically distinct pillar is reflected. What makes it the case that it is 
correct to say that the reflected pillar is seen and not the pillar behind the interposed 
mirror? Says Grice: it is “extremely tempting” (1961, p. 142) to explain this linguistic 
fact by saying that the second pillar was causally irrelevant to how things look.
99 Photons are partly responsib le  for our perception o f  objects , but not for our  perception ol them we 
don’t see them.
100 The shape o f  the region through which an object is seen aftects the way the object appears. 1 he 
claim, however, is that the shape  o f  space also determines the appearance ol the legion itsell as a 
function o f  how the objec t  seen through it appears.
108
Notably, the question as to which region of space is seen in this case, including empty 
regions, is never asked, but I leave aside questions of mediated perception until 
Chapter Seven since they pose special difficulties. Even so, the general significance of 
Grice s exposition is plain. Which pillar is perceived is the one on which the subject’s 
experience depends in a way that is appropriate to seeing. How should we understand 
this notion?
The standard way of construing appropriateness is by contrast with /«appropriate 
cases. For example, suppose an “expert” contrives to ‘trap’ a subject, such that it 
looks as though there is a clock on a shelf, but the shelf is empty. The example is 
Grice’s and he concludes: we would not be inclined to say that the subject saw a clock 
on the shelf for the clock apparently seen plays no role in bringing about the 
experience -  there is no clock. Hence, the way in which the subject’s experience 
depends on its cause -  the expert -  is inappropriate to seeing.
What counts as seeing, then, is experience that depends on its object and not on some 
ruse. It might be wondered how this relation of dependency should be elucidated. 
Grice suggests only that we leave a gap -  a “blank space” - to be filled in by the 
specialist:
“I suggest that the best procedure for the Causal Theorist is to 
indicate the mode of causal connexion by examples... for example, 
when I look at my hand in a good light, my hand is causally 
responsible for its looking [to] me as if there were a hand before 
m e... whatever that kind of way may be and to be enlighted on that 
question one must have recourse to the specialist”, (ibid., pp. 143- 
144)
In a later article, however, David Pears proposes to go “further” than Grice (1976, p. 
31), suggesting that we can fill this “slot” now “with material already available to 
everyone”. His proposal is that we can elaborate Grice’s notion of appropriateness by 
considering what is involved in occupying the right position on the appropriate causal 
line. The following case is offered as illustrative:
Say a subject is facing a door, the handle of which is illuminated by a torch behind the 
subject. It is true that the torch caused (or contributed to causing) the experience of
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the handle, but false that the subject saw the torch. This is because the torch is said “to 
occupy the wrong position on the causal line leading to [the experience] ', (ibid., p. 
26). What would occupying the right position involve? We are told:
“The door-handle occupies the right position, but the torch does not.
What this means in the case of sight is, roughly, that the door-handle 
is the last object off which the light-rays are reflected, but the torch 
is not”, (ibid., p. 28)101
Critically, then, where an object is makes a causal difference to whether it is seen, 
which in turn suggests a structural parallel with cases of chronometric explanation. 
Just as when an event occurred enters only into the context of an explanation, perhaps 
where it occurred does likewise. Indeed, this is typically why places are thought be 
acausal or inefficacious. What matters is only what causally efficient entities occupy 
those places.102 Consider how the parallel runs.
In perception, where an object is makes a difference to who sees what. Just as we can 
ask why the firework exploded at t (because it was lit five seconds before), we can 
wonder why John saw the ball (because he was standing in front of it). We can, 
however, vary our emphasis in asking this much. For we can ask:
(a) Why did John see the ball?
Or
(b) Why did John see the ball?
We can bring out the force of this shift contrastively. In asking why did John see the 
balk we are asking: why did John see the ball and not (say) the horse. And here we 
need not have recourse to quite so physical an explanation as Pears offers above. We 
can state merely that John was not facing the horse, or he was looking the other way, 
or something stood between him and the horse; responses that appeal to orientations, 
directions, and places — spatial notions. Likewise, in asking why did John see the ball 
(and not Mary), we can respond: because he was looking through the keyhole and she
101 As he notes, however,  this would  have to be refined to deal with men in armour, mirror images, 
images fil tered through w ater  and so on — I consider the case of mediated perception in Chapter Seven.
102 In Chapter T w o, 1 cast doubt  on this supposition -  the assumption of acausality  fails to take into 
account the peculiar  way in wh ich  space can meet desideratum (L). Since local regions can vary in 
their curvature, they can affect material located in and passing through them.
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wasn t viz. he was by the keyhole and she wasn t. That is, something about John's 
location meant that he saw the ball and not Mary.
Finally, consider an experience of one of two indistinguishable items — plastic ducks 
Huey and Dewey. We might ask what makes it the case that a given experience 
depends on Huey and not Dewey (when an experience that depends on Dewey would 
have been qualitatively indistinguishable). The answer is, of course, that in the latter 
case Huey occupies that right position on the appropriate causal line, or to paraphrase: 
the subject is facing Huey and not Dewey.104
So, questions as to who is where and looking in what direction, as well as what is 
oriented at the places that fall within the subject’s field of vision, all arise in the 
context of explanations as to who experiences what when. But such features of the 
relevant explanation are only contextual. It remains the case that just as John doesn’t 
cause it to be the case that he sees the ball, but is simply in the right place to see it, the 
place the ball occupies doesn’t cause itself to be seen.
Now, ascertaining which object is seen by such measures is fairly straightforward. 
Which object is seen is the one on which a subject’s experience appropriately 
depends. This involves occupying the right position on the right causal line, and, as I 
have indicated, space plays a locometric role in such cases. But empty space isn’t at a 
position, so how do we determine which region is seen? And what role does the 
relevant region play in explaining this much?
In the last chapter, I argued that empty space has visible properties that are directly 
perceived so long as something is seen through the relevant region. But this suggests a 
way of determining which region is seen. The region one sees is the region that 
transmits the light in terms of which one’s occurent visual experience of objects seen 
through it is explained. In non-mediated perception, this is just the region one sees the 
object through. But as such, the role of space in determining which empty region is 
seen is also locometric. It enters into the context of the explanation of how the object 
seen through it is seen — it is the path through which the bift flows that explains the
103 This exam ple  may be recognised from Martin (2002).
104 Note tha t the s ituation is a little different in cases of mediated perception — see Chapter Seven.
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visual experience of the object. Which empty region is seen, then, is explained 
locometrically. But, as such, particular empty regions don’t directly cause themselves 
to be seen, though our perception depends on them; although we see empty regions by 
seeing objects through them, their role in explaining how those objects are seen is 
locometric — they merely transmit the biff in tenns of which those objects are seen. 
But this being so, we can after all reconcile Strawson’s Dependency Intuition with 
Bermudez’s assumption of inefficiency. Strawson’s Dependency Intuition is honoured 
because it is true that our perception of a given region (assuming that the region is 
seen, and that an object is seen through it) depends on that region. However, since the 
dependency involves the transfer of biff, empty regions, precisely because they 
transmit biff, appear inefficient -  they merely transmit biff. What’s more, like Huey 
and Dewey, regions of space in our vicinity are qualitatively indistinguishable. But 
just as qualitatively indistinguishable experiences of the different ducks are distinct 
insofar as they depend on a different duck in each case, experiences of qualitatively 
indistinguishable though distinct regions of empty space likewise depend on distinct 
regions -  the region that transmits the biff that explains the seeing of an object seen 
through it.
So much for an account of how which region is seen depends on that region.103 What 
about how a given region appears?
5.
Above I noted LePoidevin’s contention that time fails to structure input and in what 
sense space is different. Space does affect input. Depending on its shape, space can 
determine how things seen through it look. To requote Nerlich:
105 The question concern ing  which  object is seen in a given circumstance is typically posed as a m e an s  
of  excavating w hether  there are  causally necessary and sufficient conditions on seeing. (For ex am p le  
Lewis asks w h a t  it is “ for visual experience to match the scene before my eyes (1980, p. 240), w h e ie  
here ‘m a tch ’ is understood  informationally . A visual experience ’matches the scene that caused it il its 
content is correc t and, and this is L ew is’s contribution, it it is counterfactually dependent on that 
scene). W hen I ask w h ich  empty region is seen, however, I do not aim to determine conditions  
necessary for seeing em pty  regions -  I sketched these in Chapter Three - but lather to make sense of 
the peculiar way in w h ich  the Dependency requirement is met in the case ol empty space.
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So, as we look at distant things that lie beyond the hole, the photons 
by means of which we see them sometimes pass through the hole 
and sometimes not, things will change their appearances as the 
visual angles subtended by the various paths change, just as things 
change their shapes and shimmer in a heat haze or when seen 
through some inhomogeneous physical medium like uneven class”
(1994, p. 38)
Hence, although space does not affect the informational character of light as objects 
do — it does not absorb, reflect, or scatter - it can affect the way light is transmitted, 
with consequences for how things appear (recall, Nerlich’s comparative claims work 
by drawing parallels with paradigmatic visual experiences that we do have). But in 
this sense, perception of how space itself appears depends on the character of that 
region; it depends on how things seen through it look. So, this being so we might ask: 
Is this dependency genuinely causal or merely locometric?
The dependency that explains which region is perceived is, I argued, locometric -  the 
relevant region only enters into the context of the explanation. But in the case of 
explaining how it appears, the intrinsic properties of the region itself -  its shape -  
must be invoked. But to this extent, how the region appears depends on how it is; how 
the region is is genuinely causally explanatory of how it appears.106
6 .
So far I have distinguished two ways in which the perception of empty space depends 
on the region seen - which region one sees is explained locometrically, while how it 
appears is explained causally. In this closing section I argue that both conclusions 
allow us to resist the thought that the perception of empty space involves negative
106 This contrasts with  the ‘F regean’ representationalist account o f  spatial experience recently d e tended  
by Brad T hom p son  (2010) and Chalm ers (2006). Thom pson argues that it is consistent with the 
phenomenal characte r  o f  our  spatial experience that the underlying geometry o f  the space represen ted  
could vary radically. Indeed, the analogy he draws is with inverted spectrum cases (see Block 2003).  
Hence, if  w e  hold him to the analogy, he should have to maintain that regions, the curvature o f  which is 
as distinct as red is from green (for example, regions the curvature o f  which is concave or  convex),  
could have the sam e phenom enal appearance. I f  the Direct View defended here is coirect,  this F regean  
position is false. In particular, the Fregean overlooks the substantial discovery that only regions ot 
constant curvature perm it free mobility (see also Chapter Six). Since we can m ove through space, and 
the curvature o f  space determ ines how it appears, it is not consistent with the way it appears  that its 
curvature could be highly convo lu ted .
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causation, which in turn honours the promise I made in Chapter Two — to explain why 
perceiving empty space does not involve negative causation.
Say an opaque object is seen at some location. It is true that, at that location, see- 
through space is not seen — as David Katz notes, it is as though opaque objects offer 
resistance to the eye, “a barrier beyond which the eye cannot pass” (1935, p. 8).107 
Conversely, however, if a visible object is absent at that region, then, if what I have 
argued is correct, see-through empty space -  empty space in a ground sense - is seen. 
As such, the presence or absence of objects might be thought to be causally relevant 
to the seeing of empty space.
This notion of causal relevance contrasts with that of causal operativeness. Causally 
operative entities are bifiy. But on the assumption that causes are difference makers, 
even absences, while not causally operative, can be causally relevant. As Kukso 
(2006) argues: When an entity makes a difference, a difference is made betv\>een two 
total states of the universe. Hence “both the presence and the absence of the entity is 
required in order to establish its causal relevance” (2006, p. 32). Here the comparative 
importance of ‘between’ is critical. This is since, in order to determine whether an 
entity makes a difference, we need to compare or trace the differences between tvvo 
total situations -  one in which the entity is present and one in which it is absent. The 
question is: Is the absence of visible objects at empty regions causally relevant to how 
those regions appear? If so, then perceiving empty space might be thought to involve
* * 10Rnegative causation.
Before I address this question, two notes concerning causal operativeness and 
relevance should be borne in mind.
First, space itself is a locometric condition on the coherence of Kukso’s argument. 
This is because the substitution or removal of objects -  and hence their presence or
107 Recall too Mizrahi (2010),  quoted in Chapter Three: “ in order to see behind or through a body, 
there m ust be no visible obstac le” (p.4). As I argued, there being no visible obstacle -  no thing — does 
not mean that noth ing is vis ible .
108 Importantly, this question is not merely a question as to whether the absence ol objects is 
explanatorily re levant to the seeing o f  empty regions (it is, since otherwise they would not be seen), but 
whether the absence  o f  objects  at those regions itself causally explains the region being seen.
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absence is at some place. Second, consider in what sense that affect/effect 
distinction, introduced in Chapter Two, cross-cuts the relevance/operativeness 
distinction.
While it is true that efficient entities are operative, it doesn’t follow that causally 
relevant 'entities’ (in this case absences, which we may not wish to entify), can affect. 
Causal relevance is determined by examining and contrasting two distinct worlds -  
worlds that differ only in the presence or absence of some entity at a location. But 
causal affect doesn’t involve contrasting two distinct worlds at all. Rather, in the case 
of space, its affect flows from the intrinsic properties that a given region has. There are 
no other worlds ‘between’ which we must range so as to establish the relevant affect. 
So, does the absence of objects at certain regions causally explain those regions being 
seen? One way to see why not is to turn once again to the questions of which and how.
Perceiving the absence of a visible object at a region cannot determine which region 
one sees (even if absences do have causal powers). This is because unlike the regions 
at which they are, absences do not have particularity.109 The intuition of dependency, 
then, can’t be honoured: in emphasizing a lack o f biff, the appeal to absence fails to 
capitalise on the locometric role of space in transmitting biff. This in turn points to a 
disanalogy:
While it is true that the presence or absence of light at a region (say) is relevant to 
experience of that region -  it is experienced as either bright or dark -  the presence or 
absence of an object at that region is not the sole determinant of how that region 
appears. As I have argued, empty space is seen i f  an object is seen through it and the 
flow of biff from that object is involved in the explanation of which region is seen — 
namely the one that transmitted the biff in terms of which the visual experience of the 
object seen through it is explained. Hence, it is the presence, not the absence of an 
object, that our explanation requires.
What about the how question? Does the absence of an object at a region causally 
explain how that region appears (i.e. in the sense that it is causally relevant)? If what
109 As I will argue in C hapter  Five however, absenticil locations can be intensionally indiv iduated.
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I have argued in the last chapter is correct, then surely the answer is 'no '. The 
appearance of empty regions is not only a function of the absence of objects at those 
regions, but is explained too in terms of its shape. But as such, it is the positive 
character of the region that explains how it looks, assuming too there is an object seen 
through it. But this suggests finally not only that the perception of empty space does 
not involve negative causation, it is not even a species of absence perception. I pick 
up this thought in the next chapter. Before that though, I revisit Strawson.
In a celebrated passage, Strawson writes of the causal relation between perception and 
its objects:
“We are philosophically accustomed -  it is a Humean legacy -  to 
thinking of the simplest and most obvious kind of causal relation as 
holding between types of item such that items of both types are 
observable or experienceable and such that observation or 
experience of either term of the relation is distinct from observation 
or experience of the other: that is, the causally related items are not 
only distinct existences, but also the objects of distinct observations 
or experiences. We may then come to think of these conditions as 
constituting a requirement on all primitive belief in causal relations, 
a requirement which could be modified or abandoned only in the 
interests of theory. Since we obviously cannot distinguish the 
observation of a physical object from the experience of observing it 
-  for they are the same thing -  we shall then be led to conclude that 
the idea of the causal dependence of perceptual experience on the 
perceived object cannot be even an implicit part of our pretheoretical 
scheme, but must be at best an essentially theoretical addition to 
it...but the difficulty is spurious. By directing out attention to causal 
relations between objects of perception, we have simply been led to 
overlook the special character of perception itself. Of course, the 
requirement holds for causal relations between distinct objects of 
perception, but not for the relation between perception and its 
objects. When x is a physical object and y  is a perception of x, then x 
is observed and y  is enjoyed.” (1998, p. 102)
Strawson’s point is that while perceptual experience is causally dependent on its 
objects, both cannot be distinguished. We might wonder why. Typically, 
individuation is spatial, but experiences cannot be spatially distinguished from their 
objects. In my idiom, it might be said that this is because, while a subject is path- 
connected to the objects of her experience, no subject is path-connected to her 
experience. Rather, episodes of experiencing occur where the subject is. Equivalently,
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however, it seems to me that we might be likewise “led to overlook” the peculiar 
status of space as an object of perception. For, unlike objects, we are not path- 
connected to the ‘outside’ in which they are -  the space we are in.
in mice:
I have argued that which region one sees is the region that transmitted the biff in 
terms of which one’s occurrent perceptual experience of the objects seen through it is 
explained. In such cases, the role of space in explaining which region one sees is 
locometric. Second, I argued that how regions appear depends on how those regions 
are -  the intrinsic curvature of a given empty region determines how it looks. This 
flows from the Direct View.
Finally, I suggested that, since the structural biff of space is positive, we shouldn’t 
invoke negative causation as a way of explaining our perception of empty space. 
Though the absence of visible objects at regions is part of the explanation of how 
those regions appear, it is not the sole determinant. What’s more, since absences lack 




It is now  five minutes to eight,’ said Neville. ‘I have come early. I have taken my 
place at the tab le  ten minutes  before the time in order to taste every m om ent o f  
anticipation; to see the door open and to say, Is it Percivai? No; it is not Percival.”
There is a m orbid  p leasure in saying: “No, it is not Percival.” I have seen the door  
open and shut twenty  times already; each time the suspense sharpens. This is the 
place to which  he is coming. This  is the table at which he will sit. Here, incredible 
as it seem s, will be his actual body.
- Virginia Woolf, The Haves
In the last chapter, I alluded to the claim that I aim to defend and reify in this chapter 
-  namely, that the perception of empty space should not be treated as a species of 
absence perception, a least if the Direct View is embraced. I begin by considering an 
account of perceiving empty space that I have not yet commented on -  a position, 
recently defended by Matthew Soteriou (2011) and Louise Richardson (2010), which 
I have called earlier the Structural View.
Unlike the direct account of seeing empty space elucidated in Chapter Three, the 
Structural View is indirect insofar as it emphasises not the nature of space, but the 
character of experience, and specifically its structural features. In what follows, I 
compare both views, and show in what sense the direct account I favour is compatible 
with the structuralist position, where this is read descriptively, not transcendentally.
The chapter runs as follows. In the first part, I outline Roy Sorensen’s take on the 
nature of absences and their perception, picking up a thread from Chapter Two (§1). I 
then detail a puzzle Soteriou raises for Sorensen and I set out his positive solution. I 
explain how Soteriou dialectically positions his proposal in opposition to the 
cognitive account of silence perception favoured by Brian O’Shaughnessy (§2). In §3- 
4, I set out Soteriou’s application of his proposal to the perception of empty space, 
and I explain why, if the direct view is correct, a transcendental reading of this 
treatment may prove too demanding. In the second part, I outline in what sense the 
direct account diverges from the Structural View (§5-6), and I close, in §7, by 
showing how the direct account has the resources to steer a conciliatory path between
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an attitudinal take on the ontology of absences, in a sense to be explained, and that 
favoured by Sorensen, Soteriou and Richardson.
1.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre tells a well-known story. When he goes to the café to 
meet Pierre, he perceives Pierre s absence. Notoriously, this leads Sartre to suggest 
that Pierre’s absence depends on a frustrated expectation that he would be seen, a 
characterization Richard Gale describes as ‘attitudinal’ (1976, pp. 55-61); Pierre’s 
absence depends on the presence, in Sartre, of a psychological attitude, an expectation 
that Pierre will be seen. In Seeing Dark Things, Roy Sorensen argues against this 
attitudinal take on the ontology of absence, sympathizing instead with a position 
defended by C. B. Martin.
For Martin absences are “localised states of the world or universe” (1996, p. 58), 
which, in being localised, are spatio-temporal (ibid., p. 59). But as such, absences are 
not things -  “we need to avoid the reification of absences” (ibid., p. 62) - and nor do 
they have any properties. Yet being property less, nor are they biffy or, in the 
terminology introduced in the last chapter, causally operative. Still, Sorensen urges, 
absences are causally relevant. Hence, contra Sartre, their existence is mind- 
mdependent; they are objective.
The ontology o f absence, however, is not Sorensen’s prime concern. Rather he aims to 
make sense of absence perception, though here, naturally, a dispute over the ontology 
of absences has consequences for an account of how they are perceived. It is worth 
emphasizing in what sense he differs from Sartre.
For Sartre, absences are individuated attitudinally. Hence, perceiving them also 
involves the relevant attittude. For Sorensen, however, whether or not an absence is 
perceived depends not on the presence or absence of a specific psychological episode, 
but on whether or not the presence of an absence at some localised region of the world 
is causally relevant to the perceptual episode enjoyed. But to this extent his position
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also weighs against another theorist, one who may reject an attitudinal account of the 
ontology of absences, while nonetheless advancing an attitudinal account of their 
perception.
On the assumption that only biffy entities cause, and supposing that a CTP is assumed, 
it might be insisted that absences are imperceptible or are perceived only indirectly, 
their presence being inferred from a failure to experience anything -  I sketched such a 
view in Chapter Three. But if absence ‘perception’ involves inference, it is attitudinal. 
Sorensen’s line on absences and in particular their causal nature tells against this 
theorist too, and this is so even while such a theorist might yet deny that the truth- 
makers for the relevant attitudinal episodes are, as Sartre seems to have it, subjectively 
individuated. So why does Sorensen dissent?
In Chapter Two, I sorted among theorists who admit or banish negative causes from 
their causal nexus -  genuinists and non-genuinists respectively. Chief among the latter 
are those who emphasize the flow of biff. Sorensen is less canonical in this sense. He 
advances a CTP but embraces negative causation; to this extent he might be thought a 
causal functionalist. For the functionalist, recall, whatever plays the role or has the 
function of causally explaining a certain event is a cause. But this being so, absences 
need not elude the CTP after all. Absences make a difference -  they are causally 
relevant -  and causal relevance is all a CTP needs. This, then, might seem to figure 
against the hybrid position outlined above, for although the hybrid theorist may grant 
that absences are localised, mind-independent states of the world, she denies that 
absences are directly perceived.
To be clear, then, the ontology of absence that informs Sorensen’s perceptual account 
is dialectically janus-headed: On the one hand, it leads to a rejection of an attitudinal 
view of the ontology of absence -  the Sartrean position -  and on the other, it disarms 
an indirect account of absence perception on which the relevant ‘perception’ is 
mediated by a psychological episode. I detail this position later. For the moment, 
consider why Sorensen might suppose that mere causal relevance sufficient for a C l P 
to hold.
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In the last chapter, I sketched Kukso s argument for the causal relevance of absences: 
When an entity makes a difference, a difference is made between two total states of 
the universe. But this being so, says Kukso, "both the presence and the absence of the 
entity is required in order to establish its causal relevance” (2006, p. 32). How might 
this translate to the general case of perception?
Consider two possible states of a toy universe — a room in which a light is switched on 
(state a) and off (state b). And consider the experience of a subject in such a universe. 
We might ask: Does the switching on and off of the light make a difference to the 
subject’s experience?
Clearly, the answer is ‘yes’. In the first instance the subject sees light, and in the 
second, darkness. Since, however, the difference between the subject’s experiences is 
explained by adverting to the presence and absence of light, it follows that the absence 
of light, like its presence, is causally relevant to an explanation of the nature of the 
subject’s experience at both a and b. For had the light been absent at a, the subject 
would have perceived darkness not light, and had the light been present at b, she 
would have perceived light not darkness. Hence, whether or not the light is absent or 
present at a time makes a causal difference to the subject’s experience at that time 
(assuming of course that the perceiver is counterfactually sensitive to the presence or 
absence of light at a time). Sorensen adopts this thought, albeit by appeal to a 
somewhat different tiny universe -  the universe of a toad’s stomach. In the passage 
below, he recalls a boyhood fascination:
“As a boy, I fed lightening bugs to my pet toad. To my delight, the 
bugs would continue to light up after being consumed. I could see 
the toad’s belly light up periodically” (my emphasis, 2008, p. 62).
This emphasis on seeing, the italics denoting perceptual success, helps spell out what 
the requisite counterfactual sensitivity requires.
As Sorensen explains, a mere absence of experience at a time, even it subjectively 
indistinguishable from a genuine experience of absence, cannot be sufficient for 
seeing. This is because, in instances where there is a brute absence of experience, the
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perceivei fails to be counteifactually sensitive to the presence or absence of liuht. The 
relevant sensitivity is simply lacking.
To see a lightning bug flashing in the dark, we need to see the 
absences of light between the light flashes. Mere alternation between 
seeing the light emission and failing to see does not suffice for the 
perception of flashing. Consider an electrical device that cyclically 
blinds a subject. If the subject is viewing a steadily glowing light and 
the cyclical blinder is present, the light may appear to be flashing.
The blinder can be synchronised with a flashing light, so that when 
the blinder is on the blinker is off and vice versa. Now the light is 
flashing and looks like it is flashing. But the subject does not see the 
light flashing” (2008, p. 241).
Unsurprisingly, this example of so-called veridical hallucination -  where there is 
‘match’ in the informational content of the experience without counterfactual 
dependence110 - takes for granted the particular ontology of absence that Sorensen 
assumes. That is, where the absence of light at a particular spatio-temporal region is an 
objective state of how things are. But importantly for Sorensen, it also argues against 
the attitudinal view that nonetheless tallies with this ontology; it supposes that, despite 
being causally inoperative, absences are causally relevant, and they are causally 
relevant because what makes a difference to the subject’s experience at a time is 
sensitivity to both the presence and the absence of, in this case, light.
Now, prima facie this might suggest that in order to see either light or darkness a 
subject must be exposed to both. But in fact Sorensen resists this extrapolation. There 
can, he says, be seeing without light:
“If I am seeing without any current light, does it follow that I have 
been exposed to light earlier or later? No. Babies are born seeing... 
Consequently, if a girl is born into an utterly dark room, the infant 
sees the darkness even though she has never seen the light. If she 
dies soon after birth, then she will have seen without ever having 
been exposed to light...Sight only requires sensitivity to light 
(ibid. pp. 264-265).
In the next section, I raise a puzzle for this view.
110 See Chapter Four, fn. 96.
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2.
In a recent paper, Matthew Soteriou poses a dilemma for Sorensen. Say I am asleep, 
surrounded by silence. Even while sleeping, I am sensitive to sound - if a door were to 
slam, I would wake up. Even so, I am not thereby sensitive to the absence of sound. 
Hence, mere sensitivity to sound won t do for the perception of its absence. But 
likewise, mere sensitivity to light won’t do for the perception of darkness; though I 
may wake up if  a lamp is turned on, in being so sensitive, I am not thereby sensitive to 
the absence o f light (cf. Sorenson: “Sight only requires sensitivity to light”). Of 
course, our intuitive response as to why we are not so sensitive is that we are asleep. 
But this still leaves open what the import of being awake in the context of absence 
perception genuinely is.
On the face of it, it might be thought that the attitudinal view of absence perception is 
thereby recommended, since entertaining attitudes involves being awake. For example, 
if the presence of an absence must be inferred from a failure to experience anything 
positive, it might be thought that a condition on hearing silence is the ability to 
introspect an absence of experience of sound. Such a view is associated with Brian 
O’Shaughnessy.
For O’Shaughnessy, hearing silence is a species of coming-to-know that it is silent. As 
such, a subject doesn’t perceive silence but only comes to know that it is silent in the 
absence of any introspectible experience of sound. Sorensen has an argument against 
such a view: you can experience silence while being agnostic about whether or not you 
are hearing silence, as a wounded soldier might while wondering whether or not he has 
gone deaf. I return to this objection below. First, I set out O’Shaughnessy’s proposal. 
Then I consider a problem Soteriou also raises for O’Shaughnessy, in turn sketching 
Soteriou’s positive account.
O’Shaughnessy’s discussion of absence perception is elucidated in the context of a 
discussion of what distinguishes thought and perception. Thoughts, he claims, may 
agree or disagree with reality — that is to say, thoughts have truth conditions. But 
perceptions, which arc extensional, can’t have truth conditions - “we perceive
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objective phenomenal realities like material objects, or colours or relations” and such 
entities are not apt for being bearers of truth (2000, p. 328). Still, O’ Shaughnessy
wonders, suppose there were such a ‘truth-screen’ in perception, what would be
entailed? Namely, that we should be able to have negative perceptual experiences — 
that we should be able to perceive the ball not being blue, the girl failing to smile, 
silence. The question is: Can we?
O’Shaughnessy takes perceiving silence as his parade case among ostensible negative 
perceptual experiences. Importantly, though, while he agrees that silence is an
absence, a nothing, he denies that all absences, understood as privations, are
candidates for treatment along the model he will offer. Darkness is an absence of light, 
but unlike silence, which is an absence of sound, darkness has phenomenal reality -  
we see darkness as black (albeit contingently, since darkness might have looked some 
other way). In contrast, there is no sound of silence. Indeed, this is just what “silence” 
means. As such, this reveals a significant distinction.
The concept of darkness is as of an appearance, whereas the concept of silence is as of 
an absence. Hence, the question as to whether we can perceive absence is, in the hands 
of O’Shaughnessy, a query as to whether we can perceive entities that lack 
phenomenal reality or, in O’Shaughnessy’s idiom, are not ‘positivities’. But, on this 
understanding, darkness is a positivity - it has phenomenal reality despite its 
privational nature.
As I see it, two features of this account require special emphasis.
First, though darkness may have looked some other way, it is difficult to make out an 
analogous sense in which silence may have ‘sounded’ some other way, hence the 
thought that the concept of silence is the concept of an absence — namely, of sound.
111 It has been suggested  to m e by Andy Clark that particular silences — localised absences o i  sound 
may in fact have particular  phenom enal appearances. For example, in m aking sound recordings, the 
‘silence’ in the record ing space is also typically sampled and recorded. Silences dillei from ioom  to 
room. So a tw o-par t  record ing o f  an aria say -  if  begun in a theatre, but finished in a cathedial — needs 
to have its silences ‘eq ua lised ’. Particular 's i lences’, then, may differ as a function ol low level am b ien t  
noise and, m ore importantly , the shape o f  the environment in which that noise revei berates (which, in 
turn, suggests a parallel with the direct view the shape o f  the recording space determines the 
phenomenal appearance  o f  the relevant ‘s i lence’).
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Still, one might ask. Is no-sound something one hears? Sorensen would say ‘yes' — so 
long as you are countei factually sensitive to sounds, you are counterfactually sensitive 
to their absence. O’Shaughnessy, however, resists this line of thinking.
For O Shaughnessy, silence is not heard not because silences cannot exist or prevail at 
places (he thinks they do), or because silences are causally inoperative (though he 
surely does hold this view), but rather because perceiving is necessarily of phenomenal 
realities and the concept of silence is just as o f there being no sound (rather than 
sounding a particular way -  viz. silent). On O’Shaughnessy’s view, then, it simply 
makes no sense to say that we hear silence. Rather, when we ‘perceive’ that it is 
silent, there is no attendant auditory experience. But to this extent, we differ from the 
deaf.
O’Shaughnessy insists that the deaf lack auditory experience but do not ‘perceive’ 
silence and this is because, in the case of the deaf, an absence of auditory experience 
does not yield the immediate knowledge that one is surrounded by silence. Hence, 
though the deaf lack auditory experience, they cannot hear that it is silent:
“Hearing the silence is a special case of coming-to-know of 
contemporary silence: namely, that in which one’s knowledge arises 
immediately in an experience out of an absence of auditory 
experience which one knows to be a veridical perceptual reading.
Therefore a cognitive attitude, with silence figuring in its content, is 
a necessary condition of hearing silence, as it cannot be in the 
hearing of sound (and animals must be unable to hear the silence).
And to repeat: no hearing occurs when one hears the silence”. (2000, 
p. 329)
But this answers Sorensen’s objection. Sorensen noted that it is possible to hear 
silence while remaining agnostic about whether or not one has gone deaf. But we can 
recast this in line with O’Shaughnessy. A perceiver that lacks auditory experience can 
wonder whether she is experiencing silence or whether she has gone deaf. That is, she 
can wonder whether her perceptual reading is veridical. If it is veridical, then she 
experiences silence, but granted she only hears that it is silent if she also appreciates 
that she fails to hear anything because it is silent. This suggests a second feature of the 
account worth highlighting:
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When O ’Shaughnessy insists that perception is ‘positivity all the way’, he individuates 
the ‘positive’ as that which has phenomenal reality. Hence, on his account, ‘positivity’ 
need not always be predicated of biffy entities. That is to say, he does not seem to 
endorse the link assumed above, i.e. between causal operativeness and positivity. But 
this being so, he can thereby suppose that there are some privations we can directly 
peiceive — that is, that we perceive non-epistemically. Darkness is a case in point. 
Below I suggest that empty space (which if read in an absolute sense is not a privation) 
falls into this category. First, though, consider Soteriou’s worry and his positive 
account.
Given O Shaughnessy s insistence on ‘positivity all the way’, Soteriou wonders how 
the boundaries of perceptual entities are to be perceived, here taking his cue from C. 
B. Martin. I re-quote from Chapter Three:
“The concept of an edge is the concept of a limit of where something 
is and where something isn’t...The reference of the referring term 
‘world’ is divided into presences whose limits are drawn by 
absence”. (Martin 1996, p. 60)
For Soteriou, this suggests the experience of absence is not of “marginal significance”:
“If the perceptual experience of the boundaries of some positivity is 
itself a positivity, then that positive perceptual occurrence may
necessarily involve the experience of absence as well”. (2011, p.
191)
Take the case of hearing a series of discrete beeps. On O’Shaughnessy’s account, in
order to hear the silence between the beeps, a subject should have to hear that it is
silent, with silence figuring in the content of a cognitive attitude. Soteriou suggests 
that we can avoid this particular commitment (and the over-intellectualisation of 
experience it prompts -  see Chapter Three) while nonetheless acknowledging the 
insight C. B. Martin isolates. The way to avoid this commitment, he suggests, is to 
recognise the respect in which we can have conscious perceptual contact with regions 
of space and intervals of time within which the boundaries of such positivities can be 
perceived. I explain this thought in the context of Sorensen’s childhood universe.
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When, as a child, Sorensen saw the lightning bug flash in the toad's belly, he saw. at a 
localised spatio-temporal region, namely that occupied by the toad's belly, the 
piesence and absence of light. He leports how he was thereby able to keep track of the
toad through darkness (at least for the most part):
In the dim light of a porch lamp, I was seeing only the effect of the 
consumed lightning bug. I let my toad hop into the darkness because 
I could track him by seeing the flashes of the lightning bug. The 
hitch was that other lightning bugs would alight near the toad. I 
could not see which was the lightning bug inside the toad and which 
was the lightning bug outside the toad”. (2008, p. 62)
Soteriou s insight helps explain in virtue of what Sorensen’s boyhood self could
successfully track the toad.
Like Martin and Kukso, Soteriou treats absences as localised spatio-temporal states of 
the universe. But the key to perceiving them, he argues, lies in our conscious 
perceptual contact with the spaces and times at which they can be located or fill. This 
explains why Sorensen was able to track the toad: When absences are located in 
certain regions of space or fill certain intervals of time, and when we have conscious 
perceptual contact with those regions or intervals, absences need not cause themselves 
to be perceived. Rather, to perceive them we need only have conscious perceptual 
contact with the regions or intervals in which they are. On this understanding, then, 
Sorensen was able to track the toad, not simply because he was counterfactually 
sensitive to the luminousity of the bug, but because he had conscious perceptual 
contact with the regions of space and intervals of time within which flashes could 
successively appear and wane.
This, then, allows Soteriou both to preserve Sorensen’s insistence on counterfactual 
sensitivity - when we are in perceptual contact with regions of space and intervals of 
time, we are counterfactually sensitive to the presence or absence of causally operative 
events at or within those regions and intervals -  and to defuse the cognitivism of 
O’Shaughnessy’s account, at least as it applies to silence. When we hear silence, we 
have conscious perceptual contact with intervals of time within which sounds might 
have been heard but aren’t, and it is in virtue of such silences - temporally located,
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particularised absences of sound that the boundaries of sounds can themselves be 
heard.
But this explains, finally, why a sleeper, though sensitive to both sound and light, does 
not hear the silences and see the darknesses that surround her. She does not have 
conscious perceptual contact with the region of space and interval of time within 
which such absences are housed and extended.
In the next section, I outline Soteriou’s application of this idea to the perception of 
empty space, thereby reifying a little what conscious perceptual contact with a region 
of space involves.112
3.
Soteriou suggests that it is part of the phenomenology of experience that, when 
looking straight ahead, the region of space of which you are visually aware is 
presented as a sub-region of larger space that has that region as a part. Moreover:
“When looking straight ahead you may be aware of regions of empty 
space -  i.e. regions of space that are empty of visible objects. When 
looking straight ahead you are not aware of a region of space behind 
your head in that way -  i.e. as empty of visible objects.” (ibid., p.
192)
Here Soteriou draws a distinction between being visually aware of empty regions of 
space and simply being aware of other regions that are not now visually experienced. 
In the latter case he notes that awareness of such regions is not to be explained by 
awareness of those regions as empty of objects that could be experienced. But this 
suggests that, in the former case, one’s awareness is to be so explained. The following 
passage clarifies this thought:
112 Though this discussion would  benefit from consideration of Soteriou s treatment ol time, I focus 
only on the spatial case.
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One might then think that a crucial component of the right 
characteiisation of the way in which we are visually aware of regions 
of space, when aie aware through vision of the spatial locations of 
objects, should accommodate the idea that this can involve the visual 
legistiation of an absence — one s perception of regions of space as 
empty of visible objects. And it is this that allows us to perceive the 
boundaiies of objects, by allowing us to perceive where things are not, 
as well as where they are.” (ibid., pp. 192-193)
Visual awareness of empty regions in the former sense, then, is explained by a 
subject s visual awareness of the absence of visible objects at places, and this is what 
allows us to perceive the boundaries of objects.113 Still, we might ask: How can a 
subject be aware of the absence of objects at certain locations? Moreover, must the 
relevant experience thereby have a negative representational content — viz. such that 
‘no-object’ figures in the content?
Soteriou argues against this thought. His proposal is that we can appeal instead to 
‘structural ’ features of the conscious character of visual perceptual experience. I spell 
this idea out.
To detail this notion, Soteriou harnesses a distinction between strong and weak forms 
of perceptual transparency. The notion of perceptual transparency is supposed to 
capture the sense in which, phenomenologically, when asked to characterise the nature 
of one’s experience, introspection uncovers only the mind-independent objects, 
properties and relations that one is aware of in having the experience. Soteriou 
characterises this as a ‘strong’ version of the transparency thesis -  the emphasis is on 
mind-independent features of reality alone. In contrast, the weaker version allows that 
“when one attempts to attend introspectively to what it is like for one to be having a 
perceptual experience it seems to one as though one can only do so through attending 
to the sorts of mind-independent objects, qualities and relations one is apparently 
aware of in having the experience” (my emphasis, ibid., p. 185). He suggests that 
reflection on the conscious character of visual experience gives us reason to reject the 
stronger view. For consider: when you are aware of a region of space in front of you, 
you aware of that region as a sub-region of a larger space that has that sub-region as a
113 Soteriou glosses the notion o f  the “visual registration o f  an absence in terms ol one s perception ol 
regions o f  space  as em pty  o f  visible objec ts” . Presumably, then, the visual registration oi an absence is 
the perception o f  regions o f  space as empty o f  visible objects.
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part. Intuitively it might be thought - at least this is how Soteriou characterises it — 
that you are theieby aware of something like a cone of physical space’’ in front of you 
(ibid., p. 193). Nonetheless, it does not seem to you that the space of which you are 
aware has boundaries — you do not think of the boundaries of this cone as boundaries 
of some thing of which you are visually aware. Rather, suggests Soteriou, we should 
think of the boundaries of the visual field as present in experience through one’s 
awareness of one’s sensory limitations."41 detail this notion further.
In experiencing your visual field as bounded, you are aware of your sensory 
limitations in the sense that you are aware that there is more to be sensed than is 
currently sensed. But this in turn explains your awareness both of the presence of 
regions of which you are not now visually aware and your attendant sense that the 
region of space currently experienced is a sub-region of a larger space that has that 
region as a part. This brings into focus the import of the weaker version of the 
transparency claim:
You are aware of the boundaries of the visual field by attending to the mind- 
independent objects that fa ll within them. Hence, though you cannot attend to such 
boundaries directly, you can nonetheless attend to them through attending to mind- 
independent objects that fall within their bounds. But to this end, notice it does not 
matter which objects are perceived. Rather, argues Soteriou, it is an invariant feature 
of the conscious character of visual experience that you are visually aware of a region 
of space the limits of which are drawn by your sensory limitations. He describes this 
feature as ‘structural’, and concludes that it is this feature of experience that is 
involved in perceiving empty space:
“the correct explanation of the respect in which we can be consciously 
aware in vision of absence -  e.g. of regions of space as empty of 
visible objects — will sometimes need to appeal to relatively invariant 
features of such conscious awareness”, (ibid., p. 195)
And why?
114 See Richardson (2010) for a detailed characterisation and detence o f  this cla im.
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Because when such structural features are part of the conscious character of visual 
experience, the space they delimit is experienced as a space within which objects can 
be seen - this delimited region is the region with which a subject has perceptual 
contact. But importantly, this also accounts for the sense in which a subject can be 
consciously aware of regions of space at which there are no objects to be seen. The 
subject is aware of such regions as regions where objects could be seen.
This makes plain the respect in which the structural feature Soteriou isolates is 
involved in seeing empty space -  space in which objects could be seen but aren’t. In 
the next section, I explore an assumption on which the account offered might be 
thought to spin: the thought that seeing empty space is a species of absence perception.
To conclude this section, it is worth noting in what sense the Structural View contrasts 
with the Direct View set out in the last two chapters:
On the Direct View, empty regions are seen when something is seen through them. On 
the Structuralist View, however, a subject is consciously aware of empty regions when 
she is aware too of the region of space with which she has perceptual contact as a sub­
volume of a larger space. Assuming that our naive category ‘space’ is absolute, it is 
worth noting how the notions of empty space in a ground sense and empty space in an 
absolute sense -  the fourth sense detailed in Chapter One - are thereby brought into 
synchrony.
I now turn to an assumption the Structural View seems to embrace and which it is the 
goal of this chapter to renegotiate: the thought that seeing empty space is a species of 
absence perception. In § 5 ,1 try to establish what motivates this thought.
4.
For Soteriou, the perception of the boundaries of some positivity may necessarily 
involve the experience of absence as well” (2011, p. 191). Even so, it need not be 
thought that the relevant perceptual experience must thereby have a negative 
representational content. Rather, in having conscious perceptual contact with legions
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of space and intervals of time within which positivities can be perceived, a subject also 
has contact with regions outwith those positivities, locations at which absences are 
housed and extended, and in virtue of which the boundaries of such positivies are 
perceived. In the case of perceiving bounded objects, then, they are seen as bounded in 
virtue of seeing the empty space that surrounds them.
Now, critically, as Soteriou indicates, the space with which a subject has perceptual 
contact is itself a positivity — it is something. Still, when it is ‘empty’, it is ‘empty’ 
because objects are absent at those locations. This explains, then, why seeing bounded 
objects involves absence perception -  it involves seeing the absence of objects outwith 
those bounds. As I explained, this is understood by Soteriou to involve a structural 
feature.
Recall: Where a subject’s perceptual experience has the phenomenology that her 
visual field is bounded, the subject is implicitly aware of her sensory limitations -  she 
is aware that there is more to be sensed than is currently sensed. And in having such a 
sense, she has a complicit awareness too that for objects to be seen they must fall 
within the boundaries of the visual field. Hence, space is seen as empty (in a ground 
sense) when a subject is consciously aware of a region of space at which there are no 
objects to be seen but where objects could be seen. As I have indicated, this treatment 
involves establishing a synchrony between empty space in a ground sense and empty 
space in an absolute sense, at least so far as our naive category ‘space’ is concerned 
(see Chapter One). When a subject is aware of empty space in a ground sense, she is 
aware too of the space with which she has perceptual contact as a sub-volume of a 
larger space. In this section I aim to show that this synchrony is established by treating 
the perception of empty space as a species of absence perception.
Soteriou gestures at the Kantian spirit of his proposal:
“Much of what is being proposed here echoes some remarks that 
Kant makes in the metaphysical expositions of space and time in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, where Kant marks a distinction between 
the ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of appearances, and argues that space and 
time are ‘pure forms of sensible intuition’... I suggested that in 
vision, any region of space we perceive is perceived as a sub-iegion
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of a region of space that has that sub-region as a part. I suggested 
that in explaining this aspect of the phenomenology of visual 
experience we should appeal to certain structural features of 
conscious visual experience”, (ibid., p. 201)
Here Soteriou emphasises the formal features of visual experience that are involved 
in seeing space in general. But by contrasting matter and form in this Kantian sense, it 
might be wondered whether it is in fact a transcendental condition on the possibility of 
seeing empty space, understood in a ground sense, that a subject must experience her 
visual field as bounded. One reason why such a condition might be imposed is the 
assumption that perceiving empty space is a species of absence perception. For on this 
assumption, it might be thought that a subject cannot appeal to the content or matter of 
experience in order to explain what is involved in seeing empty space. After all, if 
there are no objects to see, there is no such content.
Now, on the direct account I am advocating, empty space is seen when objects are 
seen through it, where the way it appears depends on its shape. But, as such, what 
explains the relevant seeing is not the form of the experience but its content or ‘matter’ 
- th e  region seen through and, as I explained in Chapter Four, its intrinsic character.
To be clear, then, the Direct View I am exploring can resist the supposition that it is a 
transcendental condition on perceiving empty space that a subject must experience its 
visual field as bounded; all that is required is seeing through. Still, it remains the case 
that as a piece of descriptive phenomenology -  that is, as a description of how things 
seem to us -  the Structural View should be embraced. As such, the Direct and 
Structural Views may be compatible, even if the assumption that might be thought to 
underwrite the appeal to structural features is resisted - namely that perceiving empty 
space is a species of absence perception. In §5 and §6, I set out two reasons, sketched 
below, in support of this resistance.
One reason that might be thought to motivate the move to structural features is the fact 
that absences lack phenomenal reality. But I have argued that empty space has 
phenomenal reality — it has a look. If this is correct, then we need not appeal to the 
structure of experience to explain seeing empty space. We can appeal instead to the 
structure of space.
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Second, it might be thought that perceiving space as empty o f  objects already involves 
seeing empty space, where perception of the latter grounds the former. If so. 
perceiving empty space should not be identified with seeing space as empty of objects.
I discuss both points in turn.
5.
For O’Shaughnessy, while there is no hearing of silence, the same is not true in the 
case of darkness. Darkness has phenomenal reality, one which is only contingently 
linked to the absence of light - darkness might have looked some other way. But this 
suggests that “seeing the dark look is not in itself fa t seeing of an absence, but is 
instead the seeing of a presence signifying an absence”. In contrast, “hearing silence is 
the experienced cognitive accompaniment of an absence of experience signifying a 
further absence” (my emphasis, 2000, p. 334). It might be wondered whether seeing 
empty space is best analogized to seeing darkness or hearing silence -  that is, whether 
it involves the experiencing of a presence (e.g. darkness) signifying an absence (no 
light), or the awareness of an absence (viz. of experience) signifying a further absence 
(e.g. no sound)."5
Now, for Soteriou I suppose the answer is ‘neither’. On the Structural View, seeing 
empty space doesn’t involve the absence of experience but the experience of absence -
115 O 'S haughnessy  does not consider the case o f  perceiving empty space, and it is unclear whether he 
would in fact advoca te  treating it on the model o f  silence. For he writes (albeit reflecting on the 
peculiarity o f  holes):
“T he  perception  o f  holes is a true perceiving -  but then a hole is not an absence.
Even i f  a hole w as an empty portion o f  space, the portion o f  space is not the 
absence o f  matter  from that space; and in any case seeing a hole is neither a seeing 
the absence  o f  matter in a space, nor seeing-that matter is absent from a sp ace” .
(2000 , p. 333 , fn. 6)
Here O ’Shaughnessy  endorses a controversial line on the ontology o f  holes — one that m igh t  be 
identified w ith  the materialis t  position advocated by Lewis and Lewis (1970) and sketched in C hap te r  
Three. W hat is critical, how ever,  is his observation that empty space ("an empty portion ol space ) is 
not the absence o f  matter  from that space. This is am biguous between two distinct readings — (i) that 
what we call em pty  space  contains matter (dust particles say) and so is not an absence ol (all) matter 
from that space and (ii) tha t em pty space ought not to be identified with an absence oi matter l iom  that 
space. A t any rate, w h ichev er  reading is preferred, seeing empty space would only be a candidate foi 
the cognitivist trea tm ent O ’Shaughnessy advocates in the case o f  silence if it were also assum ed that 
empty space has no phenom enal  reality. Such a treatment would assume that the concept o f  em pty  
space’ is a co ncep t  o f  absence jus t  as the concept o f  silence is as oi there being no-sound. But 
O’Shaughnessy does not speak to this issue.
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viz. the absence of objects at locations. So it doesn't involve the experience of an 
absence of experience signifying another absence. But because it involves the 
experience of absence, nor is it the seeing of a presence signifying an absence, for, if it 
were, it is arguable that no appeal to structural features would need to be made.
In contrast, on the Direct View, seeing empty space does involve seeing a presence; 
absolute space that is seen through. As I have argued, such empty space has a certain 
phenomenal appearance -  a see-through look. But to this extent, seeing empty space 
can be analogized to seeing darkness after all. Just as darkness might have looked 
some other way, so might empty space, and just as the concept of darkness is the 
concept of an appearance, so, I urge, is the concept of empty space, at least in a ground 
sense. Recall Emily Bronte’s sketch of her writing table at the parsonage - it might be 
argued that the absence of pencil marks captures an appearance, not an absence o f  
something appearing.
What’s more, as I argue below and in Chapter Eight, for certain subjects such an 
appearance may well signify an absence; it may signify an absence of visible objects, 
namely by looking a certain w ay."6 But since absences don’t look a certain way, if the 
Direct View is correct, perceiving empty space is not a species of absence perception, 
even if it is true that there are no objects at those regions."7
This leads to a related point:
For Soteriou, the perception of bounded objects may involve the perception ol 
absences outwith those boundaries. The Direct View suggests a distinct way of 
accommodating this insight.
Smith and Varzi (2000) distinguish between two class of boundary; those that are bona 
fide and those that are set down by fiat. Fiat boundaries are laid down by normative 
practices that depend on human beliefs and practices - for example, the equator, or the
116 Soteriou, though agnostic on the metaphysics o f  space, seems to embrace a s imilar perceptual 
ontology. The space o f  perception is, he argues, a positivity - something that can be lilled 01 is empty at 
regions.
117 Hence, we visually ‘regis ter’ the absence o f  visible objects by seeing see th ro u g i  empty space. . uc 
space is empty o f  visible objects ,  but we d o n ' t  perceive it as  empty. W e just  see it.
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border of China — while bona fide boundaries involve either spatial discontinuity or 
qualitative heterogeneity. Holes, fissures, cracks and slits are stereotypical cases of the 
former - they are gaps in some sort of extended material. While boundaries that 
involve a change in texture or material constitution are qualitatively heterogenous - for 
example, the boundary between the sea and sand, or cake and icing. What type of 
boundary does Soteriou suppose is perceived? A bona fide one surely, but which 
type?
Since absences lack qualities, it should naturally be denied that the relevant boundaries 
are perceived by perceiving qualitative heterogeneity -  absences have no qualities. 
Instead, it must be insisted that spatial discontinuity is perceived, where this, it might 
be supposed, involves perceiving an absence of matter outwith the bounds of objects.
Now, on the Structural View, perceiving this much requires conscious perceptual 
contact with a region where objects could be seen but aren’t, which in turn involves 
the experience of the visual field as bounded; that is, as delimiting a region where 
objects could be seen. But the Direct View makes plausible an alternative response. 
Again, I take my cue from O’Shaughnessy.
O’Shaughnessy writes that “the perception of presences is not opposed to the 
perception of absences, but to either not perceiving at all or to perceiving other 
presences” (2000, p. 334). The Direct View has the resources to harness this thought.
When a subject perceives the boundaries of objects, she does so not by perceiving an 
absence - namely an absence of matter outwith the relevant boundaries - but by 
perceiving a presence — a positivity, space, that is empty of objects. Happily, however, 
this much is consistent with Soteriou and Richardson, for they likewise grant that 
space is a positivity. Nonetheless, on the Direct View, it remains the case that a subject 
sees empty regions not by experiencing her visual field as bounded, but by seeing 
objects through the relevant region. Yet this suggests that the direct theoiist can aftei 
all allow that when a subject perceives the boundaries of objects, she does so by 
perceiving qualitative heterogeneity. I explain in what sense.
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I argued in Chapteis Two and Thiee that the shape of space, which is a quality of a 
given region, constrains the way it appears. But if this is correct, seeing empty space is 
not simply the seeing of an absence of matter outwith those boundaries, it involves 
seeing the intrinsic properties of a particular region. My claim is that, when such 
regions are seen, they have a particular phenomenal appearance, and so, in 
0  Shaughnessy s sense, are positivities. But this being so, even if it is insisted that the 
boundaries of objects are characterised by spatial discontinuity and thereby involve the 
presence of the absence of matter outwith those boundaries, we can still insist that the 
perception of such discontinuity involves the perception of qualitative heterogeneity in 
as much as it involves the perception of ‘another presence’ outwith those bounds - 
namely space with a see-through look."8
This completes the first part of my argument. In the final part of the chapter, I outline 
reasons for thinking that perceiving empty space grounds the perception of the absence 
of objects at those regions and so should not be identified with perceiving their 
absence.
6 .
Soteriou’s account allows us to sort among absences the ontology of which differ -  we 
can distinguish among absences that are spatially extended, such as absentee 
voluminous objects, and those that are temporally extended, such as silences. 
Likewise, some absentees are spatio-temporal -  rainshowers on a cloudless day. Call 
that which is absent an absentee, and the absential location the location in time or 
space that an absentee would have occupied if present."9 So cast, silences have
118 It might be objected  that there is no qualitative heterogeneity in this instance since both objects  and 
the empty regions ‘o u ts ide’ them are Euclidean. The curvature o f  those 'outside regions then (w here  
curvature is understood  as a quality o f  a region) is not distinct from the curvature ol the objects for 
which it is their  ‘outside. Hence, there is no qualitative heterogeneity . My claim, however, is that the 
relevant heterogeneity  is phenom enal,  and. in this sense, is qualitative. There is a visual phenom enal oi 
qualitative d ifference between seeing empty regions and opaque objects
119 The thought that absen tees have absential locations is developed in the Indian philosophical l u d i l io n  
known as Vaiiesika. An absence  has an absentee and also a location and time. Hence x  does not occui 
in y  at time /’ is recast as ‘an absence-of-v occurs in y  at time t (see Ganeri 2001, p. 82). Notably, the 
relation between absences  and their locations is distinct from that between presences and locations.
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absential locations in time, while absentee objects have absential locations in space. 1 
suggest we might use this idiom as a way of recasting the structural analysis.
On the Structural View, when a subject experiences her visual field as bounded, she is 
implicitly aware of a region within which objects could be seen were they to fall 
within that region. On these grounds, the subject is visually aware of locations at 
which no objects can be seen but which, were objects to occupy those locations, would 
be seen, namely by falling within the relevant bounds. Hence, in being implicitly 
aware of her sensory limitations, a subject is attendantly perceptually aware of 
absential locations for absentee visible objects.
Now, prima facie it might be thought that, in being perceptually aware of absential 
locations for absentee visible objects, such a subject is thereby aware only of empty 
regions -  regions at which visible objects are absent. But critically, spatially extended 
absentees may also have absential locations at regions that are occupied — the region 
at which Pierre is absent might be filled by Sartre. But in this sense, perceiving the 
absence of objects at locations is distinct from perceiving silence. How so?
When you perceive silence at a time, you have perceptual contact with an interval of 
time within which sound could be heard but isn’t. But when you perceive the absence 
of an object at a location, it need not be the case that no object is seen at that location 
(in the way that no sound is heard when one ‘hears’ silence), for another object may 
be seen there. Hence, to generate the structuralist parallel between silence and empty 
space, it must be insisted not that particular objects or kinds must be absent from those 
regions, but that any visible stuff or material is.
Now, at the outset of this thesis I noted that seeing no thing does not yet entail that 
nothing is visible, for empty space may be visible. Must the structuralist conversely 
insist that where no thing is visible at a region at a time that nothing is visible? I 
suggest one reason for denying this entailment.
Only the latter involves contact  for example (Ibid., p. 87). See also Matilal (1985. p. 145). I thank Dan 
Arnold for email co rrespondence on absence perception In Indian philosophy.
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The structuralist may wish to preserve the possibility of sorting among two species of 
empty region that may fall within the space the visual field delimits at a time - regions 
where objects would be seen were they to occupy those regions, and regions where 
objects wouldn t be seen were they to occupy those regions, namely because other 
opaque objects would occlude them — for example, the empty region behind the 
unopened door that Percival fails to occupy.1-0 Call the former unoccluded empty 
regions.
Now, it might be insisted that unoccluded empty regions are simply those where, if 
objects were located there they would be seen. On such a view, it might thought that 
we should thereby identify unoccluded empty regions with the possibility of absentee 
visible material being seen if only it were present at those locations. Critically, such an 
understanding harnesses a relative sense of being empty -  empty space is space that is 
empty of visible objects. As I noted at the outset, however, I am mostly interested in 
perceiving empty space in a ground sense -  space that is empty of visible material but 
which, if I am correct, we don’t tend to conceptualise as empty, either in a relative or 
comparative sense. Rather, as I have indicated, the concept of such empty space is best 
understood as an appearance. We can harness O’Shaughnessy’s idiom as a way of 
characterising this difference: While the concept of empty space in a relative sense is a 
concept of absence, the concept of empty space is a ground sense is the concept of an 
appearance. In Chapter Three I provided an argument for the empty space in our 
vicinity having an appearance.
Now, the structuralist understands “empty space” as space at which visible objects are 
absent, and which is thereby “empty” in a relative sense. But need a structuralist
120 Here I should  offer  an explicit gloss on the notion o f  the visual field as understood by the 
Structuralist. First, visual experience  is said to have a ' f ie ld '  since w e  are aware o f  its boundaries  or 
limits. Second, as R ichardson urges, it does not have a field character because things appear  to us ‘from 
somewhere’ -  saying that visual experience has a field is not to say there is an origin present in visual 
experience, but tha t it has the above character (2010, p. 232). Third, the field is invariant because it is 
characterised in term s o f  these structural features. Hence, even though different regions of space are 
delimited at a time, no region is identified with the "field’ o f  vision. Fourth, and importantly, the space 
the field delimits  is not everything that is seen at a time — it also contains unseen regions (such as the 
empty space behind the closed door  that Perceival fails to occupy). This view follows M. G. F. Martin. 
As Richardson writes: “ As Martin m akes clear in his account, the visual field includes regions of space  
at which noth ing is currently seen due to occlusion (1992, p. 199) or darkness (1993, p. 2 1 4 )—  On 
Martin’s view, with my head in a closet, my visual field does not d w ind le . . .T he  visual field includes 
the spaces and objects  beyond the walls o f  the room and even the building f am in (2010. p. 233).
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analysis preclude a treatment where the concept of empty space is the concept of an 
appearance? It seems to me, the answer may be ‘no’ (though naturally I defer to the 
structuralist).
The structuralist treats empty space as “empty” in a relative sense, perhaps because of 
the dialectical opposition to O’Shaughnessy’s treatment of silence perception. As I 
have tried to establish, this may also explain why, on a structuralist treatment, the 
notions of empty space in absolute and ground senses are thereby brought into 
synchrony. Since empty space is understood relatively as the absence of visible 
objects, there is no content to appeal to, hence the requirement to engage structural 
features as explanatory. But this explains why a concomitant conception of absolute 
space must be adopted -  when a subject experiences her visual field as bounded, she 
experiences the space delimited by those bounds as a sub-volume of a larger space that 
has that space as a part.
The structuralist solution, then, is to treat empty space in a ground sense as relative 
absence: it is urged that a subject perceives the absence of visible objects when she has 
conscious perceptual contact with regions where objects could be seen, i.e. by falling 
within the bounds of the visual field, but where objects are not seen. As I have 
suggested, however, this does not yet distinguish between two types of empty region 
where objects could be seen, namely by falling within the bounds o f the visual field, 
but where objects are not currently seen -  empty regions that are occluded and 
unoccluded empty regions. Yet since structural features are ubiquitous in experience, 
they cannot sort among these regions.121
As both Soteriou and Richardson note, it is an invariant feature of the phenomenology 
of visual experience that we experience our visual field as bounded. But as such, the 
boundaries of the visual field are present independently of whatever objects fill the
121 It might be objec ted  that there is a natural way to accom m odate occlusion on the Structural View: an 
occluded object would  be seen without any changes in the visual field il other objects  in the space the 
field delimits  at a t im e  w ere  moved, while objects that are outside the visual field cannot be seen by 
rearranging objects  (Thank you to Matt Nudds for emphasising this point). 1 maintain, however, that 
there is a phenom enal distinction we can mark between unoccluded empty regions and regions occupied 
by opaque objects at a time. And arguably this is what helps sort among which rearrangements  w o u ld  
bring unseen objects  and em pty places into view -  viz. those that "clear the occluding ground in the 
appropriate w ay .
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relevant sub-volume delimited at a time (and hence, which empty regions are occluded 
or unoccluded at a time). Indeed, as Soteriou notes, they are present independent of 
any objects or empty regions being seen:
In viitue of its possession of a spatial sensory field, in vision our 
conscious visual contact with a region of space, of limited extent, 
within which objects can potentially be seen, does not depend on our 
actually seeing some object occupy that spatial region. And 
arguably, it does not depend on our being causally affected by 
objects, or light, that fall within that spatial region. If no objects and 
no light are seen to fall within such a spatial region, we see the
darkness that fills that limited region of space”. (2011, p. 199)
This brings into view where the Direct and Structural Views diverge, at least insofar as 
seeing empty space is concerned.
On the Direct View, an empty region is seen when an object is seen through it; this 
requires the presence both of objects and of light. In contrast, on the Structural View, 
empty regions are perceived when a subject is visually aware of regions at which no 
object is seen, but where objects would be seen were they to occupy those regions.
Now, naturally, what is required fo r being seen is being somewhere in the region the 
visual field delimits. But as I have explained, not anywhere in the region will do. To 
be seen, a visible object must fall within a region not yet occluded by other opaque 
objects. How might the structuralist sort among occluded and unoccluded empty 
positions?
Two possibilities seem open.
It might be suggested either that we treat the perception of unoccluded empty regions 
phenomenally, or that we treat their perception in phenomenalistic terms. For example,
it can be argued either that we see unoccluded empty regions because they have an
appearance that we see (as I have argued by seeing through them), or we can identify 
such regions with the possibility of an object being seen were it to be located there and, 
hence, the perception of those regions with the perception of the possibility ol an object 
being seen if it were so located.
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The fust position is that advocated by Direct View and, as I have suggested, it remains 
consistent with the descriptive phenomenology of the Structural View. But this being 
so, it can nonetheless be allowed that when we are in conscious perceptual contact 
with regions where visible objects are absent, we are in conscious perceptual contact 
not with the possibility of objects being located there (indeed it is difficult to appreciate 
what such perceptual contact would involve), but with the grounds of those 
possibilities -  the empty space that objects could thereafter take up.
The Direct View argues, however, that we see those grounds, namely when we see the 
see-through look. But, critically, on such an understanding, seeing empty space is no 
longer a species of absence perception. Rather, as I explain in the closing section, 
seeing empty space grounds the ‘perception’ of the absence of objects at locations. 
But, as such, seeing empty space shouldn’t be identified with seeing their absence. I 
elucidate this thought by returning to the attitudinal take on the ontology of absence 
with which I began.
7.
O’Shaughnessy considers the nature of the experience involved in seeing an 
anonymous letter:
“Instead of the expected signature at the end of letter you see blank 
white paper: you say, ‘I saw that there was no name.’ This reports an 
experience of absence, which... happened as you saw, and registered 
the presence of, a pure expanse of white. Then could this experience 
of absence be identical with the seeing of the white? Now the white, 
being no more the absence of a name than (say) of a drawing (or a 
rhinoceros!) cannot be identified with the absence of a name: after 
all, the white is something and the absence is nothing. So how could 
the seeing of one be the seeing of the other? And yet the white can be 
visually experienced under a negative aspect, for example as not 
being a name-bearer... Could such a negative mode of experiencing 
white be the experience of seeing name-absence? But seeing name- 
absence is a seeing-that something is missing, whereas the 
aforementioned negative experience is the seeing-of a presence as 
endowed with a negative property. In a word, seeing the absence 
neither is, nor is it a mode of, seeing the white”. (2000, pp. 329-j 30)
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I suggest the same analysis should apply to the seeing of empty space as empty of 
visible objects. This is so in the following sense:
When a subject sees the see-through look, though she sees a region at which there are 
no objects, she does not see the region as empty of visible objects. Rather, when she 
apprehends the latter, she does so because it sees the look (it might be urged that this 
is what the visual registration of an absence amounts to). Similarly, O’Shaughnessy 
holds that the seeing of the absent signature is ‘occasioned7 by catching sight of the 
white. But as such, the seeing of the white and the seeing of the absence of a signature 
are two distinct experiences:
“That is, the experience of absence is consequent upon the seeing of 
white in the context of an expectation of seeing a name; it is 
consequent upon comprehending seeing of white as a pure expanse 
of white. In short, a directly experienced causal relation links the two 
experiences. Thus, the visual experience causes the experience of 
absence, which is in addition directly given as arising out of the 
visual experience. The experience of seeing the absence of X  is the 
coming-to-know-of-the-absence of X  (directly given as arising out of 
a present visual experience of what shows no X). This cognitive 
experience is such that we experience the visual object as a presence 
endowed with a negative property. For example, we see the pure 
expanse of white as an unsigned-upon white expanse, as (so to say) 
bereft in a certain regard77, (ibid.)
This echoes the metaphor that has guided my elucidation of the notion of empty space 
in a ground sense throughout -  the notion of a sketch. I can now make my proposal 
fully explicit. A lack of pencil-markings need not represent an absence but may rather 
represent a positivity that in turn signifies an absence.122 Likewise, just as the seeing
122 Cf. M o l n a r s  (2000) d ispute  with Taylor  (1952). Taylor argues that the absence o f  the dot in the 
circle on the r ight can. like the presence o f  the dot in the circle on the left, be directly and non- 
inferentially pe rceived .
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Molnar suggests,  how ever,  that while  the latter can be non-inferentially perceived, the sam e is not true 
in the form er case. He writes  that while  there is nothing available on which to ground the re levant 
inference in the form er case, “ there is something from which we can inter the c i rc le s  being em pty o f  
dots... nam ely ,  the perception o f  the circle and the failure to perceive the dot (2000, p. 80). In 
contrast, I urge with Molnar and against Taylor that the perception o f  the absence o f  the dot cannot be 
non-inferentially perceived, but I nonetheless claim with Taylor and against Molnar that the em pty  
region, here unders tood  as a presence that signifies an absence, can be diiectly non-in fe ren tia l ly  
perceived. O n e  can infer the absence o f  the dot not from a failure to expeiience anything, but by
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of the white is not to be identified with the absence of a signature, seeing empty space 
and seeing it as empty of visible objects are distinct. I suggest that this provides the 
resources for dissolving the dispute with which I began.
When Sartre notices that the café is “bereft” of Pierre, he supposes:
This does not mean that I discover his absence in some precise spot 
in the establishment. In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café; his 
absence fixes the café in its evanescence; the café remains ground; it 
persists in offering itself as an undifferentiated totality to my only 
marginal attention; it slips into the background; it pursues in 
nihilation. Only it makes itself ground for a determined figure; it 
carries the figure everywhere in front of it, presents the figure 
everywhere to me.” (1969, p. 42)
Here Sartre insists that Pierre’s absence is not discovered “in some precise spot in the 
establishment”. Rather, where Pierre is absent is the whole café - in the idiom I 
introduced earlier, the absential location is the café at large. But surely we should want 
to say that Pierre is absent, not only from the café, but from all its sub-regions too - 
after all, Pierre’s absence is an objective state of how the world that comprises the 
café, including its sub-regions, is. How, then, can Sartre suppose otherwise?
I suggest that we can do justice to Sartre’s intuition while nonetheless granting a non- 
attitudinal take on the ontology of absence once we allow that we can distinguish 
between ways in which absential locations are individuated. In the passage above, the 
place at which Pierre is absent can be individuated both intensionally and 
extensionally. Read intensionally, what counts as the relevant absential location is 
whatever region it is at which Sartre might have expected Pierre to appear. In this 
instance, the boundaries that demarcate the relevant absential location - viz. that pick 
out which absential location is relevant - are fiat. That is to say, they depend, for their 
individuation, on some attitude. Individuated extensionally, however, which spatio- 
temporal regions are bereft of Pierre is just an objective matter. Hence, perceiving
experiencing the em pty  expanse that grounds an apprehension of the absence oi the dot. Cl. R ichardson  
(2010, p. 230) and Sorensen (2008, pp. 247-248).
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Pierre s absence is simply a matter of perceiving any region at which Pierre is absent, 
and this is so independently of any expectation that Pierre would be seen.123
For those theorists that treat the perception of empty space as a species of absence 
perception then, it seems apposite to ask: Which analysis is intended - intensional or 
extensional? Naturally, were an intensional analysis applied to the perception of empty 
space, it would have to be supposed that, just as Sartre must look for Pierre in order to 
perceive his absence, to perceive empty space a subject would have to look for, and 
fail to see, visible objects at certain regions — viz. those the relevant episode 
individuates. Such an account would be attitudinal since would it depend on the 
presence in the perceiver of a psychological episode with ‘no-thing’ figuring in the 
content (viz. ‘no thing is there’). In contrast, on an extensional analysis, seeing empty 
space simply involves seeing regions at which visible objects are absent. I take it that 
this is the analysis the structuralist favours.
As I have outlined, both Soteriou and Richardson explain such seeing by appeal to the 
structural features of visual experience, thus suggesting that a propositional account of 
seeing empty space can be resisted. In this chapter, however, I have provided an 
alternative means of resistance. I have argued that even while we can grant that seeing 
empty space involves seeing regions that are empty of visible objects, we should 
explain such seeing in terms of the matter or content of experience -  the space in 
which the subject is and which she sees through. But for this reason, I have likewise 
argued against treating empty space as a species of absence perception, here taking my 
cue from O’Shaughnessy’s reflection on the perception of darkness.
Since absences are nothing, they lack perceptible properties. But as such, the 
‘perception’ of absence must be grounded in the perception of some positivity — one 
that signifies absence. In the case of empty space, I have argued that seeing the look 
grounds the ‘perception’ of the absence of objects at certain locations. But this being 
so, I thereby favour an intensional account of the ‘perception of space as empty ot 
visible objects. On my view, ‘perceiving’ the absence of visible objects at certain
123 Note absential locations so individuated have dimensions -  they are the size ol the region that the 
absentee would  have taken up if  present. In ‘‘Blanks" Sorensen notes: ih e  size and location ol a blank
is just the s ize and position o f  the character position (1999, p. 310).
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locations is grounded in, and occasioned by, the perception of empty space, itself a 
distinct and non-epistemic experience. But as such, just as seeing empty space does 
not involve looking for nothing, nor is it exhausted by the seeing of no thing at regions 
where something could be seen.
I return to this distinction in Chapter Eight. I argue that one can see empty space by 
seeing the look without seeing empty space as something that objects could take up. 
This in turn helps clarify further where and in what sense the Structural View and the 
direct account diverge, even while at the level of descriptive phenomenology they can. 
I think, be happily reconciled.
in mice:
In this chapter, I have argued against treating perceiving empty space as a species of 
absence perception. Since empty space is empty of objects, it might be assumed that it 
lacks phenomenal reality. However, because I have motivated absolutism as an 
assumption (Chapter One), and since I have argued that even Euclidean space has a 
look (Chapter Three), I reject this view.
What’s more, I have tried to explain why we need not thereby embrace a Structural 
View, one which requires that a subject have an implicit sense of her sensory 
limitations in order to perceive empty space. Since the direct account I am urging 
appeals to the content of experience (Chapter Four), not its form, a subject can 
perceive empty space without having the phenomenology that her visual field is 
bounded.
In the chapter that follows, I touch on the tactile -  just as seeing empty space is not a 
species of absence perception, nor, perhaps surprisingly, is ‘touching it.
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Touching Empty Space
His thigh bones and shoulder blades are scales 
That a speck o f  dust could tilt
- Michael Longley, Oliver Plunked
In Chapter Three, I explained why the look of empty space is apt to go overlooked — it 
looks see-through. Still, empty space is seen. Here I make a case for tactile 
perception. I suggest that there is no tactual sensation associated with ‘touching’ 
empty space; this is insofar as when, as I will argue, we ‘touch’ empty space, we 
don’t undergo an experience of contact. Still, just as empty space has visible 
properties, so, I suggest, it has tactile properties that we are tactually aware of through 
(in a sense to be explained) bodily awareness and sensation.
Here is how I aim to proceed. In §1, I set out an argument offered by Nerlich for the 
claim that «ow-Euclidean empty regions can be felt. Like the visual case, however, 
Nerlich denies that Euclidean empty regions can be felt -  such regions are not felt, he 
claims, since we do not notice feeling them. In §2, I outline M. G. F. Martin’s 
ostensibly contradictory claim that space outwith the body is unfelt, and I show how 
once the notions of feeling, read in a bodily sensation sense, and feeling, read in a 
perceptual sense, are distinguished, the appearance of contradiction vanishes. I 
suggest there is a way of reading Martin’s account that is compatible with the claim 
that empty space can be ‘touched’, even in the Euclidean case (§3). In the final part of 
the chapter, I develop this claim by explaining how the notions of felt resistance and 
contact come apart. In § 4 ,1 chart the possiblity of touch without felt resistance; here I 
appeal to the taxonomy of tactual phenomena sketched by David Katz in The World of 
Touch. And, in §5, I consider a peculiar case of touch without the experience of 
contact — the experience of touching something with a numb hand. This brings into 
relief the thought that, although there is no tactual sensation associated with 
‘touching’ empty space, at least on the model of contact, we can nonetheless enjoy
~  vi ~
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tactual awareness of empty space even in the Euclidean case, where no resistance is 
felt. I close by noting some objections (§6).
1.
Paradigmatic cases of touch involve contact; I feel the book in my hand, someone’s 
fingertip on my shoulder. Likewise, they tend to involve resistance; as when I try to 
push open a heavy door, or walk against the wind. Sometimes experiences of contact 
have a punctual quality - as a knock on a door has. Indeed, in reflecting on 
experiences of contact, we may think, not of the fact of contact or even the relation of 
contact (such as there is when you hold someone’s hand, or run your fingers across 
velvet), but rather the moment of contact, the event whereby something is met with in 
touch, perhaps bumped into.
With such cases in mind, it is hardly surprising, then, that we might be inclined to 
dismiss the claim that we ‘touch’ empty space. Empty space is surfaceless; it has no 
sides. But as such, there is no contact experienced, no resistance felt.
In this chapter I aim to show, again prompted by metaphysics, that there are reasons 
for thinking that untutored reflection misguides us here. There is, I argue, a genuine 
sense in which we enjoy tactual awareness of empty space.
In Chapter Two, I outlined the thought, defended by Nerlich, that, like Putnam’s peg 
and the hole it fails to fit, there are some parts of space that have shapes that impede 
the passage of matter through them or which, depending on the convolutions of the 
region, require that the relevant material change shape so as to ‘fit’ through them. The 
analogy I drew was with an ill-fitting garment: a jumper may have to stretch to 
accommodate the girth of someone, or sleeves that are too long may wrinkle at the 
wrists and have to be rolled up. Likewise, matter may have to change shape to take up 
paths in space that are peculiarly curved.
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In Time and Space, Dainton imagines an attempt at trying to pass some matter — in 
this case a cube of foam - through such regions:
Like light rays, moving particles follow geodesics unless acted on 
by a force. Suppose you take a sizeable cube of soft foam rubber and 
move it into the hole. What would happen? Would it pass freely 
through? There are no material barriers to prevent it, just air and 
empty space. In fact, you would very likely feel a resistance. On 
entering the hole, the particles in the rubber will follow geodesic 
paths, and so initially they will converge then diverge. But this 
convergence will be resisted by the inter-particle bonds: you can 
imagine these electromagnetic forces as akin to elastic bands 
connecting the particles; as the particles try to converge, the bands 
have to stretch. Consequently, for the rubber cube to succeed in 
entering the hole a force needs to be supplied -  to stretch the bonds -  
and hence you feel resistance when pushing the cube forwards”.
(2001, p. 222)
I spell out this idea.
Dainton imagines that the valency that binds the particles that constitute the rubber 
are ‘elastic’. To pass through the relevant region, then, the interparticle bonds would 
have to contract and stretch, which would require the application of force. Hence, if 
you were to attempt to force the cube through such a hole, you would feel resistance. 
We might think of the resistance felt as akin to that experienced when biting into an 
apple or treading on hard, wet sand -  it may be experienced as exerted from without. 
Still, unlike the apple and sand, we explain its specific character not by appeal to the 
material constitution of that moved through - after all, space is immaterial - but to the 
shape of the relevant region.
Of course, our bodies are material too. But this being so, we might wonder: Does the 
same thought apply?
Dainton supposes it would, and not only would we feel the relevant resistance exerted 
from without in such instances, we would feel it also from within — since stress 
tensions would be generated among your middle parts you would feel a distinctly 
queasy sensation” (ibid.). Nerlich, to whom this idea can be traced, piovides a
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different analogy. In palpating non-Euclidean contours, one would, he ventures, 
ache:
Helmholtz showed that only spaces of constant curvature permit free 
mobility; that is, if the space is variably curved then a thing would have 
to change shape in order to move from one region to another of different 
curvature. It would not be freely mobile... Since we ourselves are 
reasonably elastic, we could move about in a space of variable 
curvature, but only by means of distorting our body shapes into non- 
Euclidean forms. We would have to push to get our bodies into these 
regions, for only forces will distort our shapes. If the curvature were 
slight, the rheumatism might be easy and bearable; if acute, fatally 
destructive, just as if you fell into a black hole. Let us suppose that the 
changes are noticeable and the effort to move into the hole perceptible 
too. Then we could fee l non-Euclidean holes. They would be more or 
less obstructive, some of them downright barriers to progress. We could 
palpate their contours and ache with the pressures of keeping our hands 
in the parts of deepest curvature”. (1994, p. 39)
Just as we can see non-Euclidean holes, so, it seems, we can feel them. What, though,
of the Euclidean case?
At times, Nerlich seems to allow that we do perceive the “bland symmetries” of the 
space in our vicinity (for example, ibid., p. 40). But in the passage above he gestures at 
a distinct entailment. He supposes that we could only be credited with feeling empty 
space were we to notice the bodily changes involved in palpating non-Euclidean 
regions (“Let us suppose that the changes are noticeable and the effort to move into the 
hole perceptible too. Then we could feel non-Euclidean holes”). Noticing, then, is a 
condition on feeling. I aim to undermine this thought, and specifically in the Euclidean 
case. I argue that we do experience the tactile properties of empty space in our vicinity 
but that, just as the look of space is apt to go overlooked, we do not notice the tactual 
awareness that we thereby enjoy. My strategy is to consider the account of bodily 
awareness and touch offered by M. G. F. Martin.




In reflecting on the structure of bodily awareness, Martin provides the following 
instruction:
[Cjonsider one s sense of the relative position of parts of one’s 
body. If one extends one’s arms out in front of one, one has a sense 
of the position of both hands, and their positions in space relative to 
each other. No part of one’s body occupies the region of space lying 
between the two hands; and it does not feel to one as if any part of 
one’s body is there. One does not have, therefore, in position sense 
any awareness of what occupies that region of space, if indeed 
anything does. Nevertheless, one does feel one’s hands to be 
separated across that region of space. In this way regions of space 
which extend beyond what one feels at a time through bodily 
awareness enter into the character of how one feels things to be 
through bodily awareness. What one feels in this way is felt to be 
located in a larger space which one does not also feel. Since one is 
aware of nothing but one’s body, it does not have to be identified as 
such within experience; there are no other objects of awareness to 
contrast it with. But since one is aware of it as in a world which 
contains many other objects, one nevertheless has a sense of it as 
one’s body in contrast to other objects, things which one doesn’t 
feel”. (1993, pp. 212-213)
Martin’s thought in this passage is that bodily awareness is experienced as bodily only 
when a subject experiences her body as occupying a space that extends beyond it. 
Such space is, we might say, unfelt space. Space, then, enters into the character of 
bodily experience as bodily since, in experiencing bodily sensation as within the body 
and hence - as I am using the term - as bodily, a subject experiences its body as 
bounded and limited and so as occupying a space that extends beyond it. This space, 
as Martin emphasises, is not fe lt in the same way.
Here, the idea is that in order to experience the body as bounded, a subject must be 
aware of space outwith that boundary. But naturally, space outwith the body cannot 
be experienced through bodily awareness. Martin’s insight is to urge that although it 
might be supposed that the sole object of bodily awareness is the body, for a subject 
to be aware of her body as her body, she must also be aware of space outwith the 
body. And this is because to experience sensation as ‘within , she must have a sense
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of there being a without a world that extends beyond the limits of sensation, and in 
terms of which those limits are drawn.
Two points require special emphasis.
First, it shouldn t be thought that through bodily awareness, the boundaries of the 
body are thereby felt to be determinate.1-4 Consider the awareness you have of your 
nose. It is not the case that by sensing it from within you feel it to have any particular 
shape. Martin’s point is not that through bodily awareness the boundary of the body is 
itself experienced, but rather that, if a subject experiences its body as bounded, then it 
is concomitantly aware of a region that extends beyond it.
Second, Martin aims to suggest, on the basis of this observation, that the structure of 
bodily awareness and the structure of visual awareness are distinct. Unlike bodily 
awareness, the objects of vision and the space in which they are located, including 
empty regions, are experienced in the same way. Take his parade case, which I quoted 
earlier:
“Consider the case of looking at a ring-shaped object, a Polo mint, 
for instance, head on. One is aware of the various white parts of the 
mint arranged in a circle and aware of how they are related to each 
other. One is also aware of the hole in the middle of the mint, and 
that that hole is there in the middle. If one was not aware of the hole 
one would not see the mint to be a ring-shape rather than a circle.
Nothing need be perceived to be within the hole. One is aware of the 
hole as a place where something potentially could be seen, not as 
where something is actually seen to be.
So we can think of normal visual experience as experience 
not only of objects which are located in some space, but as of a 
space in which they are located”. (1992, p. 199)
Here, Martin suggests that we are visually aware of objects and empty space in the 
same way, where seeing ‘empty space’ involves seeing a location where something 
could be seen but isn’t. This feature of visual awareness contrasts with the bodily case 
in the following sense.
124 Notably, the bodily boundaries  o f  the subject can be prosthetically enhanced. I overlook this 
complication.
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In bodily awareness, the space in which the body is cannot be experienced as bodily 
for otherwise we would lose the contrast in terms of which the boundaries of the body 
as bodily aie drawn (i.e. whereby sensation is experienced as ‘within’). Martin’s 
strategy, then, is to reveal, by analogy, a ¿//¿'similarity between visual and bodily 
awareness, one that he also casts as ‘structural’.125 This runs as follows:
In vision, empty spaces are visually experienced in just the same way as objects are — 
both tall within the bounds of the visual field. But in contrast, we are not aware of the 
space in which the body is in the same way we are aware of the space the body 
occupies. The limits of the bodily field are such that space outwith the body cannot be 
felt in the same way -  viz. bodily.
This analogy is, it seems to me, acute. Still, we can point to a disanalogy between the 
two cases, the force of which is perhaps obscured by parallels Martin elsewhere 
elucidates between bodily awareness and touch.
In the visual case a comparison is drawn between objects and empty space, while in 
the bodily case the contrast is between bodily space and space outwith the body -  
unfelt space. As noted, space outwith the body is ‘unfelt’ insofar as it is not 
experienced as bodily. But as such, the term ‘unfelt’ applies indiscriminately to 
whatever is outwith the body, and so is neutral among unfelt objects and empty 
spaces. This makes tempting a extrapolation from Martin that is relevant to our 
dialectic and which, as I will explain, is mistaken.
For Martin, bodily sensation is not entirely subjective — qua bodily sensation it has a 
felt location, namely within the body. It is this feature of bodily awareness that Martin 
suggests provides for touch:
125 Nudds (2001 . p. 213) notes a structural dissimilarity with the case o f  sound: “In the case o f  vision, 
we can distinguish be tween having an experience o f  their being nothing at a place w here  w e  could  
experience som eth ing , and not having an experience o f  anything in a place w'e could ex per ience  
something; be tween that is, being aware that nothing is there and being unaware ol anything the ie . . .  it 
is this visual aw areness  o f  places where there is nothing, which has no auditoiy equivalent. W e aie 
simply not auditorily aw are  o f  empty places -  there’s no difference between not expeiiencing a sound 
at some place, and experiencing no sound there” . Here the point is that in visual experience w'e can 
have visual aw areness  o f  places where there is nothing to see. But in auditory expeiience W'e cannot 
have auditory aw areness  o f  places where there is nothing to hear.
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We are embodied in a world which contains potentially many other 
bodies. We can come into contact with other bodies, and they can 
impede our movement and distort our shape. Such physical 
impingement on us is leflected in the awareness we have of our 
bodies. One is awaie when one s movement is impeded, and when 
one s skin is in contact with objects or is distended by them. In being 
aware of one s body, sensing how it is disposed, where it can and 
can t move, and where one has sensations, one can attend to the 
objects in virtue of which these are true. One measures the properties 
of objects in the world around one against one’s body. So in having 
an awareness of one’s body, one has a sense of touch” (199? p"
203)
It worth noting just what bodily awareness’ is for Martin. Critically, it means to pick 
out “the various ways in which we are aware of our own bodies”:
“At present I am aware of my posture, orientation in space, the 
position of my limbs; I have some sense of the shape and size of my 
body, and within and on it I am aware of various goings on — itches, 
aches, patches of warmth”, (ibid., p. 201)
Through bodily awareness, then, not only are bodily sensations felt to be at some 
monadic objective location within the body, they are also felt to be at some location 
relative to other parts of the body. But this also involves the contrast that Martin 
urges, namely between sensation felt to be within the body and unfelt space without. 
After all, it is not the case that, when you feel parts of your body to be related, you 
feel them to be related through parts o f your body. Rather, as Martin writes, you feel 
them to be a certain distance apart in space extending beyond the body. Feeling bodily 
sensation to be at some objective location within, then, is attendant with a sense of 
how the body is disposed in space. And it is this awareness of how the body is 
disposed that provides for the sense of touch. I spell out this thought.
When your body touches an object, say when your finger touches the rim of a glass, 
the place where you feel the sensation to be and the part of the object that presses 
against your finger share a common spatial property; in veridical perception they are 
at the same location in space. Hence, the sensation, in having a felt location, can 
provide an awareness of the location of the object that impedes the movement ot your 
finger. But this being so, bodily sensation is constitutive of, and grounds, tactile 
perception. Importantly, however, it should not be thought that the bodily sensation
154
and the tactile perception are thereby distinct states of mind.126 Granted, when you 
touch an object, you can attend to the location of the sensation felt or to the object 
touched. But in both instances it is the same state of mind that is attended to, albeit in 
different ways. This is often glossed in terms of ‘bipolarity’. Touch is said to have 
two poles as a function of awareness. When you attend to the sensation in your hand 
(say), the object touched recedes into the background of awareness - what is fore­
grounded or ‘stands out’, rather, is the bodily sensation. In contrast, when you attend 
to the object touched the body seemingly becomes ‘transparent’ — it becomes the 
medium through which the object felt is felt.127 In the latter case, writes Martin, one 
perceives something “lying beyond the body but in contact with it, so that the spatial 
character is that of the location of whatever it is which connects with and impedes the 
movement o f one’s body” (ibid., p. 204).
Now, here I have provided a somewhat atomic example of tactile perception, one 
whereby a finger touches a single point on a glass. Martin’s emphasis, however, is on 
more molecular cases, those involving contact at more than one point on the body. 
Below he considers the experience of touching the rim of a glass with all five fingers:
“When one grasps the rim one comes into contact with it at only five 
points, where one’s fingertips touch it. Nevertheless one comes to be 
aware that the glass as a whole is circular”, (ibid., p. 200)
In this instance, the awareness a subject has of the arrangement of her body is 
attendant with an awareness of the shape of the object touched outwith the body. It is 
in this sense that, as Martin writes elsewhere, the body acts as a ‘template’ with which 
objects in the world, and their properties, can be perceived. This, then, is his 
‘template’ model of touch. But the claim that bodily awareness grounds and is partly
126 In his ref lections on  intersubjectivity, and elsewhere,  Husserl develops a similar p henom enolog y .  
But, given his transcendental motivation, his conclusions are somewhat ditterent. For example, I Iussei 1 
also thinks that tactual sensation can be thematized as an objective property ol the object touched oi as 
an o n -o b jec t iv e  property o f  the experiencing organ, say the hand, and, in both cases, the sensation is 
localised as occuring  in the sam e place. Nevertheless,  localising sensation in this way is not suffic ient 
for the objectif ication o f  the body. The body is originally given as a volitional structure (an 'I can ' or 
an 'I d o ’) and to merely localise sensation is not yet sufficient to suspend (or better sub lim ate)  
subjectivity so as to constitute the body as an object in the world. Rather to constellate the ex per ienced  
body (Leib) as objective (Korper), one has to be confronted with the bodily appearance ot another (see 
Zahavi 2003, pp. 98-12 5) .
127 Lcdcr (1990 , p. 17) describes this as an “uncertainty principle of em bodim ent -  we cannot perceive  
the body and w hat  is perceived with it at the same time.
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constitutive of tactile perception has a further important consequence: the structural 
difference uncovered between the visual and bodily case applies also to tactile 
peiception. Conrpaie the case quoted at the outset of this section (a) -
If one extends one s arms out in front of one, one has a sense of the 
position of both hands, and their positions in space relative to each 
other. No pait of one s body occupies the region of space lying 
between the two hands; and it does not feel to one as if any part of 
one s body is there. One does not have, therefore, in position sense 
any awareness of what occupies that region of space, if indeed 
anything does”. (1993, p. 212)
- with (b) the tactile experience of the glass (the example above):
“In being tactually aware in this way, is one aware of the parts of the 
rim in between the points of contact in the same way as one is aware 
of those points, and is one aware of the region of space lying inside 
the rim? The answer would appear to be not: one comes to be aware 
of the glass by being aware of the parts one touches”. (1992, p. 200)
In both bodily awareness and tactile awareness, then, although the subject is aware of 
regions outwith the body, the subject does not experience such places, through such 
awareness, as being filled or empty.
Another example Martin uses to make this thought explicit is borrowed from Gareth 
Evans,128 again developing the thought that visual awareness is distinct from bodily 
and tactual awareness.
Imagine viewing four points arranged in a square -  say stars in the night sky. In 
viewing such points, you are also aware of the space that surrounds and contains 
them, and within which they stand in spatial relations. As an analogue, Martin asks us 
to consider a rock climber on a cliff face whose hands and feet are inserted into cracks 
in the rock such that they are arranged in a square. In such instances, although the 
climber may be aware that the cracks are approximately equidistant, she has no sense 
of what lies between them, at least not through tactuo-kinaesthetic awareness. So the 
climber cannot tell “whether anything is there or not’ (1993, p. 216). But this 
contrasts with the visual case. When viewing the stars and the space between them,
1-8 See Evans (1985 , p. 392).
156
you can tell, by seeing a region of space in darkness, that no stars are located at those 
regions.
But considei now the case of the glass. When you touch the rim at five points, you 
have a sense, through bodily awareness of the configuration of your hand and hence 
of the shape of the object that you are touching, that it is circular. But like the rock- 
climber, you fail to have any sense, through bodily awareness, of what lies or fails to 
lie within the rim, which in Martin’s example is empty space. And this is so even 
while, because one has bodily awareness, one is concomitantly aware of space outwith 
the body.
Now, it seems to me that there are two ways of reading this particular example and 
the phenomenology it points to. The first one I detail is Martin’s, and the second is a 
mistaken extrapolation from the structural dissimilarity Martin excavates.
In the visual case, unlike the tactual case, you are aware, in the same way, both of 
objects and of locations where objects could be seen but aren’t -  both are visible. 
Cast somewhat differently, so long as they fall within the bounds of the visual field, 
you are visually aware of objects and locations at which objects could be seen but 
aren’t, where, importantly, what falls outside the bounds of the visual field is not 
relevant to how things within it appear to be within it -  i.e. visible (cf. the Structural 
View detailed in the last chapter). But this is distinct from the tactual case. A subject 
cannot be tactually aware both of objects touched and locations where objects could 
be touched but aren’t. This just seems obvious. But why? Because, says Martin, 
tactual perception is grounded in bodily awareness, and what falls outside the bounds 
of bodily awareness is relevant to how things seem in and through bodily awareness —
i.e. bodily. (Recall, regions outside the body cannot be experienced as bodily for 
otherwise the boundary between within and without -  those in terms of which the 
limits of bodily experience are drawn and which are constitutive of the sense of touch 
- would collapse). This explains, then, why we cannot feel the space within the rim -  
if it were felt, the body would be felt to extend to that region. But since it doesn t 
extend to that region, that region is not thereby felt.
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The above is, I hope, a fail representation of the intricate argument Martin builds. 
Here, howevei, is a mistaken extrapolation one might, on the basis of the parallels he 
elucidates, be tempted to diaw. We are visually aware of objects and empty space in 
the same way. But we aie not tactually aware of objects and empty space in the same 
way.
Now, Martin doesn t speak to this issue. Besides, as I noted earlier, the space that 
extends beyond the body, and in terms of which its limits are drawn (insofar as it is 
unfelt), is neutral among objects and empty space. Why, then, might one be tempted 
to draw this conclusion? For one, the examples Martin offers might seem to suggest 
as much -  viz. comparing visual experience of a Polo mint with tactual experience of 
an empty glass.
Second, and more importantly however, is the following: the way in which Martin 
makes sense of empty space in the visual case -  as regions where objects could be 
seen but aren’t -  translates somewhat peculiarly in the tactual case - viz. as ‘regions 
that could be felt but aren’t ’. Naturally, given that bodily awareness provides for 
touch, a subject could not be tactually aware of such regions if they were not felt. But, 
as I will show, this doesn’t mean that we cannot enjoy tactual awareness of empty 
space, and, moreover, in just the same way that we can enjoy tactual awareness of 
objects.
3.
In his paper “Feelings” (1951), Gilbert Ryle iterates the numerous ways in which we 
can use the term ‘feel’. One may feel tired or melancholic. One may feel like a 
cigarette or that there is a flaw in my argument. A doctor may feel fo r  a patient s 
pulse, though, perhaps because it is faint, without succeeding. When one is feeling 
for, one may fa il to feel.
More familiarly, we ‘feel’ sensible qualities, for example, the softness ol velvet or the 
roundness of the ball, as well as itches, pains, tickles, and so on. This latter bodily
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sensation use is distinct fiom the former perceptual use.' 1 Which sense of ’feel' does 
Martin mean to harness?
On Martin s account, space outwith the body is necessarily unfelt for otherwise the 
distinction between bodily space and the space without the body, in terms of which its 
boundaries are drawn, would collapse. But as such, Martin’s claim only invokes 
feeling in a bodily sensation sense and does not entail that empty space cannot be 
touched. Rather, what Martin’s account urges is that tactile feeling is grounded in 
feeling in a bodily sensation sense. It hence flows from the account that, if it should 
be found that empty space is felt in a perceptual sense, such feeling must be grounded 
in bodily feeling and awareness. How might we make sense of this claim in the case 
of empty space?
Consider putting your finger into a glass and moving it through the empty space 
within. Since you experience feeling in a bodily sensation sense, you feel your body 
to extend to where such sensation is located. Now, since you feel no resistance to your 
movement, it might thereby be thought that nothing is, in a perceptual sense, felt, save 
perhaps the absence of some thing (say water) at that region. If so, such a thought 
would tally with C. B. Martin:
“The blind feel for the absence of solid impediment to their progress.
The sensation of their hand or limb passing through the space that is
empty of such impediment is the desired perception of absence or
emptiness in a perfectly straightforward way”. (1996, p. 64)
But whether or not this is what the blind feel for, if the Direct View that this thesis 
defends is correct, just as the visual perception of empty space is not a species ol 
absence perception (see Chapter Five), nor is the tactual case, or at least not in a 
perfectly straightforward way This is so for two reasons.
129 He writes  “T o  feel a tickle and to have a tickle seem to be the same thing. The spoon may be sticky 
or my teeth may be  chattering, without my feeling it (or seeing or hearing it). But there could not be an 
unfelt tick le” (p. 193). Hence ,  while velvet could feel soft, without anyone feeling it. A tickle could not 
feel a certain way w ithout  being felt.
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First, perceiving an absence of water at a location is arguably an epistemic perception 
— one is tactually aware that the glass is empty of water (this follows from the 
argument made in the closing section of the last chapter).
Second, like the visual case, there is reason to suggest that the feel of empty space is 
also a function of its shape. Recall Nerlich’s hypothesis that, in moving through 
regions of variable curvature, a subject would ache; she would ache because in 
attempting to move through such regions, her body would have to change shape so as 
to fit the relevant contours and dulations. But since the shape of a given region is an 
intrinsic property of that region, feeling empty space is not simply the feeling of no 
thing; it is the feeling of no thing at regions that are also felt. I suggest the template 
model of touch gives us a way of making sense of this claim, even in the blandly 
symmetrical spaces we find ourselves moving through.
On the template model, both by sensing how the body is disposed through an 
awareness of the location of felt sensation, and by having an awareness of where the 
body can and can’t move, one can attend, writes Martin, “to the objects in virtue of 
which these are true” (1992, p. 203). But in this sense empty space, be it non- 
Euclidean or otherwise, is as much an object for tactual awareness as common-or- 
garden objects like bicycles and chairs. Granted, in moving through Euclidean space, 
no change in the shape of the body is required or occurs. Likewise, as I will explain, 
no effort is needed in passing through it. But this does not entail that empty space is 
not felt. Rather, to the extent that the body does not change shape and can move 
without resistance, the body is as much a measure of the space it is in and moves 
through as it is a template of the objects that surround it. So why did Nerlich suppose 
otherwise?
As I noted at the outset, when we touch something, we typically have experience of 
contact — I feel a hand brush across my cheek, my fingertips on the rim of a glass, a 
coin on my palm. But in ‘touching’ empty space, there is no experience of contact. 
Does this mean that empty space is not thereby ‘felt ? In the final pait ot this chapter, 
I draw on the resources of the template model to suggest leasons toi tesisting this 
conclusion.
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In §4, I chart the possiblity of tactual experience without contact; here harnessing a 
taxonomy of tactual phenomena set out in David Katz’s The World o f  Touch (1925), 
while in §5 I reflect on an anomalous case of feeling, in a perceptual sense, that 
0  Shaughnessy (1989) details - the experience of feeling with a hand that is, in a 
bodily sensation sense, numb.
4.
Naively, we may treat contact as involving resistance. But not all cases of contact do. 
Think of the contact enjoyed when a penny is placed on your palm. You do not need 
to exert an upward force on the coin so as to ‘hold it up’ -  it is too light. And the coin 
does not exert a downward force on you (beyond the force of gravity), since you do 
not need to overcome any force so as to uphold it.130 Likewise, there is a difference 
between placing your hand on someone’s arm, and squeezing it; a difference of 
threshold. There comes a point where you can be said to be actively doing something 
-  viz. squeezing. Take Martin’s example, of your fingertips against the rim of a glass. 
If you rest them very lightly, no resistance is experienced. Still, if the template model 
is correct, you are tactually aware of the shape of the glass through bodily awareness.
Katz’s notion o f ‘surface touch’ helps capture this phenomenon:
“We experience surface touch when we feel and manipulate an 
object made of wood, metal, glass, cloth or other material. What is 
common to all of these tactual phenomena? In each case, we 
encounter a continuous, unbroken palpable area, which is located at 
the surface of and follows all the curves on the object in which it 
occurs... Invariably a two-dimensional tactual structure, an obstacle 
bounded in space, presents itself to our consciousness”. (1989, p. 50)
It is worth noting how this notion contrasts with that of surface colour, later 
developed by Katz in the The World o f Colour (1935). Surface colour offers, in a 
metaphorical sense, “resistance to the gaze” (ibid., p. 51) -  one does not see through it
130 My claim is not that  there arc no forces operative in this circumstance, but only that none arc 
experienced and actively exerted.
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as one does with film colour, or, as this thesis argues, empty space. Surface colour is, 
simply put, opaque - it is the colour that apples have (they are not transparent).
Similaily, surface touch seems to involve resistance, though not in a metaphorical 
sense. When one touches an object that one feels by surface touch, one’s hand does 
not pass through the object. The object so felt is experienced as impenetrable. 
Nevertheless, as Katz urges, it should not be thought that impenetrability, a property 
of an object, entails the experience of resistance. If a surface is touched lightly, no 
resistance is experienced though surface touch occurs. Rather, only if pressure is 
increased to a certain threshold is active resistance felt. Indeed, “surface touch 
remains essentially invariant throughout the entire interval from where the 
phenomenon of resistance just begins up to where it attains its highest degree of 
pronouncedness.” (ibid.)
Consider this thought in the context of the template model.
Martin is careful to distinguish between two distinct modes in which, through bodily 
experience, one can have perceptual tactual awareness of the external world.
First, one can have awareness of the shape of an object through awareness of the 
configuration of one’s body -  in such instances, one need not experience resistance.
Second, one can have awareness of the material composition of an object through the 
experience of the resistance felt in trying to pass through or manipulate it. For 
example, it is not until one applies pressure to the rim of the glass that one 
experiences the active resistance that indicates that one’s fingers cannot pass through 
the rim -  viz. that the glass is impenetrable.
Now, in the case of immaterial space, the situation is a little different. It is not 
materiality, but the shape of space that, in the non-Euclidean case, might be found to 
impede the passage of the body through it. Rather, to pass through such a region, the 
body would have to change shape, where, depending on its convolutions, this would, 
as I have explained, require the application of force; namely, whatevei foice would be
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requiied to change the spatial ielations in which the parts of the bodv stand to each 
othei so as to fit through. But as such, the two modes above do not coine apart. The 
experience of resistance felt would, on the application of such a force, be attendant 
with a change in the shape of the body.
Naturally, though, this is not the case in Euclidean space. In Euclidean space, no 
experience of resistance is felt and no concomitant change in the shape of the body is 
required, which in turn explains why no experience of resistance is felt. But, arguably,
this is what explains Nerlich’s presumed reluctance to grant that we do, after all,
enjoy tactual awareness of empty Euclidean space -  since no effort is required to pass 
through Euclidean space, and there is no concomitant change in the shape of the body, 
we do not notice it. For Nerlich, recall, noticing is a condition on feeling. My claim, 
however, is not that there is no feeling, but that we do not notice the tactual awareness 
of empty space that we have. To this end, then, it is worth highlighting two other 
species of touch set out by Katz.
In comparing so-called ‘immersed’ and ‘volume’ touch, Katz tutors us:
“Direct a powerful stream of air against the hand, or move the hand 
with sufficient speed in liquids of various consistency -  then one 
experiences a tactual phenomenon that has no definite shape or 
pattern. It has a certain thickness but cannot be regarded as spatial, 
because it lacks the rear boundary found in volume touch”, (ibid., 
pp. 50-51)
Here, the idiom of immersion should be taken literally. Immersed touch occurs when 
one (or part of one’s body) is immersed in, or surrounded by, the substance felt. Three 
points distinguish surface and immersed touch and bring the latter into focus.
First, immersed touch, or what Katz describes as “space-filling touch ’, can only 
characterize a substance, not an object. This is because — and this is the second point — 
in surface touch, unlike immersed touch, the orientation and distance from the 
observer of the object, the tactile properties of which yield surface touch, are fixed. In 
immersed touch, however, the subject is immersed — she is surrounded entiiely by the 
substance felt and so is not path-connected to it.
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Third, and importantly, in immersed touch the sensation of resistance cannot he 
removed without removing the sensation. Take, for example, the experience ot 
walking against a stiong wind. One can struggle to move against it (head down, 
shoulders bent). But when the air is still, as it is after a storm, the resistance 
experienced is lemoved and so is the sensation. Unless it is warm or cold or moving, 
we don’t usually feel the air that fills empty space.
Nerlich’s supposition seems compatible with a treatment of the ‘feel' of empty space 
on this model; in the Euclidean case, since resistance is removed so is the sensation. 
But I have made space for the possiblity of tactual awareness without felt resistance; 
those cases where one feels the shape of the penny on one’s palm, where one rests 
one’s hand gently on someone’s arm. Nonetheless, such experiences involve contact - 
they involve some happening or moment we can point to where contact, understood as 
an event, occurred. In our putative experience of empty space, however, there are no 
such analogous moments. To this extent, then, our intuition may remain steadfast: we 
cannot be said to enjoy tactual awareness of empty space.
In the next section, I dispute the claim that a sensation of contact is essential to tactual 
awareness.
5.
In claiming that empty space looks see-through, what is implied is that empty space 
has no visual sensory character; it is not coloured. As I have argued, however, this 
does not mean that it is not seen; empty space has visible properties that can be 
directly perceived so long as something is seen through the region thereby seen.
In the tactual case, it might be wondered whether a parallel can be forced such that 
empty space feels felt-through. As I explain below, this analogy is mistaken. Theie is, 
however, a commonality we can excavate.
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Just as visual experience ot empty space has no associated visual sensory character, so 
there is no tactual sensation, understood on the model o f experience o f  contact, 
associated with our tactual awareness of empty space.
To biing out, fiistly, the disanalogy with the visual case, consider Katz’s notion of 
‘volume’ touch.
In the discussion of immersion touch in the passage above, Katz insists that it has a 
kind of “thickness’ , but lacks the "rear boundary” found in volume touch. Here’s an 
example of what he has in mind:
“Place a small object, such as a matchbox, on a solid support, and 
cover it with a thick layer of cotton waddling or cloths. If the object 
is then felt in order to recognise its form, we obtain a pretty good 
idea of what it is, and at the same time the filling material lying 
above it provides us with a space-like or volume touch”, (ibid., p.
52)
Touch of this nature, says Katz, is also frequently deployed in medical practice:
“By palpation, the physician “touches” the internal organs through 
the skin and cushions of fat in order to detect pathological changes in 
them. The attention is directed at the organs themselves, and not at 
what lies between them and the feeling hand and is given as volume 
touch”, (ibid., p.53)
This, then, is an example of touch-trcinsparency. The volume touched-through -  the 
intervening medium - becomes transparent. This is insofar as attention is directed at 
the “rear boundary”, or that which is felt through the intervening medium. Water can 
obviously yield experience of volume touch; if you touch something through it. But it 
can also yield immersed touch - if you merely draw your hand through the water, as a 
child might when a passenger on a paddle boat.
Now, on the face of it, it might be thought that the notion of volume touch could 
happily apply to empty space. The ‘feel’ of empty space would then parallel the 
‘look’. What’s more, this would explain the apparent transparency to aw at eness oi 
empty space — our attention is directed to the objects felt-thiough, not the medium
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through which they are felt. We do not notice it. But I think we should resist this 
paiallel. Empty space can be felt independently of whether any object is met with 
through space - foi example, we can enjoy tactual awareness of empty space when 
dancing. Even so, what the notion of feeling-through preserves is the intution that the 
experience of contact, or of meeting with an object, is central to our understanding of 
the nature of touch. Below, I outline another way of accommodating this intuition — I 
explain why tactual experiences involving contact may require a tactile ground in 
order to ‘stand out’. First, consider a case O’Shaughnessy (1989) details:
Say one s hand is numb. It is not the case, even though one experiences no sensation 
in the numb hand, that one cannot use it to discover some impediment by touch — for 
example, one can discover that one cannot push the hand through some obstacle, it 
cannot ‘go any further’. But this suggests that just as there can be tactual awareness 
without experience of resistance, so there can be tactual awareness without the 
sensation of contact.
On the face o f it, this suggests that a conceptual space is thereby made for forms of 
tactual awareness where there is neither felt resistance nor the sensation of contact, 
and we might think, as I do, that our tactual awareness of empty space can fill this 
lacuna. There is, however, a caveat we should note.
On the template model the distinction between ‘within’ and ‘without’ is grounded in 
bodily sensation — one experiences one’s body as bodily when one is aware of a 
region extending beyond one’s body that one is not aware of in the same way (viz. 
through felt sensation). Moreover, the qualitative aspect involved in bodily sensation, 
in being bodily, is not entirely subjective; it is at a felt location. But this in turn 
grounds bodily awareness — awareness of the approximate shape, configuration and 
current disposition of the body. Hence, although O’Shaughnessy’s example reveals 
that one can perceive tactile properties without the sensation of contact, it should not 
be thought that a creature could lack all bodily sensation and still enjoy tactile 
experience. This is so on two counts:
166
First, without bodily sensation the subject would lack a sense of how her body is 
disposed at a time.
Second, nothing would ground the distinction between ‘within’ and ‘without'.
This biings into view one final motivation for granting the claim that we ‘touch’ 
empty space, or whatever is outside or ‘without’ the surfaces that we meet with in 
experience.
We can think of contact either as an event that occurs at a time, or as a relation 
between the perceiver and the thing felt. Naturally, the contact relation is established 
when the event of contact occurs, but the former can be sustained after the event, as 
when one runs one’s hand across a piece of velvet, or simply holds the thing felt, a 
cup say. Critically too, just as there are events whereby the relation of contact is 
established -  viz. where contact in the first sense occurs -  there are events where what 
occurs is that the contact relation no longer holds; as when one lets go of the cup. This 
suggests the resources to translate Soteriou’s argument, sketched in the last chapter, to 
the tactile case.
Having a tactile experience of oneself (parts of one’s body) as coming into contact at 
a time with the surface of an object might be thought to require a concomitant 
awareness of whatever is tactually experienced at adjacent times, including times 
before the event, and hence prior to the contact relation holding. And one might think 
that having an experience of establishing contact with a surface also requires 
experience of whatever is outwith that surface at times prior to the contact relation 
holding, canonically empty space. Now, one way of accommodating such awareness 
might be to insist that when one is aware of the absence of tangible material outwith a 
surface, one is aware only that nothing is touched, inferring the present absence of 
anything tactile at a region from a failure to enjoy tactile experience. Arguably, 
however, such a conclusion fails to sort between an absence of tactile awareness at a 
time, such as when one is asleep and fails to feel the pillow underneath one s head,
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and a tactual awareness of the absence of tangible material at a place, which, as I 
urge, is also felt.131
But if a condition on the experience of contact is tactual awareness of places at times 
before the contact event occurs (and the relation holds), then this just requires tactual 
awareness of regions at which the thing thereafter felt is not felt, typically empty 
regions. To this extent, such regions might be said to act as the tactual ground against 
which moments of experienced contact and the surfaces that ground them "stand out'. 
Katz introduces this notion by recalling Edgar Rubin’s work on visual figures:
“If we look at a piece of stiff linen, then we do not see nothing at the 
square openings, but rather empty space that is free of matter. Stiff 
linen provides an opportunity to study ambiguous figures in the 
sense of Rubin. One can either emphasize the square as figure, with 
the thread receding to ground, or, as is probably more natural, allow 
the space occupied by the thread to serve as the figure, with the 
openings then becoming the ground. Rubin certainly would not 
object if we were to apply his very stimulating reflections 
concerning visual figure-ground, mutatis mutandis, to three- 
dimensional tactual structures. If you move [your hand] over the 
bristles of a stiff brush... you will feel a discontinuous space filled 
with points, a tactual figure... Between the points there is not 
“nothing” in a tactual sense, but rather empty tactual space that is 
not covered by matter. The tactual space is covered discontinuously 
with the tactual matter of the brush points; the space between forms 
the tactual ground”, (my emphasis, 1989, p. 61)
Now, in elucidating the notion of a tactual ground, we do not have the metaphor ol 
sketch to guide us. Still, there is a rough analogue we can tenatively appeal to - mime.
In watching mime, empty space is the visual ground against which the body and 
hence what it is mimed as touching (but which is not visually sensorily piesented), 
stand out.
“The mime’s [the artist’s] body is an instrument; its bones, muscles, 
and joints, are the keys of that instrument; by playing articulately on
Note, w h ere  S o te rio u ’s treatm ent would, I presume, conclude that one m ust have co nsc ious  
perceptual contac t  with regions where things could be felt but aren t, I claim, in a ltion, t at t e 
regions at w h ich  no things are located are also experienced; although no thing is felt, it s not the case 
that noth ing is.
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those keys, the mime tries “to make tactual space visible”” (Huston 
1978, p. 65)
But although empty space is the visual ground for the body and what it is mimed as 
touching, it is also the visual ground for the body when what is mimed are episodes of 
experience where no thing is touched — say when the mime artist represents his 
protagonist walking through an empty region.132
Now, in mime the medium of representation is bodily action. Hence, in watching 
mime, one observes actions. Yet just as there are characteristic ways the miming body 
looks when, through action, contact with material objects is represented, so there are 
characteristic ways the body looks when what is represented, through action, are 
episodes where nothing is touched; where the respresenting body represents 
movement through empty space.
From this suggestion we might extrapolate the following claim:
Just as there are characteristic ways the body looks when what is represented, through 
action, is movement through empty space, there are also characteristic ways the body 
feels, in a bodily sensation sense, to the mime, when such episodes are represented -  
there is a certain quality and ease of movement (which, granted, we might suppose is 
exaggerated in mime). But arguably, how the body feels when such episodes are 
represented is just how it feels in the non-representational case, since, unlike the 
pencil sketch, the medium of representation is action in three-dimensional space.
Still, we might wonder: How might we characterise how such actions feel and their 
associated qualities?
Here I suggest that we follow the strategy advocated elsewhere by Grice. We can 
indicate their feel and quality by demonstration. When you move your arm through 
empty space, this is the way that movement in empty space feels, whatever that kind 
of way may be” (1961, p. 144). And when such movement is felt, so is empty space.
132 Naturally, in such instances the ground, in a literal sense, is touched, but I leave this qualification  
aside.
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the movement is felt to be that way because one is moving through empty space 
which, if I am correct, one thereby perceives.
6 .
I close by sketching some objections.
/. Object ion from  Particulars
It might be objected that when one touches things, one touches particulars, where 
particulars are distinguished by their place in space. In contrast, in putatively 
‘touching’ empty space, nothing particular is touched -  after all, one touches located 
things, not the places at which they are located.
Response: This worry is overcome once Absolutism is adopted. Moreover, once it is 
acknowledged that space is curved, and so disuniform, it becomes intelligible that 
particular regions can have particular properties (though, note, this flows from 
Absolutism and not specifically from the disuniform nature of curved space -  viz. it is 
true also of absolute flat spaces). Besides, I have argued that the points of space have 
particularity without being particulars -  they have their identity, just as days of the 
week do, in virtue of their particular position in manifold space, and this is so even 
while, like days of the week, one region may not be qualitatively distinct from another.
2. Objection from Path-Conned ion 
Touch, it might be insisted, involves path-connection. Things that don’t touch have a 
path between them, whilst things that are touching are not separated by space.
Response: Leaving aside the question as to whether two bona fide  bounded entities 
can ever be said to touch in this sense,1’3 we have already a way of staving oft this 
objection. We are happy to grant that immersed touch occurs. One can feel the water 
one is submerged in even though one is not path-connected to it.
133 See Casati and Varzi (1999, pp. 74-75).
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3. Objection from  Fullness
It might be pointed out that when I am feeling empty space, empty space is not empty, 
since to feel empty space one must feel one s body extend to that region — this follows 
from the template model.
Response. To feel empty space one must move through it. But moving through empty 
space takes time. Hence, even while it may be true that when moving through a 
certain empty region one’s body fdls a sub-part of that region at a time, it is not true 
that at every moment within the interval of time that it takes to move through that 
region, one fdls the entirety of that region (otherwise, one would not be moving 
through it).
4. Objection from  E ither/O r
I have argued that cases of tactual awareness without resistance and tactual awareness 
without contact make plausible a conceptual space that empty space can fdl. It might 
be insisted, however, that either the sensation of contact or of felt resistance are 
necessary to tactual experience -  one cannot have touch without one or the other.
Response: If either the sensation of contact or of felt resistance are necessary to 
tactual experience, then it must be maintained that where neither are experienced, 
nothing is felt. But this assimilates the absence of tactile experience -  for example, 
such as there is when one is asleep -  and the tactile experience of empty space in a 
tactual ground sense.
5. The Incompatibility' ofA w areness an d  the h  allure to Not ice
It might be wondered how it can be maintained that one can be tactually aware of 
something but, as I am urging, fail to notice one’s tactual awareness of that thing. On 
such an understanding, awareness is a state that obtains in virtue of an experience. So, 
one cannot be in a state with the content (say) ‘this region is empty and fail to notice 
that one is in that state.
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Response. There are different ways in which one can come to be aware of some fact 
01 thing through expeiience. One can come to be aware that the island is inhabited 
by seeing footprints in the sand, or, somewhat differently, one can be aware of objects 
in their entiiety by seeing their facing parts. In such cases, the relevant awareness 
might be said to be indiiect; to be mediated by, in the first case the perception of 
footprints (leading to the perceptual belief that the island is inhabited), and in the 
second the seeing of the facing surface of the object.
Now, I have argued, drawing on the template model, that one can enjoy tactual 
awareness of empty space through bodily awareness and sensation. It might be 
wondered what the import of ‘through’ is here.
Two possibilities seem open.
On the assumption that one is indirectly aware of empty space in virtue o f  one’s 
bodily awareness and sensation, then, the claim that one could enjoy such awareness 
without noticing it, would be difficult to sustain. For it would require that one is in an 
awareness state without noticing it. Consider a parallel. We rarely notice the feel of 
our clothes against our skin, but we can attend to how they feel if prompted. On the 
indirect model, the claim I am making in the case of empty space would thereby 
translate as follows: it would amount to a claim that we can be aware of the feel of 
clothes against our skin without noticing that we are aware of how they feel.
Fortunately, then, this is not the claim I am making, pace Nerlich, in the case of 
space. My claim is not that we can come to be tactually aware of the emptiness of a 
given region through bodily sensation and awareness, where ‘through’ is read in an 
indirect sense. But rather that in bodily sensation and awareness, we directly 
experience empty space; the experience and the awareness do not come apart.
l34S e e N u d d s  (m anuscrip t)  for related discussion.
135 See Richardson (2011) for a detailed defence o f  this claim.
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6. Objection from Semantics
One might object finally that it just doesn t flow from what we mean by “touch” that 
we can touch empty space.
Response: Here we could once more appeal to the usual Gricean maxims - since every 
region in our vicinity is uniform, the fact that one has touched a particular region is 
irrelevant and uninformative. As such, though we typically have no cause to say that 
we touch empty space, this does not mean that it is not felt. It seems to me, however, 
that this response misses the insight at the heart of the objection. In fact, I think we 
should concede it.
We can, I think, allow that although we do not “touch” empty space (where this 
presumably captures the intuition that no experience of contact or resistance is 
undergone), there is nonetheless a sense in which we do ‘touch’ it; we enjoy tactual 
awareness of empty space. Besides, not everything we know about tactile perception 
is captured by the word “touch”. Hence, even while it may be linguistically false that 
we “touch” empty space, it may yet be philosophically true.136 It is this possibility that 
I have tried to make palpable here.
In the next chapter, I use this finding to generate a distinction between seeing and 
feeling empty space, and merely seeing see-through empty space.
in mice:
In this chapter, I have argued that we have tactual awareness of Euclidean empty 
space, and I have defended this claim through an exposition of M. G. F . Martin s 
template model of touch.




You can ju s t  see a little peep o f  the passage In Looking-Glass House, 
if  you leave the door o f  our drawing-room wide open
- Lewis Carol 1, Through the Looking-Glass
In the last chapter, I argued that we can feel empty space. I use this conclusion here as 
a way of drawing a distinction between seeing through empty space and seeing see- 
through space.
When we see through empty space, we see regions that we could feel by moving 
through. But when we merely see see-through space, it does not follow that we are in 
a position to move through, and so feel, the empty region seen. For example, when 1 
see Rue de Rivoli in Paris on a web-cam, though I can see see-through regions not yet 
occupied by bicycles or passers-by, I am not in a position to move through and so feel 
those empty regions (viewing them as I do in Glasgow).
I suggest we can use this distinction as a way of making sense of the perception of 
empty space ‘in’ specular objects -  objects the surfaces of which reflect light. My 
strategy is to compare specular perception with the perception of empty space in 
perceptual objects, in particular figurative paintings.
The chapter unfolds as follows: In § 1 ,1 draw on Matthew Nudds’ strategy for sorting 
among the senses as a way of elucidating the distinction between seeing through 
empty regions, and merely seeing see-through regions. In §2, I explain how this 
distinction can be used to make sense of what is involved in learning to perceive with 
a mirror, and I sketch a puzzle that arises in the case of perceptual specular 
experience. Specular space is not seen through -  by specular space I mean the space 
that is apparently looked through in looking at reflections of objects ‘in a mirror. 
Even so, it looks see-through. In §3, I offer an explanation as to why this is the case, 
before turning to the perception of empty space in figurative paintings (§4-5). I aigue
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that because reflections, like pictures, are superficial phenomena, seeing empty space 
in mirrors involves seeing-in, even while empty space in mirrors looks see-through 
(§6-7).137
1.
Nudds (2004) argues that when we individuate the senses we distinguish ways of 
perceiving. For example, it makes sense to say that something, a vase say, is seen 
rather than touched, if seeing rather than touching has distinct consequences for 
judgments and actions that arise as result of the way the vase is perceived — this 
explains what Nudds describes as the significance of the distinction.
A way of perceiving something is significant, he says, if perceiving it in that 
particular way has consequences for what the subject does and thinks. We know that a 
way of perceiving is significant if, by learning that a subject had perceived something 
in that way, we learn more than if we had simply learned that the subject had 
perceived that thing:
“It is more informative to be told that Alice sees the vase, rather than 
to be told merely that she perceives it, since her seeing it makes it 
probable that she perceives that the vase in a certain way. That is, 
her seeing the vase makes it more probable that she perceives certain 
other properties of the vase, properties such as its shape, colour, and 
location, and so on” (2004, p. 44)
So, by seeing the vase rather than touching it, or by touching it rather than seeing it, 
the range of features that Alice perceives is distinct. For example, in touching it she 
may perceive its fragility, which in turn may have consequences, not only for how she 
touches it, but what she may do with it more generally (for example, she may keep it 
out of Kitty’s way). Equivalently, in seeing the vase, she perceives not just its shape, 
but also its colour, which in turn might lead her to evaluate it in a certain light.
137 An abbreviated version o f  this chapter was presented at the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society 
2010, and will appear in the 2011 Proceedings, Part III. An earlier version was presented at the Thunws 
Perceiving and Feeling W orkshop in Geneva, July 2010. I am also grateful to Tom Avery for detailed 
comments on an earlier version and to Akiko Frischhut.
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Notably, this account is contrastive; it says that a vase is seen rather than touched, if 
seeing, rathei than touching, has distinct consequences for judgement and action. But 
I think we can apply it conjunctively too. For example, while an antiques dealer may 
be able to identify a Ming vase by seeing it, she may only be able to determine its 
value if she can, in addition, feel it (the quality of the glaze for example). In this case, 
then, the consequences of seeing and feeling are distinct from those entailed by seeing 
or feeling alone. I suggest a similar distinction can be made between merely seeing 
empty space, and being in a position to see and feel a given empty region.
If one sees an object through a region, then one not only sees that region but, 
providing the curvature is relatively constant, is also in a position to feel it, i.e. by 
moving through it. But this being so, a subject that sees through a given region is in a 
position to perform actions that are closed to a subject that merely sees it. For 
example, a witness to a crime seen through a given empty region may be in a position 
to intervene. Not so the subject that only sees it on closed-circuit television. This 
suggests the distinction is ‘significant’ in Nudds’ sense.
As Nudds notes, some distinctions are not informative. Seeing something with the 
right rather than the left eye makes no real difference to what is perceived. Likewise, 
touching something with one’s hands rather than with one’s feet. But knowing that a 
subject both saw and touched something, rather than seeing or feeling it alone, is 
informative and, as I am urging, this is so even in the case of empty space. For 
example, the second witness, unlike the first, may be blameless in failing to
1 S8intervene.
In the next section, I outline an intermediate case — specular, perceptual experience.
138 Naturally, I d o n ’t suppose it is Informative to be explicitly told that a subject saw and tell a given 
region -  this is a philosophical claim. It is, however, informative to know that a subject was at a g iven  
place at a given time. But i f  a subject was at a given place at a time then, ceteris panbus , the subject 
was in a posit ion to feel the em pty spaces in that region, namely by moving through t em.
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Suppose it looks to Grice as though there is a pillar in front of him, but what he in fact 
sees is a leflection of a pillar behind him. His coming to appreciate this much — 
namely that his perception of the pillar he sees is mediated by a mirror - involves an 
appreciation of the fact that, to touch the pillar he sees, he would have to turn away 
from the mirror. This suggests that the case of seeing space in mirrors is intermediate 
between seeing through empty space and merely seeing see-through regions.
When a subject sees an object ‘in’ a mirror, the subject is path-connected to that 
object (for otherwise the reflection of the object would not be seen ‘in’ the mirror). 
Nonetheless, the path the subject would have to move through so as to touch the 
object specularly displayed, and the path taken by light in visually presenting that 
object, come apart. In common with the non-mediated perceptual case, then, the 
subject is path-connected to the objects seen. The difference is, however, that it 
doesn’t see paths that it could move through by seeing through them. Rather, like 
other cases of mediated perception, see-through empty space is merely seen,139 and 
this is so even though, because the subject is path-connected to the objects displayed, 
it is nevertheless in a position to feel the empty regions seen with concomitant 
consequences for action and judgment.
Notice that all of this assumes, however, that the subject is not, to borrow the idiom of 
Roberto Casati (forthcoming), epistemically innocent of the presence of a mirror.140 
That is, it assumes that the subject knows that it is perceiving with a mirror. But 
sometimes we are not so epistemically privileged; we can be ‘taken in by mirrors - we 
can mis-take specular space as space that can be moved through or into.
I clarify this thought.
Consider the image on the next page, borrowed from Savardi, Bianchi and Bertamini 
(2010).
139 Except, o f  course,  the region that the mirror is seen thiough.
1401 am grateful to Roberto Casati for access to his unpublished manuscript.
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The ex p e r im e n ta l  apparatus m im ic s  the appearance o f  a m i r r o r .
F r o m  Savardi,  B ian ch i  and B e r ta m in i  (2010, p. 11).
Here, the experimental apparatus is set up to mimic the appearance of a mirror; two 
three-dimensional objects are arranged to look like a single entity and its reflection 
(something, of course, that the two-dimensional photo obscures). As such, the visual 
scene is supposed to be indiscriminable from the scene that would be presented were 
the frames to enclose instead a mirror.
The ‘mirror scene’ in the Marx Brother’s 1933 film Duck Soup deploys a similar 
strategy.
Duck Soup. 1933. D ire c te d  by Leo M cC arey .  P a ram o u n t  P ic tu re s .141
In this still shot, Harpo, on the right, is presented as being ‘in’ the mirror, while 
Groucho, on the left, is supposed to be the subject looking in . Harpo not being 
Groucho however, the space occupied by Harpo is not specular space, but thiee-
141 This still is available a t w w w .how base .com , <http :/ /w ww .howbase.com /soup/>. Retrieved 12/09/1
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dimensional physical space, space through which, as later becomes obvious, the twins 
are path connected.142
This helps makes sense of the idea of being ‘taken in' by specular space.
Just as one can mis-take three-dimensional space for specular space, so, aptly, does 
the reverse hold: specular space can mistakenly be treated as three-dimensional. But. 
as such, it has a see-through look. I take this to be a puzzling fact about specular 
space.
If one can mistake specular space as space to move into, as one might in epistemically 
innocent cases, then the experience of seeing space in mirrors is phenomenally 
indistinguishable from the non-mediated perceptual case. But if there is no space 
where the mirror is and hence no space is seen through, how can ‘it’ - specular space - 
look so indiscriminable? How can ‘it’ look see-through? This is the question this 
chapter addresses. I take it to be puzzling since although, as Casati notes, perception 
mediated by the use of a mirror tends to leave a trace -  namely on the objects 
reflected ‘in’ the mirror - empty space survives reflection unscathed. What’s more, 
since, as I argued in Chapter Four, empty space merely transmits biff, it is less 
apposite to say it is reflected, even though empty space is seen ‘in’ the mirror.
3.
The claim that empty space seen ‘in’ mirrors looks see-through is motivated by the 
epistemically innocent case; if one can mis-take the specular case for the non­
mediated perceptual case, as one does in cases of innocence, then how space looks 
‘in’ mirrors is indistinguishable from how it looks in non-mediated perceptual 
experience. But since in non-mediated perceptual experience empty space looks see- 
through, or so I have argued, it must also look see-through in the specular case. The 
question is how. In what follows, I present a candidate explanation. I outline a view
142 The scene can be v iew ed  on w w w .y o u tu b e .c o m ,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdQ9jh5GvQ8&feature=related>. Accessed 12/09/11. My thanks
to Robert Leach for draw ing  my attention to this scene.
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on which the space in the mirror looks see-through because it looks to be continuous 
with the space through which the mirror is seen. Here’s a sketch of the idea I aim to 
explore:
When you look in a mirror, the space you are in looks to be continuous with the 
space in the mirror. For example, because your mirror reflection looks to be the 
same distance from the surface of the mirror as you, it looks to be twice the distance 
from you as the mirror is. But this being so, you seem to look through a path in 
specular space that is continuous with the path looked through in looking to the 
mirror. And in looking through, you thereby seem to see through and so to ‘see’ a 
specular space that is continuous with the space that you are in. The suggestion is that 
this appearance of continuity explains the see-through look of empty space seen ‘in' 
mirrors. The empty space ‘in’ the mirror looks see-through because it looks to be 
continuous with the space the mirror is seen through. In what follows, I suggest that 
the same is true of empty regions that are not mediately perceived, but are nonetheless 
seen as continuous with empty regions that are seen through.143 An example helps 
bring this latter claim into view.
Imagine looking at the scene captured in the photo below, from the place where it was 
taken (where this requires imagining looking at the scene itself, not the photo).
143 In the next chapter  I outline conditions on perceiving regions ot space as continuous.
144 This im age is available a tc o m m o ns .w ik im ed ia .o rg ,
<h ttp : / /com m o ns .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w /index .php? t i t le= S p ec ia l% 3 A S ea ich& search  bob+jones+ tiees+h ori
zon>. Retrieved 12/09/11.
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In seeing the trees, it might be said that you also see the empty spaces between them, 
as well as the empty regions that separate their branches. Since, however, you see 
these empty regions — the empty spaces between the branches say - through other 
regions o f  empty space — viz. the space you see the trees through — you don't see the 
empty spaces between the branches by seeing through them. Still, if my 
phenomenology is acute, they have a see-through look. I suggest that they look see- 
through because they look to be continuous with regions that are seen through — the 
empty regions one sees the trees through.
In the next section, I consider the perception of empty space in figurative paintings as 
a way of clarifying this thought.
4.
Pictures are, we might say, phenomenally expansive, even while they represent empty 
space. This is most obvious in pointillism. In the painting below by Georges Seurat no 
‘point’ is uncoloured -  there are no gaps or lacunae. Still, empty space is ‘seen’; the 
observer on the bank is seen as at a spatial distance from the boat in the background, 
and no opaque objects are depicted as interposed in the space that separates them.
GEORGES S e u r a t ,  LePontdeCourbevoie. 1886-87. Oil.  
C ourtau ld  Institute, London, w ikim edia commons.
l4S See c o m m o n s .w ik im e d ia .o rg ,<h t tp : / /co m m o n s .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w / in d e x .p h p ? t i t le = S p e c ia l% 3 A S e a rc h & red i rs - l& sea rc h -G eo rg es+ S e
u r a t & f u l l t e x t = S e a r c h & n s 0 - l & n s 6 = l & n s l 2 = l & n s l 4 = l & n s l 0 0 = l & n s l 0 6 = l & u s e l a n g = e n > .  Retrieved
12/09/11.
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Rudolf Arnheim  makes a similar point, here drawing a distinction wdth sculpture:
Within the frame of a painting every spot is positively present, first 
as a mateiial part of the paint-covered canvas and secondly as a 
substantial element of the pictorial construction. In a completed 
painting, the units of the composition vary as to their apparent 
density and also as to their spatial position within the figure-ground 
hierarchy, but none of them may give us the impression of an empty 
gap, a hole torn in the pictorial tissue. This is different in sculpture, 
where we are used to find all spatial relationships limited to the 
figure itself. These relations often reach across a void — and the 
length of the leap counts compositionally — but they generally do not 
include these intervals the way they would in a painting”. (1948, p.
33)
Anaheim’s observation is that in pictorial compositions, although figures are 
represented in relation to a ground, there are no empty spaces or gaps in the “pictorial 
tissue” - in the idiom above, the painting is phenomenally expansive even though 
empty space is depicted. This, however, is distinct from sculpture.
In painting, the spatial relations between represented entities are also represented; 
they are represented by the ground. But in sculpture, at least “generally”, all spatial 
relations are relations that obtain between parts of the figure', the ground is not pail of 
the composition. To this extent, however, Arnheim suggests that the sculpture of 
Henry Moore is distinct, though not without historical precedent (he mentions 
Bernini’s horsebackriding Louis XIV, “the sweeping locks and folds collect the air in 
hollow pockets” (ibid., p. 35)). He argues that Moore’s figures “capture” portions of 
space, mostly through the use of concave forms, thereby making those regions part of 
the composition.
This idea is best understood by example.
182
HENRY MOORE, Reclining Figure. 1951. Bronze.
S co t t i sh  N a t io n a l  G a l le ry  o f  M o d e r n  A rt ,  E d in b u rg h ,  w ik im e d ia  c o m m o n s .146
Here the cavity in the figure’s abdomen is part of the composition -  as Arnheim puts 
it, three-dimensional space is an “active partner” in the composition (I pick up a 
related thought in the next chapter; I argue that objects and empty space are co-seen). 
But in classical sculpture, in contrast, “the discipline of the style is all internal”; that is 
to say, it pertains only to the figure', “there is little capacity or desire to expand 
beyond the basic block. The function of the surrounding space is almost exclusively 
negative” (ibid.). Consider the familiar image of the Venus de Milo in light of this 
observation.
146 See c o m m o n s .w ik im e d ia .o rg ,<http ://com m ons .w ik im edia .org/w /index .php?tit le=Specia l% 3A Search& search=henry+ m oore+ sco t t1sh
+national+gallery>. Retrieved 12/09/11.
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Venus de Milo. 130-110B CE.
L o u v re  M useum, Paris,  w ik im e d ia  c o m m o n s .147
Here, the empty space that surrounds the statue is not part of the composition, 
something that is most obvious where parts of the ‘tissue’ of the sculpture are 
missing; in observing that the arms are missing, one does not thereby include, as part 
o f the composition, the regions at which the arms are absent. Recalling a distinction 
made in Chapter Three, the statue is in space but empty space is not in the statue.
This helps make sense of the contrast Arnheim details so as to bring M oore’s 
innovation into view:
In painting, the ground is part of the composition, though what is included is not 
empty space. Moore’s work also makes the ground part of the composition, but in 
including the ground, empty space becomes part of the tissue of the sculpture. This, 
then, is unlike the Venus de Milo. The empty space that surrounds the statue is not 
part of the composition. Still, if what I argued in the last chapter is correct, an 
apprehension of an absence of the scuptural tissue at certain locations is grounded in 
the non-epistemic perception of empty space. As such, this intensional apprehension 
is quite unlike the extensional perception of absence that is involved in perceiving the
147 See co m m o n s .w ik im e d ia .o rg ,
< h t tp : / /com m o ns .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w /in d ex .p h p ? t i t le= S p ec ia l% 3 A S ea rch & sea rc h = v en u s+ d e + m e lo >.
Retrieved 12/09/11.
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cavities that, if Arnheim s analysis is apposite, are part of the fabric of Moore's 
sculpture. For it does not seem that, in perceiving those regions, one sees them as 
regions where objects would be seen were they to take up those spaces (although it is 
true that objects would be seen were they so located). In the pictorial case, however, 
even the possiblity of such intensional apprehension seems foreclosed. When empty 
space is pictorially represented, one does not perceive the region depicted as a region 
where something could be seen but isn’t. For empty space is materially depicted. But 
this being so we might ask:
Given that the ground is part of the pictorial composition, but that empty space is not 
-  there are no gaps in the pictorial tissue -  how does immaterial empty space ‘get 
into’ the material phenomenal expanse? I take up this question in the next section.
5.
Discussing Raphael’s The Expulsion o f Heliodorus in Art and its Objects, Richard 
Wollheim outlines a possible ‘get-in’ strategy. He writes:
“It is hard to see, for instance, how a man could ‘read’ the void in 
the middle of Raphael’s fresco if he was not at the same time able to 
make out the spatial relations that hold between Heliodorus and the 
youths who advance to scourge him, or between the Pope and the 
scene that he surveys in calm detachment”. (1980, p. 14)
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RAPHAEL, The Expulsion o f Heliodorusfrom the Temple. 1511-1512. 
A posto lic  Palace, Vatican City, w ikim edia.commons.148
Here Wollheim’s proposal is that one could not ‘read’ empty space into the 
phenomenal expanse — that is, one could not see that there is empty space ‘in’ the 
middle of the fresco -  unless one could already “make out” the spatial relations that 
hold between the figures depicted. As such, he supposes that there is a kind of 
perceptual appreciation of spatial relations that precedes seeing that certain relata are 
separated. His proposal is that we see-in such spatial relations.
For Wollheim, seeing-in denotes a very specific sui generis type of visual experience, 
one that is perceptual rather than cognitive, and which is nonetheless distinct from 
face-to-face perceiving and visualisation. He summarises his thesis as follows:
“When a picture represents, say, a horse, the appropriate experience 
to be had in front of it is to see a horse in its painted surface, and 
what is most distinctive of the phenomenology of such an experience
is what I call twofoldness, or that, within a single experience, but as
separate aspects of it, I am aware of the surface and of a horse”.
(2003, p. 133)
Here, a visual experience of a representational painting is “appropriate if it is the
kind of visual experience in virtue of which the representational properties oi the
painting can be explained (ibid., p. 131). Such an “appropriate experience is one that
148 See w ik im ed ia .c o m m o n s .o rg ,<h ttp : / /com m on s .w ik im ed ia .o rg /w /in d ex .p h p ? t i t le= S p ec ia l% 3 A S ea rch& red irs= l& sea rch = fresco + ra p h
ae l+ ex pu ls ion+o f+ hcliod orus& fu ll tex t= S earch & nsO = l & n s6 = l  & ns 12-1  & ns  14-1 & ns  100-1  & ns  106-1
&uselang=en>. Retrieved 12/09/11.
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involves twofoldness. That is to say, it involves seeing both the surface of the painting 
and what is represented simultaneously.149
In the case of empty space, then, we might suppose the following: when a picture 
represents empty space, the “appropriate” experience “to be had in front of it” is to 
see immaterial empty space ‘in’ the painted material surface and to be simultaneously 
aware of the surface of the painting, and hence, if what I have argued so far is correct, 
the empty space ‘outside’ the surface that is not part of the composition.
I return to this notion of appropriateness below. First, I clarify an idea sketched at the 
close of the last section.
Above I noted that sometimes distant empty regions can be seen through other empty 
regions; the example I offered was the experience of seeing trees on the horizon. In 
seeing the trees, I suggested, you also see the see-through space that is between them 
and that separates their branches. Since, however, you see those empty regions -  for 
example, the empty spaces between the branches - through other regions o f  empty 
space -  you don’t see the empty spaces between the branches by seeing through them. 
I suggest that we can harness the notion of phenomenal expansiveness to reify this 
phenomenology.
Consider how distant regions seen through (other) empty spaces appear. It seems they 
are also presented phenomenally expansively, something that René Magritte’s La 
Condition Humaine (below) illustrates.
149 Hence, une  does not see one and then the other -  something Ernst Gom brich  maintained. See 
Maynard 1994.
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R E N É  M A G R I T T E ,  L a  Condition Humaine. 1 9 3 3 .  O il.  
The National Gallery of Art, W ashington.150
Here the parody is that, save for a tiny glimpse of the side of the stretched canvas, the 
view seen through the window and that seen-in the painting are indistinguishable -  
they both appear to be phenomenally expansive. Still, there is a difference.
Though distant empty regions may not be seen through, they are continuous with 
regions that are seen through, and through which we see those distant regions. 
Hence, insofar as they are continuous with space that is seen through, they can be 
attributed a see-through look. My thought is that the same is true of the phenomenal 
character of specular space. Specular space looks see-through since it looks to be 
continuous with the space which one sees the mirror through, space which, as I 
argued in Chapter Three, has a see-through look. But this in turn explains why one 
can occasionally mis-take oneself, when epistemically innocent of the presence of a 
mirror, to be path-connected, through specular space, to the objects specularly 
displayed.
150 Im age is available at w w w .n g a .g o v ,
< h t t p : / / w w w . n g a . g o v / f c g l - b i n / t i n f o J ? o b j e c t = 6 8 9 6 6 . 0 & d e t a i l = n o n e > .  R e t r i e v e d  1 2 / 0 9 / 1 1 .
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In the epistemically innocent case, the space ‘in’ the mirror and the space ‘outside' 
the surface of the mirror are perceived to be distinct sub-regions of the same space. 
Hence, one does not see the space outside the surface of the mirror as a sub-region 
of the space in which the mirror is. This, then, is unlike the Venus de Milo\ as I noted, 
one sees the empty space outside the statue as the space in which the statue is. Still, 
nor is an analogy with the work of Henry Moore acute — viz. where empty spaces are 
included as part of composition. I spell out this thought by returning to the non- 
specular world.
On the assumption that empty space must be seen-in a pictorial phenomenal expanse, 
it might be wondered whether distant regions that, as I have explained, also appear 
phenomenally expansively and which are non-mediately perceived, must likewise be 
seen-in. I suggest one reason to resist this thought:
Unlike a painting, which is a perceptual object, when one sees distant regions one 
perceives a sub-region of the larger space in which one is. But this being so, one does 
not see the empty space one sees those regions through as a sub-region of a space that 
is distinct from the space in which those distant objects are located. P,ather one sees 
distinct sub-regions of the same space.
To clarify this thought, recall what is involved in seeing empty space ‘in’ pictorial 
perceptual objects. It involves seeing the empty space ‘in’ the material phenomenal 
expanse and the empty space ‘outside’ the surface of that expanse and through which 
that surface is seen. What’s more, it involves an appreciation that the space ‘in’ the 
phenomenal expanse is part of the composition, while the empty space ‘outside the 
surface of the painting is not. But in contrast, and disanalagously, when one perceives 
distant regions, including empty spaces, one perceives such empty regions as 
continuous with the empty space one sees them through — both regions are perceived 
to be sub-regions of the same larger space. But to this extent they are rather like the 
empty spaces that are part of Moore’s composition. The empty spaces that Moore s 
work “captures” are continuous with the empty regions through which the work is 
seen.
189
So how far we have come?
I have argued that empty regions that are seen through other empty regions, although 
they are presented as part of a phenomenal expanse, can nonetheless be attributed a 
see-through look. This is because they appear continuous with the spaces through 
which they are seen. I have suggested that empty space, when seen in a mirror, also 
looks see-through because it looks to be continuous with the space the mirror is seen 
through. Critically, however, this is so even in the epistemically un-innocent case — 
that is, when one’s actions and judgements are counterfactually sensitive to the 
presence o f  a mirror.
But this suggests a further question: Why does specular look see-through even in 
cases of uninnocence -  that is, even when one knows that the space in the mirror is 
the space in which the mirror is?'5'
Below I argue that because the space ‘in’ the mirror is the space in which the mirror 
is, one’s visual experience displays ‘elasticity’ - patterns of ‘expansion’ and 
‘contraction’ that cue awareness of the presence of objects and that are typically 
characteristic of non-mediated perceptual experience.152 I suggest that this explains 
the appearance of continuity in virtue of which specular space looks see-through.
151 The term ‘un in nocen t’ is Casati’s and I use it throughout.
152 Elasticity is supposed to capture a phenomenological notion. Nonetheless, it may be partly spelt out 
by appeal to m otion parallax and motion perspective, psychological notions. Motion parallax relers to 
the m o v em e n t  o f  the “projections” o f  several stationary objects caused by the m ov em ent o f  the 
observer (see Cutting 1995, p. 89), while motion perspective refers to "the field ol relative motions ol 
objects r igidly attacted to a ground plane around a moving observer. . . . i t  specifically does not reler to 
object m otion” (Cutting 1997, p. 31). Notably, so called ‘flow rates' can vary as a function o f  d istance. 
As H e lm holtz  noted: “ In walking along, the objects that are rest by the wayside stay behind us; that is, 
they appear  to glide past us in our field o f  view in the opposite direction to that in which  w e  are 
advancing M ore  distant objects do the same only more slowly, while very rem ote bodies like the stars 
maintain their  perm anen t  posit ions in the field o f  v iew” (Helmholtz 1876/1925, P.295, quoted in 
Cutting 1995, p. 89).
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6.
In outlining his account, Casati details a thoughtful parallel. Mirrors, he says, act like 
windows rather than images. If you retreat from a full-length mirror, the space 
‘reflected will enlarge as more of the room comes into view. Likewise, what is seen 
through a window changes with the movement of the observer. But pictorial empty 
spaces are melastic in this sense — they are not responsive to movement.
A way of understanding why pictorial spaces are inelastic is to recognize that 
figurative pictures inscribe what Wollheim (1998) describes as ‘a spectator in the 
picture’ — in addition to what they depict, they also depict a point o f view. What they 
depict is depicted from somewhere. In contrast, while specular spaces are presented 
perspectivally, they do not inscribe a spectator. Still, there remains a sense in which 
looking at a picture and looking at a mirror image are somewhat similar. One can 
adopt ‘a spectatorial attitude’ or ‘pictorial stance’ when viewing a mirror. Walton’s 
(2002) imaginative account of pictorial experience (which I implicitly called upon 
above) helps illustrate this thought.
For Walton, when viewing a picture one imagines one’s perceptual experience (the 
seeing of the painting) to be another perceptual experience (the seeing of what the 
painting depicts). Although the perspective one has on the painting is distinct from the 
perspective depicted by the painting, one imagines one’s current perceptual 
experience of the picture, with its current elastic perspectival properties, to be an 
experience of perceiving, from the depicted point o f view, what is depicted.
Fie characterises the experience of viewing Nicolas Poussin s Rinaldo and Armida as 
follows:
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NICOLAS POUSSIN, Rinaldo and Armida. 1629. O il .  Dulw ich  
Pic ture  Gallery, London, w ikimedia.commons.153
“The viewer of Rinaldo and Armida is actually at a certain place 
relative to the picture -  seven feet from it and slightly to the left of 
center, for instance. It is from this position that one sees Rinaldo in 
the picture surface. But this location in space does not correlate with 
one’s perspective on Rinaldo in the sense in which “his face is 
turned toward us”, the sense it in which it is the perspective from 
which he is depicted. To change one’s position relative to the 
canvas, to move closer to it, for instance, or further left, does not 
affect one’s point of view in the latter sense. (This is why we can say 
that the picture depicts Rinaldo from a certain point of view; we 
cannot normally say this about freestanding sculpture)”. (2002, p.
29)
I suggest that this helps explain how one can adopt a pictorial attitude when viewing a 
reflection in a mirror:
The perspective one has on the mirror (and hence on what it displays) is imagined to 
be a depicted perspective (or, in cases where a mirror is used as an aid to depiction, 
the perspective that is to be depicted). Still, unlike pictorial space, specular space 
remains elastic, and it is elastic because the subject is path-connected both to the 
objects displayed and to the mirror. But this, in turn, explains the appearance of 
continuity in virtue of which specular space can be attributed a see-through look.
153 A vailable  a t  w ik im ed ia .co m m on s .o rg ,< h U p :/ /com m on s.w ik im ed ia .o rg /w /index .ph p? ti t le= S pec ia l% 3A S earch& search= rina ldo + and + arm id a> .
Retrieved 12/09/11.
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When a subject is path-connected to the objects his experience phenomenally 
presents, his experience displays characteristic patterns of ‘expansion’ and 
contraction that cue awareness of the presence of objects and. as I will argue in the 
next chapter, the empty space that is their ‘outside’. But, critically, one's experience 
can only display such elasticity when one shares the same space as the objects and 
regions that one sees — that is, when the empty regions one sees are part of the space 
in which one is.
But this also accounts for the elasticity of specular experience. Because the subject is 
path-connected to the mirror, when the subject moves, the changes in the visual angle 
which the reflection subtends mimic the changes in the visual angle that objects 
would sub-tend were the subject to approach or retreat from those objects in the non­
mediated perceptual case. This, then, makes sense of the appearance of continuity in 
virtue of which a see-through look can be attributed to specular space.154
Because specular experience is elastic, the space ‘in’ the mirror looks to be 
continuous with the space through which the mirror is seen and, as I have argued, 
because it looks continuous it can be attributed a see-through look. But critically, this 
is so even in the epistemically uninnocent case -  where one knoM’s that the space in 
the mirror is the space in which one is. As such, this leaves one final question: In 
looking see-through, is empty specular space not, then, seen-in?
7.
Recall, seeing-in involves twofoldness. That is to say, it involves seeing both the 
surface of the painting and what is represented simultaneously. Wollheim glosses 
twofoldness as follows:
154 It oug h t  to be noted  that treating such "elasticity’ as visual evidence for the continuity ol space 
requires representing  the continuity o f  space independently o f  one 's  m ovem ent through it -  1 consider  
this additional requ irem ent in the next chapter.
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Looking at a suitably marked surface, we are visually aware at once 
of the maiked surface and of something in front of or behind 
something else”. (1998, p. 221)
The question is whether specular experience is also twofold. I propose that the answer 
we give will vary as a function of innocence.
In epistemically uninnocent cases, and where one’s judgements and actions are 
appropriate to the seeing of a mirror, it is seems apposite to say that we are aware 
of something in front of or behind something else”. After all, the specular image 
appears behind the surface of the mirror. To this extent, then, the experience might be 
said to involve seeing-in, though, critically, with a distinction. The space in which the 
mirror is is the space one sees. But, as such, one is aware that the space ‘outside’ the 
surface of the mirror is distinct in from the space ‘in’ the mirror only insofar as they 
are not perceived to be distinct sub-regions of, by analogy with non-mediated 
perceptual experience, the same space, or, by analogy with pictorial experiences, 
distinct sub-regions of distinct spaces -  rather one perceives that they are the same 
sub-region.
What, though, of cases of innocence?
It might be objected that in epistemically innocent cases, and specifically where the 
mirror is clean and planar, there can be no two-fold seeing, since in such instances 
one doesn’t see the surface of the mirror. But this, it seems to me, is not quite right. 
Though it may be true that in epistemically innocent cases one doesn’t intensionally 
represent the surface o f a mirror, and hence that one has no phenomenologically 
salient experience of twofoldness, it is not true that one doesn’t see the surface and the 
reflection at the same time.
Consider a parallel case: the non-mediated perception of colour. To see the colour of 
an object, one must see its surface. But a reflection is like a colour in this sense: to see 
a reflection one must see a reflecting surface.
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To this extent, however, even in the innocent specular case, there is a kind of two-fold 
seeing. Specular experience is a superficial phenomenon, which explains why the 
region the mirror occupies is not seen through -  there are no gaps in the specular 
tissue, no holes in the mirror. The difference is, however, that in “appropriate” 
specular expeiience there is perceptual success — there is a seeing of the space in 
which the m inor is, albeit a seeing that is also mediated by the perception of a mirror. 
But in the second, innocent case the experience is illusory — there is no space where 
one perceives space to be. Put somewhat differently, one takes the tissue of perceptual 
experience to include empty regions which it does not include. I spell this final 
thought out.
One does not see through regions where opaque objects are located — recall, it is as 
though they offer resistance to the eye, “a barrier beyond which the eye cannot pass” 
(Katz 1935, p. 8). But the same is true of regions where reflecting surfaces are found.
One does not see through reflecting surfaces, or at least so long as they are not, like 
windows, transparent. Yet for this reason, and despite its elasticity, where specular 
space is not seen-in, there is no seeing. For the space one appears to see is no where. 
There is no such space.
This completes my speculative account.
in mice:
I have distinguished between seeing through empty space and seeing see-through 
space, and I have argued that specular experience is an intermediate case. While the 
subject can see and feel regions specularly displayed, namely because he or she is 
path-connected to the objects visually presented, it remains the case that the subject 
does not thereby see regions to move through by seeing through them. I have 
explained why specular space looks see-through — namely because it looks to be 
continuous with the region the mirror is seen through. And why, because reflections 
are superficial phenomena, specular space must be seen-in, despite looking see- 
through.
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In the final chapter, I spell out conditions on perceiving space as continuous, and in 
particular I try to elucidate the complicity between perceiving objects and perceiving 
empty space, a complicity gestured at in Anaheim’s notion of space as an ‘active 




To ge ther  as carpen ters  w ith  h a m m e rs  
w e have taught the d is tance  
ho w  to build a r o o f  
from  the trees 
w e  run b e tw ee n
- John  Berger ,  and our faces, my heart, b rief as photos
In this closing chapter, I try to make sense of the contribution of objects to the 
perception of empty space, and to weave together some of the lines of thought that 
have run through this thesis. I iterate those that are relevant for the argument that 
follows.
In Chapter One, I motivated metaphysical absolutism as an assumption, but I also 
indicated that our naive category ‘space’ is absolute; we think of things as moving in 
space, but we don’t think that space can move. Likewise, we experience the region of 
space of which we have experience as a sub-volume of a larger space.
In Chapter Five, I detailed how, on the Structural View, an awareness of the space of 
which one has experience as a subvolume is attendant with a grasp of one’s sensory 
limitations. I outlined in what sense perceiving empty space in a ground sense is 
thereby dependent on an implicit conception of space as absolute -  the requirement 
that one experience one’s visual field as bounded requires that one implicitly conceive 
of space as absolute.
In Chapters Three and Six I argued, in line with the metaphysical assumption adopted 
in Chapter One, in favour of a content view of seeing and feeling empty space -  one 
that appeals to the matter of experience. I explained why we need not think ol 
perceiving empty space as a species of absence perception.
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And in Chapter Seven, I noted that when one is path-connected to objects seen 
through a given region, one s visual experience is apt to display ‘elasticity', 
characteristic patterns of expansion and ‘contraction" on movement. I argued that 
specular space is elastic.
In what follows, I tie together some of these thoughts.
Drawing on a notion introduced in Husserl’s 1907 Thing and Space lectures, I argue 
that objects and empty space are co-seen\ this follows Husserl’s emphasis, declared at 
the outset, on “not the mere isolated thing but the thing together with its thingly 
environment” (1997, p. 7, lines 18-19).1'’'’ I argue, however, that this is so in tw’o 
distinct respects:
To see objects as taking up space or, as Strawson (1961, p. 54) puts it, as space-takers, 
one has to represent empty space as something that objects can take up. But such co- 
seeing is not yet phenomenally foundational, in a sense to be made clear, since there 
could well be creatures which, although they co-see objects and empty space, do not 
see empty space as space that could be filled.
Here my argumentative strategy is as follows:
When Husserl affirms his commitment, not to “the mere isolated thing” but to “the 
thing together with its thingly environment”, he naturally takes the perceiver to be 
part of that thingly environment. But this in turn yields the datum that he takes as his 
starting point: two non-identical perceptions can present the same object.
“Take a house as seen now from the front, and now from the back, or 
as seen from the inside and then from the outside. If we consider 
these perceptions within the the phenomenological reduction... then 
each one appears differently... Nevertheless, we say, and with 
certain evidence, that they present the same house . (1997, pp. 22- 
23, lines 32-35)
lss I am  g ra te fu l  to O l iv ie r  M ass in  for  bringing the notion o f  co-percep t ion  to my at tention. See M ass in  
(2010 , §12 .3 ,  p. 4 3 2 ) .
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For Husserl this is a datum and ‘harbours no mystery’. But for some philosophers, the 
fact that perception is from a “standpoint” (ibid., p. 9, line 3) is apt to provoke a 
puzzle — one that lequires a philosophical resolution. For example, consider this 
desciiption of the phenomenology of seeing a tomato given by Alva Noe in Action in 
Perception:
Suppose, for example, that there is a tomato on the table in front of 
you. The facing side (facet) of the tomato is interposed between you 
and the far side and underneath (as well as the insides) of the tomato.
You can only see part of the tomato’s surface”. (Noe 2004, p. 76)
With this description, Noe aims to diagnose a feature of perceptual experience that he 
supposes requires philosophical treatment. The ‘problematic’ feature of experience 
that he discovers in this phenomenology is as follows:
Though we only see a part of the surface of the tomato, we experience it as 
voluminous - as three-dimensional. But, says Noe, “experiencing a bit of a surface 
isn’t like experiencing a solid thing” (ibid., p. 76). So the question is how we can 
come to perceive the tomato as three-dimensional given that we “can only see part of 
the tomato’s surface”. On this understanding, seeing the facing surfaces of objects 
isn’t sufficient for seeing them as space-takers.
It should be noted that this experience has been found problematic in another sense, 
one that is perhaps more familiar. Even though we perceive the object in its entirety, 
we can remove bits of the object we see - by hollowing out a half-sphere for example 
- without changing the way the object looks.156 This is not the difficulty that Noe 
means to address. On this more familiar construal of the ‘problem’, it can be 
acknowledged that the hollowed-out half-sphere is seen as voluminous. In contrast, 
Noe’s problem is to expain precisely how we can experience an object as three- 
dimensionally extended given that we only see part of its surface. Importantly, on 
Noe’s understanding, surfaces aren’t experienced in the same way as solid things are 
(“experiencing a bit of a surface isn’t like experiencing a solid thing ). This, then, is 
why a problem arises: “Despite the fact that you can only see pait ol the object s
l56T h a n k  y o u  to  M at t  N u d d s  for em phasis ing  this point.
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surface [which, critically, isn't like experiencing a solid thing], in looking at it we 
enjoy experience as of a voluminous solid” (ibid.).
My goal in this chapter is to try to show that, on an adequate characterisation of the 
phenomenology, theie is, after all, no ‘problem’ to begin with. This is so for two 
reasons. First, when we see the surfaces of objects, this is not all we see; we also see 
the empty space outside those objects. Second, as I will explain, we see this empty 
space as continuous and as having dimensionality. But since we see it as continuous 
with the space that the object occupies, we thereby see the object as three- 
dimensionally extended. As such, I treat Noe’s ‘puzzle’ as a ruse. I consider it only as 
a way of trying to elucidate the distinct species of co-seeing it is the task of this 
chapter to set out.
1.
In Chapter Three, I noted Bermudez’s distinction between immediate and direct 
perception, and I explained how this refinement allows him to argue that, although the 
immediate objects of perception are the surfaces of objects, a perceiver can 
nonetheless make true demonstrative reference to objects by perceiving those parts. 
Hence, while three-dimensional material objects are never the immediate objects of 
perception, they can be directly perceived.
This distinction provides an answer to the question as to what the immediate objects 
of perception are. The ‘problem’ Noe gestures at, however, asks a different question. 
It asks not what the immediate objects of perception are, but how objects can be 
perceived as three-dimensional given the fact that we only see their facing surfaces. 
As such, it spins on the apparent incompatiblity of two plausible claims: (i) we 
perceive objects as three-dimensional and (ii) the only part of the object we see is the 
part that faces us.
Now, so cast, it might be supposed that the problem arises only on a covert 
equivocation on the words “see” and “perceive” — you strictly speaking see less than
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you perceive. On such an understanding, the challenge in defusing the puzzle then is 
to explain how we can ‘get from’ seeing, strictly understood, to perceiving. This is 
explanatoiy strategy I take Noe to pursue.1' 7 He argues that our tacit grasp of how the 
shape of a perspectivally presented object varies with movement, augments or 
enhances visual experience in such a way that makes those parts of the object that we 
don t (strictly speaking) see perceptually present.1"8 My aim is not to challenge this 
solution, but only to explore how the datum that gives rise to Noe’s puzzle is 
described.
Take Noe s assertion above that “you can only see part of the tomato’s surface”. 
There are two natural ways of reading this assertion. First, as a claim that seeing is 
exhausted by the seeing of the facing part of the object. And second, as a claim that 
the only part of the object that you see is the facing surface. The latter claim seems 
straightforwardly true, and the former, if what I have argued in this thesis is correct, 
false.
As I argued in Chapters Three, Five and Seven, when you see the surface of the object 
(and perceptual objects like paintings), you also see the empty space ‘outside’ those 
objects. But, as such, there is a distinction in what the ‘only’ above qualifies. It may 
qualify the experience or it may qualify the object seen. Read one way it says that all 
you can see is the facing surface of the tomato and nothing else. Read the other, it 
says that all you can see o f the tomato is the facing surface and no other part of it. But 
read this way, the claim that ‘you can only see part of the tomato’s surface’ doesn’t 
exclude the claim that you also see the empty space outside it, a reading that ‘harbours 
no mystery’ at all. For though you only see the facing surface o f the tomato, this is not 
all you see; you also see the empty space ‘outside’ it. Even so, this is not yet an 
adequate description of what we see.
Although you see the surface of the tomato and the empty space ‘outside’ it (the space 
you see it through and the see-through space that articulates its boundaries), you also
157 S e e  K a ld e ro n ,  fo r th c o m in g .
158 A n o th e r  s tra tegy  is to  p reserve  instead a m odest  identity betw een  see ing and v isually  pe rce iv in g  but 
to a u g m e n t  instead  the  k ind s  o f  con ten t that  can penetra te  experience,  f o r  ex am p le ,  it m ig h t  be u rg ed  
that the  im a g in a t io n  is involved in ‘filling ou t’ the  d im ens ionali ty  o f  ob jec ts  w h en  only  su r faces  are  
pe rcep tua l ly  g iv en  (fo r  ex am p le ,  N an ay  2010).
201
see these regions as continuous with the region that the tomato occupies. Moreover, 
since you see these empty regions as having dimensionality, this explains why you 
perceive, indeed see, the voluminosity of the object. Since you see the empty space 
outside the tomato as continuous and as having dimensionality, and since you see the 
space the tomato occupies as continuous with these regions, you see the tomato as a 
space-taker.
The rest of the chapter takes the following shape: In § 2 ,1 set out the theoretical notion 
of co-perception in more detail. In §3-4, I defend the claim that when one sees empty 
space as space that objects could take up, one co-sees objects as space-takers. I argue 
that seeing empty space as space that objects could take up involves seeing it as 
continuous and as having dimensionality, and I explain that one can only represent 
space as continuous and as having dimensionality if one can represent objects as 
space-takers. As such, empty space as space that objects could take up and objects, 
qua space-takers, are co-seen. Call this a ‘no-priority’ view. I close, in §5, by 
outlining two priority views -  views on which either a representation of space, or of 
objects, is prior to the representation of, in the first case, objects and, in the second 
case, space. I raise challenges for both species of priority theorist.
2 .
When you see the tomato, you also see its thingly environment -  the window sill it is 
ripening on, the garden beyond the window pane. More than this though, if what I 
have argued in this thesis is correct, you see the empty space that you see the tomato 
through, and you see, at its boundaries, the see-through space in terms of which those 
boundaries are articulated. What’s more, you see these spaces as continuous with the 
space that the tomato itself occupies.
As I have noted, the idea that objects and empty space are co-seen can be tiaced to 
Ding und Raum, the title ‘Thing and Space signalling how the seeing of one is 
interwoven with the seeing of the other. For the most pait, though, Flusserl talks only
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about space, empty space that is, empty space in a ground sense - is hardly 
mentioned. We can, however, reconstruct the thought he appears to have in mind.11,9
A thing is such that the way it looks to a subject can vary with movement.160 For 
example, when you approach a body, since the visual angle it subtends is increased, it 
may look to you to ‘expand’ on movement. Equivalently, when you retreat, it may 
look to you to grow smaller or ‘contract’, specifically as a function of the reduction in 
the visual angle it subtends. Likewise, in encircling it, it may appear to you as though 
respective sides ‘replace themselves’ so that, to use Husserl’s words, “the sides are 
joined to one another as continuous... they bring to appearance the closedness of the 
nexus of the sides and therefore make the complete corporeal surface appear as a 
“closed” one” (1997, p. 214, §72, lines 30-34). This phenomenology suggests a 
distinction to Husserl. He suggests that an object or corporeality is constituted by 
these patterns of ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’, ‘concealment’ and ‘replacement’ - “to 
be constituted in such a way pertains irrevocably to the essence of a body” (ibid., p. 
219, §72, lines 20-21).161 But empty space, in contrast, admits of no such modification 
- it does not seem, when you move through it, to loom or contract; it does not seem to 
you to have sides that replace each other on movement.
Consider, for example, the case of the sky.
“If, e.g. the blue of the sky appears as a vault and is thereby 
interpreted as a body, then this body must indeed have its front and 
back and its closed surface, which must be consituted in possible 
transitions, in possible cyclical turnings, etc.” (ibid., lines 17-20)
But we hardly understand what it means to suppose that the sky has sides in this 
sense, and the same is true of empty space. Rather, says Husserl, empty space is the 
‘residue’ of visual content which “cannot be accommodated to the yoke ot the 
apprehension of the thing” (ibid., p. 220, §74, lines 6-8). That is to say, empty space
1591 say ‘a p p e a r s ’ for,  as I noted  in my pream ble ,  even Husserl is so m e w h a t  am b iva len t  as 
to w h e th e r  em p ty  sp ace  is seen.
160 H ere  ‘l o o k s ’ sho u ld  be read  com para tively .  Important ly  too, given that such c la im s  shou ld  be 
u n ders to od  as c la im s  ab o u t  h o w  things look to a subject, they are not t ru th-eva luab le .  See  M artin
(2 0 1 0 ).
161 See  M u ll igan  (1995) ,  particularly  §7.3, and D ru m m o n d  (1979) .
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does not seem to you to expand and contract with the coloured expanses that cue 
awareness of the presence of objects.
We can cast this thought intuitively: When you approach an opaque object that you 
are path-connected to, its facing surface subtends a greater visual angle and so may 
look to you to expand . Similarly, when you retreat, that angle is reduced and "what 
is left over — the visual residue — may look to you to be concomitantly augmented 
(viz. there is more of it). In both cases, however, the residue itself neither expands or 
contracts. Still, it is only by seeing the residue, qua residue, that you can apprehend 
the expansion or contraction’ that cues the awareness of a /7 0 /7-residual material 
object, one the appearance of which may look to you to change on your movement 
towards, away from or around it.
Now, in the last chapter I designated episodes of experience that yield such patterns of 
contraction and expansion elastic. And in Chapter Five I defended a related claim; I 
argued that seeing the boundaries of objects involves seeing qualitative heterogeneity
-  some other positivity outwith those bounds (to use Husserl’s idiom, this other 
positivity is the ‘visual residue’ that one co-sees with the object). Critically, however, 
such seeing is extensional. So long as one is in conscious perceptual contact with a 
region where an opaque object is located, together with a visually differentiated 
region ‘outside’ it -  for the purposes of this argument regions that look ‘see-through’
- one sees the boundary of that object. Still, seeing the boundary of the object in this 
sense is distinct from seeing the object as bounded -  that is, as a space-taker. I try to 
bring out the force of this distinction by introducing the Husserlian notion of a 
foundational relation. First though, a brief refinement:
When I refer to ‘space-takers’ I aim to single out objects that, as I will use the phrase, 
have extension or are voluminous. This is to be distinguished from merely being 
extended or having extent. I clarify this thought by considering a question Antony 
Quinton raises concerning Descartes’ res cogitans/res extensa dichotomy.
Quinton asks in what sense extension functions as the maik of the mateiial foi 
Descartes. He reasons that since various geometric types aie in possession ol spatial
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pxopei ties it might be wondered which concept of spatiality Descartes means to 
deploy so as to mark off res extensa from cogitans. For example, a point has the 
propeity of having position, a line has the properties of both position and size, area 
has, in addition, shape, while volume has all of these properties plus the property of 
occupying space. Since all of these are spatial properties, we might ask: Which 
property does Descartes mean to harness?
Position Size Shape Space- occupancy
‘exten t' 'extension  'Volume V / /
Area V / V X
Lines V / X X
Points V X X X
C o n c e p t s  o f  sp a t ia l i ty  f ro m  w e a k  ( inclusive)  to  s t r o n g  (exclusive)
Quinton’s primary exegetical point is that whatever conception of spatiality Descartes 
aims to apply to res extensa, it ought to apply exclusively, for otherwise it would not 
be essential to such res that they have the relevant property.162 But the only spatial 
property that applies exclusively to matter is the property of occupying space (see the 
table above). This leads Quinton to conclude that “voluminousness or geometrical 
solidity” is the essential attribute of matter (1964, p. 335). In line with Quinton then, I 
reserve the term ‘extension’ for objects that have volume - space-takers - while 
‘extent’ may apply to phenomena that are not three-dimensionally extended, such as
this line ________. This much clarified, I return to the primary dialectic and the
Husserlian notion of a foundational relation.
When one sees colour, one also sees extent -  one cannot see colour without seeing 
some extent that is coloured. For this reason, Husserl designates the relation between 
colour and extent as ‘foundational’ -  that is to say, there is a formal or internal 
relation of dependence between them such that one cannot see one without the 
other.163
162 B ern ard  W il l iam s  (1990 . p. 124) clarifies this point:  uN o  property  w hich  essentia l ly  be longs  to o n e  
thing can  non-  essen tia l ly  be long  to another. This follows at o nce  in D escartes  sys tem , b ec au se  he  so 
uses th e  no tion  o f  an essentia l  a t tribute that all o ther  p ioper t ie s  of a thing with  a  g iven  essen t ia l  
a t tribute  m u s t  be modes o f  tha t  at tribute (Princ. 1 53, 56). M atter  o r  body  being  essentia l ly  e x te n d ed ,  
all o th e r  p ro pe rt ie s  o f  m a t te r  are w ay s  o f  being ex tended  .
163 A n  in ternal  re la t ion  is one  that  a lways holds betw een its te rm s M ulligan  (2007 , pp. 4 1 -4 2 ) .
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Now, prima facie, this might appear to contradict the primary claim of this thesis, 
namely that colouiless empty space can be seen. But it seems to me that we can easily 
renegotiate the insight that colour and extent are foundationally related without 
undermining this thought. Importantly, the relatedness that holds between colour and 
extent pei tains only to what Husserl calls ‘moments’, dependent parts o f  a thing as a 
whole (Simons 1982, p. 117, see also p. 124, cf. Mulligan and Smith 1982, p. 41). But 
this being so, while there is a symmetrical relation between colour and extent when 
dependent parts of objects, this need not apply to colour and extension (cf. Mulligan 
2007, p. 74). This, then, is a happy outcome since although one must see something 
through an empty region in order to see it (or as I argued in Chapter Seven, one must 
see empty regions seen through other empty regions as being continuous with those 
regions seen through), the foundational relation between colour and extent need not 
entail that one cannot see colourless extension.
Foundational relations, however, are of various species. The relation ‘is a sibling o f  
is symmetrically co-founded on relata that are siblings. But unlike this relation, the 
relation above is phenomenal -  call it a phenomenal foundational relation. One might 
think of a phenomenal foundational relation as one whereby experience of one 
relatum entails experience of the other; where one relatum is phenomenally 
foundationally related to another, no creature could perceive one and not the other. 
For example, it is essential to the seeing of colour that extent is co-seen; both are 
phenomenally foundationally related. How does this notion apply to the co-seeing of 
empty space and objects?
Consider the case that was detailed in Chapter Six. For M. G. F. Martin, it is essential 
to experience of bodily sensation as whthin that one is aware of a region outwith the 
body which one does experience in the same way. Still, it need not be essential to 
experience of sensation that is of, or pertains to, the body that it is experienced as 
bodily. As Martin writes:
“Suppose we have a creature which has sensations, but has no sense 
of the contrast between itself and the rest of the world. Would its 
sensations be like ours? For instance, suppose we have a kind ol 
jellyfish living in currents good enough to move it towards food and 
away from harm. The jellyfish lacks all sense of its boundaries with
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the rest of the world, and has little time for detecting predators... 
although it has sensations which inform it about its body, it is 
doubtful whethei we should think of it as sensing its body as its 
body”. (1993, p. 211)
Now, above I outlined Husserl s insistence that the perception of objects, unlike the 
peiception of that which is outside’ them, typically empty space, may be 
characterised by phenomenology that we can metaphorically describe in terms of 
patterns of expansion and ‘contraction’, ‘concealment’ and ‘replacement’. I 
explained too why seeing this much involves seeing the visual residue or ‘what is left 
over . But since such seeing is extensional, it thereby follows that whenever one sees 
the boundaries of objects, one co-sees whatever is outwith those boundaries and, in 
many perceptual instances, this is simply space that has the look -  empty space in a 
ground sense. Even so, just as there is a difference between experiencing sensation 
that pertains to the body and experiencing it as bodily, there is a distinction between 
seeing the boundaries which objects have, and seeing those objects as bounded.
When one perceives the boundaries of objects, one necessarily co-perceives that 
which is outside them. As such, it might be supposed that such co-seeing is 
phenomenally foundational. But in contrast, it seems broadly /«essential that one 
perceive those objects as bounded. This suggests the grounds for sorting among two 
species of co-seeing in the case of objects and empty space:
The first, the one I believe Husserl means to isolate, is the extensional co-seeing of 
objects and the visual residue that is left behind when one sees their boundaries - 
since one sees the boundaries of the relevant object, one co-sees their ‘outside’, 
typically space with the look. The second, as I have indicated, involves the co-seeing 
of objects as space-takers and empty space as space which objects could take up.
Now, recall that Noe’s ‘puzzle’ starts from the phenomenological datum that we 
perceive objects as space-takers, despite seeing only their facing surfaces. But il I am 
correct (and the argument that follows is sound), this being the starting point, there is, 
after all, no puzzle to begin with: If one sees the empty space outside the suiface of 
an opaque object as space that an object could take up, and one sees this space as
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continuous with the space that the object occupies, then one sees the object as being 
three-dimensionally extended while only seeing its facing surface.
I consider this claim in more detail below. First, one final point is worth recognising, 
one that nonetheless honours the intuition behind the puzzle.
Co-seeing in the former, Husserlian sense seems to involve a phenomenal 
foundational relation in the manner of colour and extent. If one sees a boundary, one 
cannot fail to see both what is within and without its bounds. But co-seeing in the 
sense I now aim to explore — the second sense - is not phenomenally foundational. 
Just as it is not essential to the phenomenal experience of the boundaries of objects 
that one perceive those objects as bounded, nor is it essential to perceptual experience 
of empty space that one perceive empty regions as space that objects could take up. 1 
henceforth designate this second species of co-seeing non-phenomenally foundational. 
It is conditions on this achievement that I now wish to explore.
3.
It is, I claim, a datum that when you see the tomato, you see the empty space around 
and ‘outside’ it. Moreover, you see the region that the tomato itself occupies as 
continuous with these regions. But this explains why you see the tomato as 
voluminuous. Because you see the empty space around the tomato as continuous and 
as having dimensionality, you see it as space that objects could take up. But since you 
see the region that the tomato itself occupies as continuous with those regions, you 
thereby see the tomato as a space-taker. I argue that seeing this much involves co­
perception in a foundational, albeit non-phenomenal sense.
Since seeing empty space as space that objects could take up involves representing it 
as continuous and as having dimensionality, an achievement which, as I contend, 
involves representing objects as space-takers, you cannot see empty space as space 
that objects could take up without representing objects as thiee-dimensional — both are
co-seen.
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Here, and in § 4 ,1 defend the claim that objects give significance to the continuity and 
dimensionality of space.164
Eveiy place in oui world is spatially related, but how perceivers grasp this fact may 
diffei. Some may only grasp it by moving through it, while others may grasp it 
independently of such movement. In both cases, however, it remains the case that how 
the peiceivei grasps the connectedness of space depends on what use is made of that 
grasp — as John Campbell writes: “we cannot ascribe spatial representations to 
animals in a way that outruns their capacity to give causal significance to the 
representations (1994, p. 25). For example, if a subject grasps the connectedness of 
space by moving through it, then the only way in which that grasp can be put to use is 
by moving through it — movement is constitutive of its grasp. But if a creature can 
make sense of the connectedness of space independently of his or her movement, then 
that grasp can be put to use in different ways, ways that need not involve his or her 
action. Campbell’s thought is that objects have a special role to play in explaining 
how a creature can come to have a grasp of the connectedness of space in this latter 
sense.
For example, when an object moves through space -  an arrow say -  the categorical 
ground for the continuity of its movement, supposing nothing intervenes, is the 
continuity of space. For if space were not continuous, if it were interspersed with 
regions of void, there wouldn’t be the space for it to move through (see Chapter 
One).165 Or imagine a marble rolling along a path, if there were holes in the path, it 
would disappear into their recesses. Hence, seeing the continuity of the marble’s 
movement is evidence for the continuity of the path on which it is rolling, and the 
same is true of the movement of the arrow. Seeing the continuity of the movement of 
an arrow is evidence for the continuity of the space through which it moves, as well as 
evidence that nothing is present at the regions that it passes through that could 
interfere with its movement, for example wind or an apple-tree.166 Importantly,
A large pa r t  o f  the  a rgu m en t  that  fol lows may be recognisib le  in the w ri t ings  ol John  C a m p b e l l ,  
espec ia l ly  C a m p b e l l  (1993 , 1994a, 1994, 20 02 ) .
165 See  C a m p b e l l  (20 02 ,  Chapter  12) for an account o f  the dist inction betw een  d isposit ions  and  the i r  
ca tegor ica l  g ro u n d s .
166 C a m p b e l l  no tes  that  o the r  p h en om ena  can be used to register the co nn ec ted ness  o f  space. H e 
conside rs  a  m a r in e r  “ nav iga t ing  in vast circuit o f  tides, w hirlpools ,  eddies  and cu rren ts” (199 4 .  p. 32),  
su gg es t in g  that  the m ar in e r  could  use these p h en om ena  as a  way o f  registering  the  con n ec ted n e ss  o f
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however, one can only grasp this much -  viz. that the space through which the arrow 
moves is continuous - if one can also distinguish objects from their places. For 
otherwise there can be no appreciation of the movement of the self-same object 
through a region. It might be asked what the conditions on such an achievement are.
On the face of it, it might be thought that merely tracking the features of objects is 
sufficient — for example, the colour or shape of the object. As I will explain, however, 
there aie reasons for thinking that something more is needed. Although a subject may 
repiesent a particular object at a time by representing particular features that the 
object has, it only represents the object as distinct from the place at which it is if it 
can represent the properties the object has as ‘internally causally connected’. I 
elucidate the thinking behind this claim.
How an object is at a time is determined by what external factors are acting on the
object as well as by factors internal to the object. For example, if an egg falls onto a
concrete floor, the shell is likely to crack, and coming into contact with the concrete 
floor, an external factor, causally explains why -  viz. the floor is concrete. But there 
are factors internal to the egg that are relevant too -  the fragility of the shell for 
example. Indeed, the fragility of the shell, a property of the egg before the fall, is a 
partial determinant of the way it is now, for had it not been the case that the shell was 
fragile, it would not have cracked. Campbell supposes that because the condition of 
objects at a time is not wholly determined by external factors, objects are ‘internally 
causally connected’. That is to say, if there is some way that an object was at an 
earlier time that causally determines how it is now, then that object is internally 
causally connected.
As a way of bringing this notion into view, Campbell offers the following example by 
way of contrast:
“The pool of light thrown by a projector onto a wall is not causally
structured in the way that a physical object is. It is not internally
space. E q u iv a le n t  p h en o m e na ,  he  suggests ,  could be used on land -  as w hen  w e  w atch  the  e l lec t s  of  
an e a r th q u a k e ” (p. 33),  b u t  “ such p h en o m e n a  are no t  suffic iently  pervasive  in ou r  exp e r ie n ce  to  p ro v id e  
the full s t ren g th  o f  o u r  grasp  o f  the theoretical s ignif icance o f  the conn ec ted ness  o f  the  space  w e 
o c c u p y ” .
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causally connected over time, the way the pool of light is at one time 
oes not have its earlier condition as a causal determinant, its 
condition is determined always by the contemporaneous state of the 
projector and the surroundings”. (1993, p. 8)
So why are objects special?
Objects are not simply property instances; they have more than one property. What's 
more, though the condition of an object at a time is partially determined by how it was 
earlier, how it was earlier itself involves a complex of internal properties, themselves 
inter-related. For example the shell is not only fragile but ovoid, and this explains why 
it can roll along the ground. But naturally having this disposition depends on the shell 
being roughly intact, which in turn explains why the shattered egg on the concrete 
floor no longer has it -  the categorical ground for the disposition, that of being ovoid­
shaped, no longer exists, and it no longer exists not only due to external factors, 
including the nature of the floor, but also because of the fragility of the shell. Hence, 
how an object is at a time, in addition to external factors, depends not merely on 
factors internal to the object, but on how those factors are (or in the case of the 
shattered egg were) inter-connected.
Why should representing objects as internally causally connected help give 
significance to the continuity of space independently of one’s movement through it? 
Campbell’s idea is that because objects are internally causally connected, a grasp of 
this concomitantly allows us to distinguish the external factors that contribute to how 
an object is at a time from the internal factors or properties which those external 
factors are apt to act on or affect. I spell this notion out.
When objects move through space, external factors are apt to affect them -  namely, 
whatever it is that occupies the places the object passes through (for example, rain), or 
indeed fails to pass through (an apple tree). But this means that a grasp ot how an 
object is at a time can help determine how things are at the place where the object is 
(i.e. wet or impenetrable). Moreover, how an object changes over an interval of time 
can help confer an order on how things are at the places that the object has passed 
through, which in turn explains the current condition of the object and the tiajectory it 
has taken. We may, for example, look to the occupants of the places it has passed
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thiough to explain why it is wet. But likewise, we might look to the absence of objects 
at places, or as 1 have argued in this thesis, the shape of space.
So, representing objects as internally causally connected helps sort external factors 
that are apt to affect the object at a time from internal factors which also determine 
how the object is at a time (Campbell 1994, pp. 28-29). Hence, if a subject fails to 
represent objects as internally connected, it cannot sort internal causal determinants 
from external determinants, even though it may be capable of tracking the object by 
representing salient properties that the object has -  for example its colour or shape. 
But, as such, without representing objects as internally causally connected, the subject 
cannot parse objects from their places.167
Now, so far I have considered how an appreciation of the way in which an object 
changes over an interval of time can help confer an order on how things are at the 
places that the object has passed through, as well as give significance to the continuity 
of the space moved through. How does this compare to cases where the order of 
places and the continuity of space is given significance through the subject’s own 
movement through it?
As pointed out above, if a subject grasps the connectedness of space by moving 
through it, then the continuity of space can only be registered in terms of the 
continuity of that movement. Analagously, the only way in which order can be 
conferred on places is by appeal to the order of experiences had by moving through 
them (see also Evans 1985, p. 277).
This, then, is distinct from cases in which the movement of objects through space can 
be used to confer significance on the ordering of places and, attendantly, the 
continuity of space. We can bring out the force of this distinction when we recognise 
that, phenomenally individuated, both kinds of experienceis may have 
indistinguishable experiences. For example, both experiencers may see an opaque 
object, extensionally construed, fly over a fence; both may see the object and the see-
167 A s  C u ss in s  (199 2 ,  p. 667)  writes:  “ A placing o f  features is not a re fe rence  to a p lace  o f  fea tu re s” .
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through space around it that it progressively moves through. Even so, there is a 
difference between the two cases.
In the second case, assuming that the relevant object is represented as internally 
causally connected, the content of the experience is not exhausted by what is 
phenomenally given at a time. For when a subject can be credited with such a grasp, it 
can appreciate that how an object is at a time is a function of how it was earlier. But 
as such, the content of the experience at a time overflows what is phenomenally given 
-  it cannot be reduced to phenomenal experience at a time. Hence, while both subjects 
may see the empty space that surrounds the object, the subject that fails to represent 
the object as internally causally connected cannot appreciate the continuity of that 
space ju s t by looking (and perceiving the passage of the object through it). Rather 
such a subject, in order to grasp the continuity of space, must itself move. But this 
being so, such a subject’s counterfactual sensitivity to the emptiness of empty space is 
exhausted by its moving through it. Such a subject, then, does not see empty space as 
space where objects could be seen but aren’t.
I recap this argument: A subject that cannot represent objects as internally connected 
cannot parse objects from their places. But since it cannot parse objects from their 
places, it cannot represent the continuity of space independently of its movement 
through it. But as such, it cannot represent empty space as space that objects could 
take up.
Now, as I noted, solutions to the puzzle may likewise seek to augment perceptual 
content -  “likewise” because, as I have said, experiences that represent objects as 
internally causally comiected represent more than is sensorily ‘given’ in experience at 
a time. But the difference in the account I am urging is that there is no puzzle to begin 
with, and this just flows from phenomenology.
When one sees the tomato one also sees the see-through space ‘outside’ it. What’s 
more, one perceives this space as having extension and as being continuous with the 
space that the tomato takes up. But this in turn suggests a reification I ought to make,
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one which also explains further at what point the structural and direct theorists may 
diverge:
When one sees the space that one is in as a sub-part of a larger space that has that sub- 
region as a part, one sees empty space as continuous, and arguably this explains how 
one can have a sense, albeit implicitly, of one’s sensory limitations - one grasps the 
fact that there is more to be sensed that is currently being sensed. But as such, one is 
aware of regions beyond the bounds of sense which are not currently being perceived. 
Insofar as one is aware of them, then, one might say that such regions are not co­
perceived, but co-present in experience. In Ideas, Husserl describes the co-present as 
a “constant halo” around the field of perception:
“it is not necessary that [...] objects be found directly in my field of 
perception. Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects 
are there for me as determinate, as more or less well known, without 
being themselves perceived, indeed, present in any other mode of 
intuition. I can let my attention wander away from the writing table 
which was just now seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts 
of the room which are behing my back, to the verandah, into the 
garden, to the children in the arbour, etc., to all the Objects I directly 
“know o f ’ as being there and here in the surroundings of which there 
is also consciousness”. (1983, p. 52, §27)
Now, I have argued that a condition on seeing space as continuous is that one 
represent objects as internally causally connected. But if this is correct, then this 
suggests that to experience regions outwith the bounds of sense as co-present, one 
must be able to represent objects as internally connected. If  so, this would also explain 
why one can attendantly see empty regions within those bounds as space that objects 
could take up. In the next section, I clarify the connection between representing 
objects as internally causally connected and as taking up space. For the moment, 
consider how far we have come:
As I have argued, there are two kinds of co-perception in the case of objects and 
empty space. In this section, I have focussed mostly on the second -  conditions on the 
perception of empty space as space that objects can take up. If what I have argued in 
this thesis is correct, however, there could well be subjects which, although they see 
scc-through space and so co-perceive in the first sense, fail to co-perceive in the
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second. That is, they fail to see empty space as continuous, and so lack an awareness 
of regions of space that exist without the bounds of sense. Naturally, then, for such a 
subject the puzzle does not arise. But, as I am urging, nor does it arise in the case we 
are in. Since we see the space outside the tomato as space that objects could take up -  
I take this as a phenomenological datum - we also see the region of space that the 
tomato occupies and which is continuous with those ‘outside’ regions as extended.
4.
So far I have argued that a subject that can represent objects as internally causally 
connected can appreciate both the continuity of space, and can attribute an order to 
places, independently of its own movement. In this section I aim to explain why 
representing objects as internally causally connected involves representing them as 
space-takers. This, in turn, further clarifies the second species of co-seeing I aim to 
delineate. First, though, I explain how, in addition to conferring significance on the 
continuity of space, objects also confer significance on its dimensionality.
It follows from what I have argued above that a subject that merely tracks features can 
have no counterfactual awareness of places where features could have been but aren’t. 
For unless the creature can parse the feature from its location, it cannot represent 
those features as existing at places and persisting through time and so as possibly 
being elsewhere at some other time. As I have explained, however, because objects 
are bundles of internally causally connected features, they can be parsed from their 
places. But this explains how objects can give signifance to the dimensionality of 
empty space.
The direction that an object takes at a time is contingent; instead of moving up, an 
object may have moved down, or to the left say. But naturally an object can only 
move through space in this way i f  there is the space fo r  it to move through. Since, 
however, objects can move through space in this way -  viz. in three dimensions - 
when they move through space, providing, of course, they can be parsed from their 
places, they reveal its dimensionality.
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So why should representing objects as internally causally connected involve 
representing them as space-takers?
As I have indicated, when one represents an object as internally causally connected 
one can sort internal from external causal determinants. What’s more, one can 
appreciate that where an object is at a time is contingent -  it could have been 
elsewhere. So treating an object in this way -  i.e. as at a place - involves conceiving it 
as a space-taker.168
There is, however, a deeper reason as to why being at a place involves taking up 
space, one that suggests not merely that representing objects as internally causally 
connected involves representing them as space-takers, but that a condition on 
representing objects as space-takers is that there are objects that take up space.
Objects have primary properties, where this notion is, as Evans notes, “extremely 
heterogeneous”. Still, he writes:
“What is important. . . is that the properties constitutive of the idea 
o f material substance as space-occupying stu ff should be 
acknowledged to be primary.” (1985, p. 269)
Why should the idea of space-occupying stuff be acknowledged as ‘primary’?
Recall, Quinton had applied an exclusivity criterion to establish that voluminosity or 
“geometrical solidity” is the essential attribute of matter. Evans, in contrast, has not so 
much a criterion as an argument as to why. Unlike secondary properties, which are 
sensory (1985, p. 268), primary properties are non-sensory. And they are non-sensory, 
because to master the concept of space-occupancy, one must be able to implicitly 
grasp a set of interconnected principles which make up a theory -  for example, the 
conservation of matter in different shapes, how objects compete for occupancy of 
positions in space, how the resistance of one body may afford the movement of
168 Consider, by contrast,  the case o f  num bers.  We d o n ' t  conceive o f  num bers  as being capable  o f  be ing
at a p lace -  we d o n ’t know  w hat it means to suppose that where a num ber  is at a t im e is contingent, o r
indeed that it could som eh ow  be affected from outwith. But num bers  a ren ’t space- takers .
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another, and so on (ibid., p. 269). It is important to recognise the interconnectedness of 
these principles.
The concept of space-occupancy is theoretical inasmuch as it requires a holistic grasp 
of a set of interconnected principles that form a primitive mechanics. But when one 
grasps the interconnectedness of these, one also grasps the causal interconnectedness 
of objects. For example, you wouldn’t be able to appreciate the principle of the 
conservation of matter in different shapes if you weren’t able to appreciate the identity 
of some piece of matter, qua an object, through time, but nor would you be able to 
appreciate the identity of an object through time if you couldn’t grasp the principle of 
the conservation of matter in different shapes. But critically, none of this could be 
grasped or apprehended if there were no objects of which all of the above principles 
hold, since it is only through the causal interconnectedness of objects that the theory 
itself can be organized.
This, then, suggests a further consequence, something that we have noted earlier.
Evans writes:
“it does not appear to be possible to regard the conception of the 
shape of a material thing -  with all the propositions about its 
characteristic behaviour and interaction with other bodies which that 
implies -  as the same as whatever shape concepts might be grounded 
in the colour mosaic thought to be given in immediate visual 
experience”, (ibid., p. 270)
But, after Quinton, we have already observed this much. The shape concepts of being 
extended and having extension are distinct. It is hardly surprising, then, that one 
cannot extract the notion of space-occupancy, which is theoretical, from visual 
experience at a time. As I have noted, when a subject represents an object as a space- 
taker, that object is represented as internally causally connected. But as such, the 
content of the experience at a time overflows what is phenomenally given at that time 
-  it cannot be reduced to visual experience at a time. This returns us, once more, to 
the puzzle.
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Since we see the empty space ‘outside’ the tomato as space that objects could take up, 
and since we see the space the tomato occupies as continous with those regions, we 
see the tomato as a space-taker; this is why there is no puzzle to begin with.
Still, as I have urged, we can nevertheless honour the intuition behind the puzzle. 
Conceiving of empty space as space that objects could take up involves conceiving of 
objects as space-takers, and conceiving of objects as space-takers involves shape 
concepts that are distinct from those that might be thought to be grounded in visual 
phenomenal experience at a time.
Yet importantly, as I have also explained, seeing objects as space-takers and empty 
space as space that objects could take up is non-phenomenally foundational. Hence, 
there could well be creatures that see empty space without yet seeing it as space that 
objects could take up.
5.
The position I have advanced in this chapter might be called a ‘no-priority’ view. In 
both species of co-seeing, there is no seeing of objects without a seeing of empty 
space -  both are co-seen. My final task, then, is to raise challenges for priority views; 
views on which a representation of space is logically prior to a representation of the 
intrinsic properties of objects, or on which a representation of objects is prior to a 
representation of space.
1. T he  S p a ce -F irs t View  
Against the co-seeing claim, it might be argued that to grasp the dimensionality of 
objects one has to conceive of space. Here, the thought is that a conception of space is 
what grounds the ability to conceive of objects as visible from various angles or 
perspectives.169 As such, the representation of space assumed is one whereby its
169 F o r  ex a m p le ,  S c he l le nb erg  (20 07 ,  p. 614)  c la im s tha t  ‘■perceiving in tr ins ic  spat ial  p rop e r t ie s  r eq u ire s  
tha t  o b jec ts  are p e rce iv ed  as perceivable f rom  poin ts  o f  v iew  o th e r  than  o n e ’s o w n ’’, w h e re  th is  
requ ire s  that  ;‘a su b jec t  m u s t  hav e  a p ractica l  co n cep tio n  o f  space  tha t  invo lves  u n d e r s ta n d in g  th a t  th e re  
are d i f fe ren t  po ss ib le  p e rspec t iv es  on any th ree -d im ens io na l  s p a c e - o c c u p ie r ” .
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continuity is already represented. For otherwise how would one be able to conceive of 
the region as subsuming the various positions that one could take up so as to view the 
object from different angles, itself, on this view, a condition on being able to conceive 
of an object as taking up space? The emphasis, then, is on the priority of the 
representation of space over the representation of objects qua space-takers.
Now, as I have argued, representing space as continuous, independently of the 
continuity of one’s own movement through it, requires, concomitantly, a 
representation of the internal causal comiectedness of objects. This is because when 
one represents the internal causal connectedness of objects, one can represent a 
moving object as moving through space over time, and the mere seeing of objects 
moving through space is not sufficient -  not only must one see objects that are 
internally causally connected, one must represent them as such; as I have argued, 
when one represents objects as internally causally connected, one can parse those 
objects from their places, and so conceive of them, implicitly, as taking up space.
The challenge for the space-first priority theorist, then, is to explain how space can be 
represented as continuous, independently of the continuity of a subject’s movement 
through it, without making a non-virtuous appeal to space-takers.
2. The P riority o f  Objects View 
Unlike the space-first priority theorist, the objects-first theorist might insist that since 
objects give significance to the continuity and dimensionality of space, objects must 
be represented prior to representing space. There are, however, empirically motivated 
reasons to doubt the correctness of this view.
A creature may be able to represent a particular space through its own movement, 
while nonetheless failing to parse objects from their places. Instead the relevant 
representation, encoded as a network of paths, may be calibrated using exocentric or 
geocentric frames of reference -  those centred on landmarks, the horizon or stars. 
There is robust empirical support for such representation,170 and its philosophical
170 For an excellen t review o f  empirical neuroscientific work in this area see M cN augh ton  et al. (2006).
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significance has been explored by, among others, Campbell (especially Campbell 
1993, 1995). But my emphasis is anyway a little different for I have sought to explore 
conditions not on representing or conceiving of space, but on perceiving empty space.
I have argued we can recognise two kinds of co-seeing in the case of objects and 
empty space. Yet only the second, non-phenomenaI species of co-seeing requires the 
representation of objects as space-takers. But as such, if the foregoing is correct, a 
theoretical space is made in the philosophical literature on spatial experience for a 
subject whose experience of the world has been so far undertheorised -  one that can 
see empty space, without yet seeing it as space that could be filled
Conclusions
to see through
To continue to watch or take part in (a matter) until the end 
(cf. to see out 3 at Phrasal verbs).
- The Oxford English D ictionary
I have raised an argument for the visibility of Euclidean empty space, and I have 
suggested that it has a look -  it looks ‘clear’ and ‘see-through’. I have proposed that 
the intelligibility of such looks claims might be counted as transcendental evidence for 
our seeing empty space (Chapter Three). In Chapter Six, I set out a broadly parallel 
argument for tactual awareness, and in Chapter Seven I harnessed these findings to 
provide a speculative account of seeing space in mirrors.
In addition, I have shown that since empty space has a kind of efficacy that flows 
from its shape (Chapter Two), it may not, after all, elude the Causal Theory of 
Perception. Empty regions explain locometrically. What’s more, since the shape of 
space determines how it appears, the shape of space is genuinely causally explanatory 
of its appearance, and not in a negatively efficacious way (Chapter Four).
I have also argued against treating the perception of empty space as a species of 
absence perception, and I have shown in what sense the Direct View I have defended 
differs from the Structural View, even while, at the level of descriptive 
phenomenology, they may be reconciled (Chapter Five); we co-see objects and empty 
space in both senses detailed in Chapter Eight.
Notably, however, many of these conclusions flow from the assumption of 
Absolutism (Chapter One). But to this extent, the Direct View, unlike the Structural 
View, does not have the advantage of metaphysical agnosticism. Still, since it is 
possible that Absolutism is true, this, I take it, is not yet a disadvantage.
In particular, the Direct View makes plausible an intermediate case:
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On the Direct View, we can grant that subjects that fail to represent objects as space- 
takers, and those that cannot yet represent the connectedness of space independently 
of their own movement through it, can nonetheless see empty space. But this being so, 
perceiving empty space is logically distinct both from representing space as 
continuous independently of one’s movement through it, and from conceiving of it as 
empty.
Rather, as I have tried to urge, seeing empty space simply involves seeing the see- 
through space ‘outside’ objects, and the empty space through which they are seen.
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